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under the

~RxxxkxxxkmeHxxaxxxRx

religious EXHXR clauseJ was initially

held for consdieration in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.602 and then

--------....

remanded to the Supreme Court of South Carolina for reconsideration in
light of th~ourt's decision in Lemon and its companion cases. -~ j . ~.
hr..j n otu •
lr
I rec.o-rJS :JeveJ o...,._J if.s. Jec.is io~ iS c....(Jpe..o-Le J •
South Carolina passed an Act to provide financing for insti-

C.Otlrt

tutions of higher learning throughx the state's issuance of revenue bon&
2RRXXRX~RHaRHK~X~X~KXXKX~RXXRgR

The overall
funds

~XH

purpose of the Act is to permit colleges to borrow

advantageously

x by

using the State's income tax free basis as XR

relates to the issuance of bonds.
The resp., Baptist College of Charleston,

:R:kkXJttldtfi!l!!!Eisi:Jd~

has petitioned the state revenue bond Authority under the Actxee seeking the preliminary approval of the Autpority for the issuance of 3 and
a half milllion assxx dollars in revenue bonds so that the college may
pay off certain outstanding indebtedness incnrred in the purchase
of certain equipment ad trailers,

~x ~XH

purchase school equipment

and sxkex make other capital improvements, and

xe~

refund certain other

indebtedness.
In accordanc8 with the provisions of the Act, the College

~xs~xex

proposes to convey substantially all its campus to the state of S.C.

{ at no cost. The Authority would then lease the property so conveyed

---------

back to the College under a lease agreement whereby the College would
be obligated to operate xsx and maintain it as an institution of higher
learning and to pay to the Authrity rentals in such amount as to meet
the principal and interest as they become due on the proposed revenue
bonds.
The question, of course, is whether the advantages the Baptist
College derives from use of trestatesxx power to issue low interest
revenue bonds(low interest because interest and dividends from the
bonds are tax-free to bondholders) so KXE entangles the state in the
administration£ of tre College as to violate treFirst ' Amendment.
In Lemon,

an action was brought

agai~

state officials

kx~

by Penn.

residentg Ej challenging the constitutionality of a statute which
provided for state reimbursement of non-publiv

~xsxx~

elementary and secondary

schools ase for the cost of teacher's salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials

in~ertain

specified XHkjeExX seculaE subjects, but prok

hibiting reimbursement for any course that contained any subject mateer
expressing any religious teaching or xxx training. The Court held that
the Penn. statute was unconstitutional under the religion EXXX clause

of the First Amendment as fostering

exc~ssive

entanglement between govt.

and religion. In so holding, The Court considered a wide variety of
factors including (1) the religious purpose and operation £ of elem-

..-------

reli~

entary and secondary schools (2) the enhancement of the process of
ious indoctrination resulting from the impressionable age of the

EkxxixR

children enrolled, particularly in elementary schomls(3)the necessity
of state surveillance to insure that teachers who were subject to
control

by religious

~k

orgamizations,~

ERRKXR

observed the restrictions to

teach only purely secular subjects (4) the state's examination of the
parochial schools finamcial

recoras to

XRB

HRKRXXm

determine which

expenditures were religious and which were secular.

One thing should

be pointed out: under Lemon, the Court devised a stringent "entanglemant
test based on multiple factors but it did not outlaw entirely state
aid to parochial schools.
The South CArolina court was thus left with the task of
applying to

xxxx the state aid process described above the test enun-

ciated by the Court in Lemon. It
ground that the "state plays a

ERREXHHRH

pxxx

upheld the aid

on the

passive and very limited role in

the implementation of thek Act, serving principally as a mi mere
conduit through whichkx institutions may borrow funds for the purposes
of the Act of a tax-free basis. Theee is in no sense a banking relationship between the Authority and institutions which utilize the Act."

~

The~ court

47

concluded that thek

ERxxRgR

state would not become too

..

entangled in the administration of the College, claiming thar the basic
function of the Authrity is "to see that religion is not promoted on KE
the leased premises, and that fees are charged

------

XHHHXX

sufficient to

meet the bond payments.

~

I

Appellants challenge this interpretation of the Act, sgating that
the "Authority is under strong motivation, both because of xx its duty
to the bondholders and its duty to the state, to be at all times
concerned with the College and itsx financial condition."
I do not think the South ~rolina court's characterization of
the Act an unreasonble one, thoughx admittedly, under this Act there
is the temptation for the State to supervise the College's operations
to make certain its obligations to bondholders might be met. But the
· financing here does not appear to be in the sensitive area of textbooks

------------------------------------------------------As a realistic matter, I

and teacher's salaries as in Lemon. xx

do not

believe this arrangement really threatens state-chruch separation and
I also do not think the Court wants to take anotther case of this nature
so soon after Lemon.

AFFIRM

JHW

/5::{J
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Justice Powell: '

L~ ,
~ z;:;:;;:.:r-

Y-o

~- ~

w-1< () ~

I0/<1/""-'

~ ~ ._,. ~ ~~ ~

Here are my relists for the confe~e this Friday. In most
cases I have written

a~xextex

a full cert note and wish to stand

by what I have said. A good many of

t~esse

these cases were relisted

to allow Douglas to write. I do not think you need to read over
all the

H

cert notes as you voted correctly the first time and

would not wish to change your vote. I saw no case where you had a
substantial auestion you wish me to

~BS

consider. I

i~~iM~Hxt~HSHX

give you these cases merely for your convenience. After you have

,.,

finished, if you give them to Larry, they can then be included in the
cert book . . conference.
JHW
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Notes on No. 71-1523, Hunt v. McNair
WCK
February 21, 1973
As I explained yesterday, this field is a
new one for me, and I come to it without strong
predispositions reagarding whether assistance of
the kind at issue here violates the Establishment
Clause.

It may be useful for you, as it was for

me, to go quickly through the major Establishment
Clause cases decided prior to Lemon and Tilton.
In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1(1947),
the Court upheld a state statute providing bus
transportation for
In Board of
the loan of textbooks on secular subjects to
parochial school children.

And in Walz v. Tax Comm'n,

397 U.S.664(1970), the Court held that the granting of
a property tax exemption to religious institutions
did not vkiate the Establishment Clause, although
it heavily emphasized the strong historical roots of
such exemptions.

I do not find much guidance for

the present case in Everson or Allen-"both involved
direct payments or services to children and both
were clearly non-sectarian.
in Walz.

Nor do I find much guidance

In a sense, Walz cuts both ways--the Court

did allow some aid to the institutions rather than
to studexnts but relied in large part on the history
of tax exemptions.

The absence of such a history in

the present case weighs in against the state claim.

-2-

;!,
With these cases to the side,then, the problem
turns primarily on the interpretation of Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403

u.s.

u.s.

672(1971).

opinion.
acts.

602(1971), and of Tilton v. Richardson, 403
In Lemon, The

C~ief

wrote the Court's

At issue there were two state educational

The Rhode Island act authorizes state officials

to subsidize the salaries of certain teachers in
certain nonpublic elementary schools in an amount
not to exceed 15% pf the teacher's salary.

Under

thad tl.D)

the terms of the statute, the teacher

~gree

not

to teach courses in religion and to use only teaching
materials which are used in public schools.
in which the teacher

teache~e

The school

one at which

per"pupil expenditures on the secular aspects of education

~ot exceed those in the average public school.
The Pennsylvania act authorized state officials to
reimburse nonpublic schools for teacher's salaries,
textbooks and instructional materials in certain
secualr subjects.

Textbooks and material• s were subject

to approval by state officials, and the nonpublic
schools 0 accounting was subject to state audit.
The opinion summarized the prior cases and
stated the "tests"•
"Three • • • tests may be gleaned fom our
cases. First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its
prin~ipal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion , • • • ;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion 8 , " at 613

-3-

Evaluating the Rhode Island program in terms of
these tests, the Court first examined the nature of
the elementary schools in question, noting that the
school buildings contained religious symbols throughout,
that religion was taught directly for about thirty
minutes per day, that there were religiously oriented
and apparently compulsory

,.

extracu~icular

activities,

that two-thirds of the teachers were nuns, and
that the atmosphere was heavily religious.

The Court

quoted the district court 9 s finding that the
schools were "a powerful vehicle for transmitting
the Catholic faith to the next geeration". at 616.

"LV he

considerable religious activities of these

schools led the legislature to provide for careful
governmental controls and surveillance by state
authoriites in order to ensure that state aid supports
only secular instruction." at 616.

The Court pointed

out that principals and nuns were appointed by
religimus orders and bishops and that teachers were
hired by parish priests, and mentioned that a
school handbook stated . . that "religious formation
is not limited to formal courses; nor is it restricted
tBi a single subject area."

In striking down the

statute, though, the Court did not assume that the
schools would be unable to separate religious from secular,
but relied on the fact that the state would be forced,

-4-

in order effectively to police the use of the funds,
t~o

evaluate school programs in terms of religious

or secular content, not only to insure that teachers
abide by their commitments but to ascertain whether
a nonpublic school spends less per p4il on secular
instruction than does the average public school.
The Court's

anal~sl

of the Pennsylvania

program was much briefer because it relied heavily,
by implication,on its analysis of the Rhode Island
statute.

The Court stateda
The history of government grants of a continuing
cash . . . , subsidy indicates that such programs
have almost always been accompanied by varying
measures of control and surveillance. The
government cash grants before us now provide
no basis for predicting that comprehensive
measures of surveillance and controls will
not follow. In particular, the government's
post-audit power to inspect and evaluate
a church"related school's financial records
and to determine which expenditures are religious
and which are secular creates an• intimate and
continuing relationship between church and state." at 621-22.
The Court closed with two other points.

The

first was that the very fact that aid to parochial
schools was becoming a political football made the
degree of entanglement greater.

The other was that

Walz could be distinguished onthe ground that the
property tax exemption was unlikely to be a first step
toward greater involvement since it represented 200
years of consistent practice.
The thrust of the Chief 8 s opinion in Lemon is,

- ·5 -

I think, that where the state deals with a heavily
religious institutiont , the Establishment Clause
is all but inevitably violated because in order to
insure that public money is not being spent for
religious purposes a State must become entangled
in the operation of the religious institution.
Douglas, with whom Black and Marshall joined,
wrote a concurrence which contains a number of intertesting
tidbits about parochial education and the views of
Jefferson but is otherwise not helpful.

Justice

Brennan wrote a concurrence, which I will discuss
below , and Justice White concurred as to the Pennsylvania
statute, but dissented as to the Rhode Island statute,
and I will discuss this opinion below also.

.

::rr

In Tilton, the Chief wrote a plurality opinion,
which was joined by Harlan, Stewart and Blackmun.
That case involved the constitutionality of Title
I of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963,
a federal act.

The Act authorized construction

grants to nonpublic institutions of higher education,
but excluded from

a eligibility

any building

to be used for I religious instruction or worship.
The Commissioner of Education required applicant
institutions to agree not to use any

fa~ilities

constructed with Title I money for any religious
purpose , the agreement to continue for twenty years on

-6-

pain of forfeiture,

"During the 20-year period, the

statutory restrictions are enforced by the Office of
Education primarily by way of on-site inspections,"
at 675,
Again applying the three-pronged test, the

opinion

fo~t

was secular,

the purpose of the legislation

The opinion then

measur~the

primary

effect of the aid on those four institutions whose
receipt of aid was challenged in that case,
"The institutions presented evidence that there
had been no religious services or worship
in the federally financed facilities, that
there are no religious symbols or• plaques
in or on them, and that they had . . .
been used solely for nonreligious purposes."
at 680,
tnere was evidence that certain institutional

Althou~h

f•c fi'J

religious restrictions on what might be
taught, there was other evidence that these restrictions
were nmt enforced in practice.

Becaus.e it might

have the primary effect of fostering religion, however,
the opinion invalidated the 20-year limitation•
on the no-religious-use

cove ~ ant,

while finding

that the primary effect of the saatute • as a whole
would not be to promote religion,

As to the third

prong of the test, the degree of state entanglement,
the

opinion distinguished the colleges

involved there from the elementary schools involved
in Lemon,

-7-

"There is sa ubstance to the contention that
college students are less impressionable
and less suseeptible to religious indoctrination."
and
"Furthermore, by their very nature, collge
and postgraduate courses tend to limitll
the opportunities for sectarian influence
by virtut e of their own internal disciplines."
While acknowledging that all four colleges required
students to take courses in theoj logy, the opinion
concluded that"religious indoctrination is not a
substantial purpose or activity" of these colleges.
The need for surveillance was correspondingly reduced:
"the Government aid here is a one-time, singlepurpose construction grant. There are nojV
continuing financial audits, and no governmental
analysis of an institution ' s expenditures
on secular as distinguished f trom religious
activities." at 688.
The Act was held to be constitutional .
Justice White supplied the fifth vote.

His

opinion addressed all three of the Pennsylvania ,
Rhode Island, and federal statutes.

While I have

some difficulty understanding how he would analyse
the problem presented, I infer that he '\Clt?Uld approve1
more aid than would the Chief.

White dissented as

to the Rhode Island statute, and in so doing pointed
out that the district court make expres s findings
that "on the evidence before it none jof the
teachers involved mixed religious and secular instruction".
at 666.

This finding , and the fact that the Court p* r&

1

-8-

chose to ignore it in favor of a sort of cof mposite
model of the Catholic elementary school, confirmed
his feeling that the degree of entanglement
was no greater in Rhode Island than under the federal
statute.

He notes, interestingly, that in Tilton,

the Chief looked specifically at the evidence before
the Court on four specific schools rather than look
to a sort of composite religious college.
too that the federal enforcement regime

He notes
might

well involve fully as much inspection as the state
scheme. For reasons which are n<lrt entirely clear, his
solution would have been to uphold both.
Justice Brennan would have ruled all three
statutes unconstitutional.

His opinion shares White's

recognition that the Chief was distorting the facts
in order to create an appearance of a sharp disjunction
between the state and federal programs.

His test would

be whether the program is in fact a subsidy to a
sectarian institution.

In his view, it is obvious

that the giving of aid to a religious institution
for use in secular pursuits frees the institution to
spend more of its own resources on religious matters.
In his view, Allen add Everson are distinguishable
because the aid there ran directly to the students
rather than to the institutions;
on historixcal grounds,

Walz is distinguishable

-9-

~

In Tilton, finally, Douglas, with
and Marshall joined, dissented.

who~Brennan

Again, the opinion

is not very helpful.
III.
What, then, is the state of the law after
Lemon and Tilton?

The Chief's entanglement theory

had seven votes in Lemon(although three of the seven
also concurred), but only four votes in Tilton.
Lemon, then, would seem to be gospel, and Tilton
only the Chiefvs commentary on the gospel.

The

problem in the present case is to define the Tilton
exception to the general Lemon • rule that aid to
a specifically religious institution is
by the Establishment clause.

pro~ scribed

The exc~tion has at

least these components: 1) that the institution be
a college or university; 2) that the degree of
surveillance be minimal.
Here, the papers before us• are not particularly
helpful in defining the nature of the institution,
We do know that it is a college, but we do not know
what sort of college, and there presumably are
colleges(and I would

gue~that

some of them are

Baptist colleges) which have a very heavy religious
program.

We do know, though, that only

student body is Baptist, Appendix at 39.

6~/o

of the

... lQ ...

I would have thought . . . . . in view of the Lemon
opinion's heavy emphasis on the nature of the
institutions being aided, and Tilton°s reservation
of judgment as to colleges other than the four before
it, tbat the South Carolina court would have given us
more information.

If the Court affirms the judgment,

this lack of information will make it very difficult
to state affirmatively that religion does not pervade
the college.

And since, under the Chief's approach,

the degree of presumed entanglement corresponds to
to degree of religious emphasis, it is diff- icult here
to ascertain the degree of presumed entanglement.
It may be, however, that the terms of the
statute are so inartfully drawn that the Court simply
cannot conclude that there is not grave potential for
actual as opposed to presumed entanglement.

On page

41 of the Jurisdictional Statement, for example, is
the following statement of powers:
"The authority may fix, revise, charge and
collect rates, rents, fees and charges for the
use of and for the services furnished or to be
furnished by each project."
And at J.S. page 36, the authority is given power:
"to establish rules arrl regulations for the
use of aa project or any portion thereof and
to designate a participating institution for
higher education as its agent to establish
rules and regulations for the use of a
project undertaken for such participating
institution for higher education."
Furthermore, the performance of these duties is not

-11-

simply discretionary at the option of the authority, but
may be compelled at the instance of any holder of
revenue bonds. J.S., page 43.
In addition to these financial responsibilities,
the authority requires that the institution execute
a covenant to not use the leased land or facilities
thereon for religious pruposes. J.S. 49.

Furthermore,

"1f;

,,Eacrh..ease Agreement shall contain a provision
permitting the Authority or any agent of the
Authority to conduct such inspections as may
be necessary to determine whether the leased
premises, or any portion thereof • • • is
being used or has been used for sectarian
instruction or as a place of religious worship
•••• " J.S., at 49.
And

, these responsibilities may be enforced at the

instance of any taxpayer of South Carolina. J.S., at 49.
While the state(the authority) may constitute
a bank as its agent for these purposes, or more
exactly as a trustee for thew. bondholders, I do not
think that this insulates the state from legal
responsibility, as,I think, is

de~nstrated

by the

fact that the device would not suffice
the case of the construction of a church.

in
Surely,

the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island schemes would not
have been saved by the designation of a trustee to
administer the state programs.
In short, my present view is that the South
Carolina scheme violates the Establishment Clause.
While a lawyer might say that the chances of deep

-12-

entanglement are not as a practical matter very

great~

the face of the statute and the regulations confers
greaJ t and continuing responsitility on the state for
the supervision of the
and the

col~ege's

financial practices

monitoring of its program.

We do not

have a history of noninvolvement under this statute
to overcome this broad statement of power• s, nor do
we even have strong findings that the atmosphere at
the college is overwhelmingly secular.
I apologize for the length of this memo
alnd its probable disorganization, but I did not

think that the standards were comprehensible apart
from a

a

detailed look at Lemon and Tilton.
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. William C. Kelly, Jr.

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: April 7, 1973

Hunt v. McNair - WCK' s draft of April 6
I placed on your desk your first draft, which I am afraid I
have "messed up" considerably.
Although I have accepted your basic approach and analysis
as sound and reasoned with your usual perceptivity, I do think it necessary
to strengthen our opinion in the following respects:
1. I have attempted, by riders, to convey a somewhat clearer

picture of the College, and particularly of the revenue bondsfinancing
with which we are concerned. It is important, I think, for the factual
seting to be somewhat more particularized that your draft.
2. Bearing in mind Justice Douglas' circulated opinion of
last October (in which he emphasized that ''the state's credit is employed
in aid" of financing the College, and referred to the state as being "a
banker", it is desirable to make it crystal clear by a full quotation from
the Act and otherwise - that the state's credit is in no way implicated.
3. Although I have not undertaken to depart from your Lemon
three-part analysis, I doubt that it is fully applicable (if, at all) to this
type of case.

For the reasons summarized in my Rider A, p. 7 (to be

added either as a note or inserted in the text at some appropriate place),

2.
the "state aid" :Involved :In this case is different from that :In any case
previously before the Court. AB I argued at the Conference, and as held
by both the New Jersey and South Carolina courts, all that the state has

done is provide a "conduit" or render a service. I consider this quite
different :In principle from lending or granting money or extending credit.
Indeed, the people who buy the bonds -induced to do so by the tax
advantage -put up the entire cost of the "aid" rendered these educational
institutions.
Obviously we would have a closer case if the college here were
in fact a sectarian institution.

Possibly, no such institution may be

rendered any service of this kind by the state - although all sorts of other
public services (police, fire, utilities, etc. ) have traditionally been
rendered churches as well as church schools. But we need not decide
this question, as this Baptist college is not shown by the record to be
sectarian in much more than name and the indirect control through the
election of the Board of Trustees. Incidentally, I am certain that under
general corporate law in South Carolina the board -elected for five-year
terms - owes their primary duty to the welfare of the college without
regard to the Baptist church or whomever may have elected them.
In any event, I want to emphasize the uniqueness of the "aid"
here :Involved, and not to equate it irrevocably with other types of aid

3.
which have been before the Court.
4. Our decision will be of little value unless it enables ''bond counsel"
to give an unqualified opinion as to the validity of the bonds to be issued.
Therefore, I think your understandable catrtion - in using carefully hedged
language at the beginning and end of the opinion - goes a bit too far. I
doubt that bond counsel, if this language is retained, could give an unqualified
opinion that bonds issued pursuant to this particular applicatioo. wwli be
valid. I think we must go at least that far, as certainly it is my view and I believe is the view of the majority of the Court.

*****
If you have an opportunity to review my riders over the weekend,

we can confer during the morning on Monday. If we are fairly close
together, then you can have a chambers copy printed during my absence.
It will be a lit bit difficult for either of us to visualize the full opinion in
its present form, and so a printed chambers copy may facilitate our
progress.
I am aware that there is some overlap among my own riders, and
also with what was in your first draft. I simply have not had the time to
try to clean these up.
Attached to this memo are three riders which I dictated, but did
not use. They may be a bit repetitive. Or you may find some place for
them.
L. F. P., Jr.

h{;K

April 11, 1973
Hunt v. McNair
1. Larry has read and edited this draft, and I have
made changes to respond to his suggestions.
2. I attach 1) your memo of April 7; 2) carbons of
your riders; and 3) the old version of page 17 with
your notes on it.
3. As you will see, I ha•ve incorporated in Part I
your riders numbered 1-4, with the exception of your
footnote 11 3A( see rider 3), which I have omitted for
reasons we have already discussed.
4. In addition, I have reorganized Part I in an
effort to make it less choppy.
5. Your rider 5 appears in the discussion of state
purpose on page 7 of the draft.

I have omitted

proposed footnotes -,•:-,': (because I did not think it
added anything to the central point and because I
doubted there would be any dispute about the number of
students in the college) and -,•:-,•:-:: (because I did not think
it appropriate to quote this from the complaint).
6. With minor changes, your rider 6 appears
on page 10 of the draft as footnote 7.

I have rewritten

the last sentence in a way which I think sharpens
our point.
7. An altered version of your rider 7 appears
on page nine of the draft as the last sentence of the
paragraph which continues over from page 8.

I changed

the sentence to drop "functions as a religious entity"
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because I did not think that that phrase was helpful
or particularly meaningful.
8. Rider 8 appears as footnote 8 on page 12.
I have omitted a good p~tion of the rider becaese
I did not think that we had a satisfactory basis for
making these assertions.

The lack of record support

for them is a particu•larly

se~sitive

point since

we rely elsewhere .. . in the opinion on the four corners
of the record.

I have substituted a reliance on Tilton

in order to preserve your point.
9. I did not use the other riders, other than the
Allen quotation regarding the importance of private
schools.
10. I have done two things to former page
17.

The first was to drop the distinction betweenkkx

the trustee and the Autho*rity.

The trustee is chosen

by the State and is an agent of the State for tte
purpose of operating the College.

Because, when we

talked about this before, we agreed that we could
not rely on t•he distinction between the . . . Authority
and the

tr~stee,

I thought it better not to slip it

in near the end of the opinion without explanation.
The other change I made was to move the discussion
of the I~dustrial Revenue Bond Act to page 13(this
was Larry's suggestion).

I agree with him that it

fits more smoothly into the discussion there.

As
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it stood before, in Part III, it seemed awkward.

j;lt.pt"ttttt <!feud cf tltt ~tb j;tatts

jt~UJ!rhtgtcn, !fl. OJ. 211~~$
CHAMBERS OP

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 17, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,~
N

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

J

,iu:pum:t (!Jou.rt of tqt ~tritth .itattg

Jlagqmgron.!B. <q.

:Wgt'l-$

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 17, 1973

Re: No. 71-1523, Hunt v. McNair
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in
this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~u:p-um:t <~tcu.rt

ttf tqt ~t~ ~httts

Jfasltittghtn. ~. <It·
CHAMBE R S OF

JUSTICE W M. J. BR E NNAN , JR .

2!lgt'l-~

April 17, 1973

/

RE: No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair
Dear Lewis:
I plan to write a dissent in this case. I am inclined,
however, to think it is related to the Religion Clause cases
argued this week and also to the Levitt cases, No. 72-269,
et al. !,therefore, will defer writing the dissent until after
I know what the outcome of the other cases will be. I hope
that this doesn't mean I'll have to hold you up too long.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc : The Conference

.inpt"ttttt ar~nrt ~f tltt ~~ .itattg
'lhudp:nghtn. ~. <!}.

2llgi'!~

CHAMBERS OF

April 19, 1973

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair

Dear Lewis:
I shall await the dissent of Bill
Brennan before voting in this one.
Sincerely, ~
T.M.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

Conference

/

.iuprtnu C4ttnrt ttf tlrt 'Jlfuittb .ihrlts
I

CHAMBERS

'BaslrittgLnt.lJl. '4·

2llc?'1~

o.-

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

April 25, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1523 -Hunt v. McNair

Dear Lewis:
I join your opinion in this case.

I may

write a concurrence but shall await the dissent
before deciding to do so.
Sincerely.J

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

f"

• • •· ,...

May 4, 1973

71-1523 HUNT v. McNAIR
TO THE CONFERENCE:
f

•

I

It came to my attention today that in ·1972, after I came on the
Court, the Virginia legislature adopted an "Educational Facilities
Authority Act" which is quite similar (if not substantially identical) to
the South Carolina Act involved in this case. This Virginia enactment
was not a surprise as the new Constitution, effective July 1, 1971, *
contained a provision (Article 10, Section 11) authorizing the legislature
to "provide for a state agency or authority" to assist educational
institutions in borrowing money for construction of educational .f acilities,
provided that the primary purpose of the institution is ''not to provide
religious training or theological education" and provided further that
"the Commonwealth shall not be liable for any debt created by such
borrowing. "*

I did not know until today, however, that ·washington and Lee
University (of which I am a Trustee) had any interest in borrowing
money through the use of such a state-created authority. In a talk
.with the Assistant to the President there, I was informed that there
have been some recent discussions of financing a proposed new dormitory
complex in this manner. This is still in the "discussion stage," no
decision has been made, and indeed the Virginia Authority is not yet a
functioning entity.
Washington and Lee University is strictly non-sectarian, although
many years ago it was of Presbyterian origin. Its board of trustees
is self-perpetuating, it is privately endowed, it derives no support
from any religious faith or organization, has no religious requirements

*I served on the constitutional revision commission.
*Virginia has a very strong "Establishment" clause in its
Constitution, Section 16 of the Virginia Bill of Rights having been
attributed primarily to Thomas Jefferson.
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-2as to courses, students, qr faculty members. It noes offer some
courses in religion, on an elective basis, as a part of a broad,
11.t>erat.a.rt~ curriculum.
As the only issue before us in Hunt v. McNair is the challenge
to the South Carolina Act on the ground that it infringes the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, our decision in McNair would not be
applicable to Washington and Lee University. I suppose it could be said,
nevertheless, that the similarity of the new Virginia statute and the
possible interest of Washington and Lee in revenue bond financing of a
new dormitory thereunder, might give me a bias in favor of this type
of legislation even with respect to a Baptist college such as that involved
in Hunt v. McNair.
I personally do not feel disqualified to participate in this case.
But I bring these facts to the attention of the Conference, and woold
welcome and abide by the views of my Brothers. As I do not have a
Court yet, there is no possibility of this case coming down prior to
our next Conference. I can receive your views and we can discuss this
further, if need be, at the May 11 Conference.
Sincerely,

·.
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the South Carolina Act involved in this case. This Virginia enactment
was not a surprise as the new Constitution, effective July 1, 1971, *
contained a provision (Article 10, Section 11) authorizing the legislature
to "provide for a state agency or authority" to assist educational
institutions in borrowing money for construction of educational facilities,
provided that the primary purpose of the institution is ''not to provide
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:. Washington and Lee University is strictly non-sectarian, although
. many years ago it was of Presbyterian origin. Its board of trustees
is self-perpetuating, it is privately endowed, it derives no support
from any religious faith or organization, has no religious requirements.

~""·~I served on the constitutional revision commission.

:

·~ *Virginia has a very strong "Establishment" clause in its
Constitution, Section 16 of the Virginia Bill of Rights having been
attributed primarily to Thomas Jefferson.

"
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as to courses, students, or faculty members. It does offer some
courses in religion, on an elective basis, as a part of a broad,
ltb·er.P.l:a.rt~ curriculum.
As the only issue before us in Hunt v. McNair is the challenge
to the South Carolina Act on the ground that it infringes the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, our decision in McNair would not be
applicable to Washington and Lee University. I suppose it could be said,
nevertheless, that the similarity of the new Virginia statute and the
possible interest of Washington and Lee in revenue bond financing of a
new dormitory thereunder, might give me a bias in favor of this type
of legislation even with respect to a Baptist college such as that involved
in Hunt v. McNair.
I personally do not feel disqualified to participate in this case.
But I bring these facts to the attention of the Conference, and wob.ld
welcome and abide by the views of my Brothers. As I do not have a
Court yet, there is no possibility of this case coming down prior to
our next Conference. I can receive your views and we can discuss this
further, if need be, at the May 11 Conference.
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WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY

'

LEXINGTON, VIRGINIA 244!10

May 4, 1973
FRANK

A.

PARSO NS

A 88 18TA N T TO THE PRI:81DHNT

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S.
Supreme Court Building
Washington, D. C. 20543
Dear Mr. Powell:
Enclosed you will find copies of the Act of the General Assembly
which established the Virginia College Building Authority, the draft of
a statement of policies and procedures provided us by the Authority's
consultants, and a memorandum which I prepared for Mr. Howe of Wheat,
First Securities, Inc., at his request following our discussions with
him and Mr. Ashton on April 27.
The notes and underscores in the draft statement are President
Huntley's marks made upon his first reading of the original from which
this copy was made.
I told President Huntley of your call and interest in the Virginia
College Building Authority, and he is pleased that you may have an opportunity to examine these materials prior to the Board meeting. He has
asked me to obtain from our Law Librarian information about the pending
South Carolina case for his review.
Should you have any further questions requiring answers that I may
be able to provide or seek, please don't hesitate to call on me.
With kindest personal regards and best wishes,
Sincerely,

~

Frank A. Parsons

Cc: President Huntley

VIRGINIA COLLEGE BUILDING AUTHORITY

CONTENTS
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VIRGINIA COLLEGE BUILDING AUTHORITY

----~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.

STATEMENT OF POLICY AND PROCEDURES
The Virginia College Building Authority (the Authority)
has been duly created and organized under Section 23-30.25 of
the Code of Virginia of 1950, as amended, as a public body
corporate and as a political subdivision and agency and instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
The Authority is authorized under the ·Educational
Facilities Authority Act (Chapter 3.3, Title 23, Code of
Virginia of 1950, as amended) (the Act) to assist institutions
for higher education in the Commonwealth (Institutions) in the
acquisition, construction, financing and refinancing of Projects.
In particular, the Act authorizes the Authority to issue revenue·
bonds and notes for any of its corporate purposes, payable
solely out of its revenues; to fix, charge and collect rates,
rents, fees and charges for the use of and for the services
furnished or to be furnished by a Project; to mortgage and pledge
its revenues and any Project for the benefit of the holders of
its bonds; and generally to do all things necessary or convenient
to carry out the purposes of the Act,
The Authority has received requests from certain
Institutions for assistance in acquiring, constructing and
financing Projects and anticipates that similar requests may
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hereafter be received from other Institutions.

The Authority

has determined that prior to making any commitment to assist any
Institution it is desirable to set forth the following statement

-

of policies and procedures to serve as a guideline for its
operations:
1.

In accordance with the Act, the following procedures

shall control and limit the operations of the Authority:
a)

The Authority shall assist only nonprofit

educational institutions in the Commonwealth whose primary
purpose is to provide collegiate or graduate education and
not to provide religious training or theological education.
b)

The Authority will assist in financing only

those educationa 1 facilities which meet the definition of "Proj ect 11
contained in the Act, i.e.,
" • . • a structure or structures suitable
for use as a dormitory or oth~~~~~:s t
housing facility for students facul
officers or employees, a dinin~a ~;tudent
union, administration building, academic
building, library, laboratory, research, facility,
classroom, athletic facility, health care
facility, maintenance, storage or utility
facility and other structures or facilities
related to any of the foregoing or required
or useful for the instruction of students or
the conducting of research or the operation
of an institution for higher education, including
parking and other facilities or structures -essential or convenient for the orderly conduct
of such institution for higher education, and
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shall also include landscaping, site preparation,
furniture, equipment and machinery and other
si~ ilar items-necessary or convenient for the
operation of a particular facility or structure
in the manner for which its use is intended . • • "

-

c)

The Authority shall not assist in financing

any items the costs of which are customarily deemed to result in
a current operating charge or any facility used or to be used
for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious worship or
any facility used or to be used primarily in connection with any
part of the program of a school or department of divinity for
any religious denomination.
2.

Within the limitations set forth above and pursuant

to the Act, the Authority will undertake the acquisition and
construction of Projects for lease and ultimate transfer to
the Institutions desiring to take advantage of the provisions
of the Act, and will finance such Projects, to the extent not
financed by the contributions of the institutions, by the
issuance of its revenue bonds, notes and other obligations
payable solely from and secured by a pledge of all rentals,
revenues, receipts and income to be derived from or in connection with, and mortgages on, such Projects.
3.

All bonds of the Authority, regardless of their

date of issue and the manner in which the proceeds of their
sale are applied, shall be issued on a parity basis and shall
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...
have the same right, lien and preference to all the rentals,
revenues, receipts and income of the Authority derived from
or in connection with Projects financed by the Authority.
There will be no preference, priority or distinction of certain
obligations of the Authority over any other obligations.

This

requirement shall not, however, prevent the Authority from
applying moneys received by it for the payment of all of its
administrative, financing, legal and related expenses.
4.

Before committing itself to provide financial

assistance to any Institution, the Authority shall first obtain
from the Institution and submit to the Council of Higher Education
for Virginia such data descriptive of the Project, the need
therefor, the proposed financing plan and the financial resources
of the Institution as will permit the Authority and the Council
of Higher Education for Virginia, in conjunction with the State
Division of Engineering and Buildings, to evaluate the need,
financial feasibility and overall merit of the Project.

In

considering whether to assist an Institution in the financing
of a Project, the Authority shall take into consideration, but
shall not be required to accept, any recommendations of the
Council of Higher Education for Virginia or the State Division
of Engineering and Buildings.

-55.

Since the success of the Authority in carrying out

its purposes must necessarily depend in large measure upon the
continuing financial prosperity of the Institutions it assists,
it is recognized that the Authority may not be able to give
financial assistance to every Institution requesting it or to
give assistance to the degree requested in all instances.

Each

Institution applying for assistance from the Authority must
therefore demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Authority that
it can fully perform all of its contractual obligations under
its lease with the Authority.

Furthermore, no application shall

be accepted unless the applicant can show to the satisfaction of
the Authority that unencumbered revenues derived from reasonably
collectible tuitions and income from investments and unrestricted
~ endowment

·

~

and the gross receipts to be derived from the use of

or for the services furnished by the Project to be financed
will equal not less than three times the average annual amount
payable by the Institution to the Authorit y under its lease
with the Authority.

c

6.

The Authority shall not assist in the acquisition,

construction, financing or refinancing of any Project begun
prior to July 1, 1972, provided however that the Authority may
assist in the financing of alterations, enlargements, reconstruction and remodeling of existing educational facilities and
~
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reimburse Institutions for legal, engineering, architectural or

-

r

other preliminary costs or costs of real property incurred or
acquired prior to July 1, 1972, if such costs were incurred or
acquired in connection with a Project financed by the Authority.
7.

The Authority, in its sole discretion, shall deter-

mine whether to assist a particular Institution, whether to
assist in the financing of a particular Project and the priority
for undertaking the financing of Projects.
8.

This statement of the Authority shall not under

any circumstances be considered as constituting a contractual
agreement with the holders of any bonds, notes or other obligations
to be issued by the Authority, or with any Institution, or with
any other person.

-7BASIC STRUCTURE OF FINANCINGS
The Authority will issue its revenue bonds on a parity
basis without any preference, priority or distinction of certain
of its obligations over any other of its obligations.

All rentals,

revenues, receipts and income shall be applied and pledged to the
repayment of all bonds and no bonds will be issued separately by
the Authority solely on the credit of one Institution.

The

Authority believes that only by utilizing this pooling of security
approach will it be able to fully perform its purpose of providing
financial assistance to the many and varied Institutions of the
Commonwealth.
1.

Master and Supplemental Indenture

All revenue bonds of the Authority will be issued under
a master Indenture which will require the assignment of all
rentals of Projects to Institutions and other revenues received by the
Authority and

to a Trustee for the equal

renefit of all those who become holders of the bonds.
will be a Virginia bank.

The Trustee

The master Indenture will contain general

provisions for the form, details, payment, redemption and conditions
of issuance of the bonds, the application of bond proceeds and the
Authority's revenues,mandatory lease provisions,and the investment
of funds by the Trustee.

It will provide for the establishment

and funding of a debt service reserve fund (DSRF), defind what
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constitutes a default on the part of the Institutions and the
Authority, and provide for remedies in the event of a default.
The master Indenture will also provide that each separate series
of bonds will be issued under a Supplemental Indenture which will
set forth the specific terms of the series, e.g., the amount, date,
and denominations of the bonds, the interest rate, maturity schedule
and redemption provisions.
2.

Lease Requirements

The bonds of the Authority will be payable solely out of
the rental payments received under leases of Projects with participating Institutions and, in the event an Institution should default
in such payments, out of the DSRF.

The rental for each Project

shall be in an amount not less than 110% of the average annual
debt service requirements of the bonds issued therefor over their
amortization period, plus an amount sufficient to cover the proportionate share of the Tru

e's annual fees and ex enses.

All

leases will be net'?leases and will provide for the payment by the

~·

Insitution of all costs and expenses of operation, maintenance,
repair or replacement of the Project and will require the Institution
to maintain adequate insurance against fire and other casualty.
3.

Debt Service Reserve Fund

As previously noted, the master Indenture will establish
the DSRF which will equally and ratably secure all revenue bonds
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of the Authority.

With respect to each Project, there will be

deposited to the credit of the DSRF out of the bond proceeds an

7

amount equal to 110% of the average annual debt service requirement
of the bonds issued thereunder.

Thereafter, all amounts received

in connection with the rental of the Project remaining each year
after meeting the debt service requirement for that year will be
deposited to the credit of the DSRF until the balance to the

-

-

credit of the Project is equal t g twg years' annual rental on the

-

debt service requirement will be returned to the relevant Institution.

pL

Project.

Once two years' rental has been accumulated in the DSRF

7

?

r~~----

..

to the credit • of the Project, all rentals in excess of the annual

In the event an Institution

defaults in making rental

payments on a Project, the deficiency will be made up out of the
balance standing to the account of that Project in the DSRF and,
if the amount of the deficiency should exceed such balance, the
excess shall be charged on a proportionate basis against the balances
standing in the DSRF to the credit of all other Projects.

When and to

rr

the extent that the amounts so withdrawn from the DSRF are recovered
from the Institution responsible therefor, such amounts shall be
deposited to the DSRF in the proportions withdrawn.

After all bonds

issued on account of a Project are paid in full, the balance remaining in the DSRF to the credit of that Project shall be returned to
the relevant Institution.
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4.

Expenses

All costs incurred in connection with the issuance of the
Authority's bonds, e.g., printing, bond counsel fees, underwriting and
financial advisors' fees, rating agency fees, and the Trustee's
acceptance fee, will be payable out of bond proceeds.

Continuing

expenses, such as the Trustee's annual fee, will be payable by
the participating Institution as additionalrent.

The administrative
I

expenses of the Authority will be payable from income earned on investment of the DSRF.

EXAMPLE OF AN AUTHORITY FINANCING
I.

-

II.

University A plans to build, over a two year construction period,
a building estimated to cost $5,000,000.
Bank B will make a loan to the Authority for the construction period
at a 5% rate of interest since the interest is tax exempt.
(a)

The Bank Loan
Estimated building cost
Debt service reserve fund (DSRF) (estimated)
Interest during the construction
period (estimated)
Total Bank Loan

(b)

$5,000,000
537,031
553,703
$6,090,734

The full amount of the loan is taken down at the outset and
invested until necessary for progress payments. It is assumed
that: 1) the funds will be expended evenly over the two year
construction period with payments made semi-annually; 2) the
funds are invested at a 7% rate of interest; and 3) the
Authority's administrative expenses are $25,000 per year.

6 Mos.

Unexpended Funds

Less:
Interest
Semi-Annua 1

1st
2nd
3rd
4th

$6,090,734
4,889,142
3,645,494
2,358,318

$152,268
152,268
152,268
152,268

Plus:
Investment
Income

Disbursements
(Including
Administrative Fee)

$213,176
171,120
12 7' 592
82,541

$1,262,500
1,262,500
1,262,500
1,262,500

Balance in DSRF at end of construction
(c)(l) Cost of building at end of construction
period, including interest during
construction
Annual debt service required on twenty year
issue of $5,850,000 at 6% assumed rate of
interest
(2) Plus 10% to create one year rent reserve at
110% of annual debt service
(3) DSRF required initially

Le~s:

1,026,091

$5,609,072

510,000
512000
$ 5612 000

'

-

2.

Proceeds of $5,850,000 bond sale after
expenses (2 1/2%)
Plus balance remaining in DSRF
Total proceeds from financing
Less: Repayment of bank loan and funding
of DSRF

-

Balance·k

-

Year

*
**

***

-

1 2 0~6~091

$6,72.9,841

$6,651,734
$

Rental

$561,000)
1
2
561,000
3
561,000
4
561,000
561,000
5
561,000
6
7-20 561,000

5,703,750

DSRF
$

639,107
709,844
785,533
866,520
953,176
1,045,898
1, 122, OQQi<'·k

Income on
DSRF {7%}
$44,737
49,689
54,987
60,656
66,722
73 '213
78,540

Administrative
ExEense
$25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000

78~107

To DSRF,'d··k
$ 70,737
75,689
80,987
86,656
92,722
99 213')b\·
'
104,540

These funds would be added to the DSRF to accelerate the accumulation
of the two year DSRF.
At this point DSRF is fully funded and excess is returned to University A.
From the 8th through the 20th year annual rentals would continue at
$561,000, but they would be reduced by return to University A of the
earnings on the DSRF and the 10% excess payment. This would make the
effective rental during this period $456,460. After the 20t~ year,
the DSRF would be repaid to University A and the title to the project
would pass to University A.
Income on DSRF less Administrative Expenses plus 10% to create one
year rent reserve at 110% of debt service.

(

(

r

(

I

-3-

Year
l
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Average

Annual
Rental

Bonds
Retired

Interest
at 6.00%

$561,000
561,000
561,000
561,000
561,000
561,000
561,000
561,000
561,000
561,000
561,000
561,000
561,000
561,000
561,000
561,000
551,000
561,000
561,000
561,000

$160,000
165,000
180,000
190,000
200,000
210,000
225,000
240,000
255,000
270,000
285,000
300,000
320,0ij0
340,000
360,000
380,000
405,000
430,000
455,000
480,000

~;351,000

341,400
3:\1,500
320,700
309,300
297,300
284,700
271,200
256,800
2'n,5oo
225,300
208,200
190,200
171,000
1!10,600
129,000
106,200
81,900
56,100
28,800

Principal
and
Interest
$511,000
506,400
511,500
510,700
509,300
507,300
509 '700
511,200
511,800
511,500
510,300
508,500
510,200
511,000
510,600
509,000
511,200
511,900
511,100
508,800

$510,150

Bonds
Outstandins:_
$5,69Q,OOO
5,525,000
5,345,000
5,155,000
4,955,000
4,745,000
4,52 0 ,000
4,280,000
4,02:i ,ooo
3,755,000
3,470,000
3,170,000
2,850,000
2,510,000
2,150,000
1, 770,000
1,36~,000

93':,0CO
480,000
-0-

DSRF
Beginning
Balance
$

639,107
708,:344
788,063
867 '727
955,168
1,050,730
1,122,000
1,122,000
1,122,000
1,122,000
1,122,000
1,122,000
1,122,000
1,122,000
1,122,000
1,122,000
1,122,000
1,122,000
1,122,000
1,122,000

Earnings
on DSRF
at 7.0rffo

Less Administrative
Expense Fee

$ 44,737
49,619
55,164
60,741
66,862
73,551
78,540
78,540
78,540
78,540
78,540
78,540
78,540
78,540
78,540
78,540
78,540
78,540
78,540
78,540

$

25 ,ooo
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000

$

DSRF
Ending
Balance
708,844
788,063
867,727
955,158
1,050, 730
1,150,581
1,229,240
1,225,340
1,224,740
1,225,040
1,226,240
1,228,040
1,226,340
1,225,540
1,225,940
1,227,540
1,225,340
1,224,640
1,225,440
1,227,740

Available to
Reduce
Rental
$

28,581
107,240
103,340
102,740
103,040
104,240
106,040
104,340
103,540
103,940
105,-540
103,340
102,640
103,440

APPLICATION FOR SERVICES
VIRGINIA COLLEGE BUILDING AUTHORITY

I.

Name of Institution

County

Official Business Address

City
II.

State

Zip Code

DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED PROJECT:
~ew

Building(s)
On
New Site
Present Site

·~<

Other

Add. to
Existing Building(s)

Alt. to
Existing Building(s)

Other*

-------------------------------

Location of Proposed Project

Street or Highway Route

City or Town

County

III.

COST DATA (Estimated)

-

Continued
1.
Cost of
Addition

-

A.

._

Total Cost

STRUCTURE COST>'(:

1.

General

$

$

$

2.

Heating

$

$

$

3.

Plumbing

$

$

$

4.

Electrical

$

$

$

5.

Test Borings

$

$

$

6.

Provision for Water

$

$

$

7.

Other Structure Costs:

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

8.
B.

3. *~'r

2.
Cost of
Alternations

Sub-total Structure

Architect's Fee

c. Movable Furniture and Equipment
__,

D.

>'(

.......,
;'r·k

Sub-total

Complete a separate Cost Data Sheet, Items "A" - "D" for each separate building
involved.
Complete only Column 3 for new building.

- 2-

III.

-

COST DATA (Estimated) - Continued

El. Cost of Acquiring Site*
(Include purchase price plus
all other costs and fees
incidental to acquisition of site)

$_ _ _ __

$_ _ __

$_ _ _ __

E2. Pre-planning Costs

$_ _ _ __

$_ _ _ __

$_ _ _ __

E3. Other Costs**

$_ _ _ __

$_ _ _ __

$_ _ _ __

E4. Total (Line D + E Items)

$_ _ _ __

$_ _ _ __

$_ _ _ __

F.

*

**

Additional Cost
1.

Contingencies - 2% o f Total

$_ _ _ __

2.

Administrative & Inspe ct ion

$_ _ _ __

3.

Total "F" Items

$_ _ _ __

Please answer these questions:
1.

Does the site include existing buildings?

2.

If answer to question "1" is "yes":
a.

What year were such buildings acquired by your College?

b.

If there any outstanding indebtedness applicable to such buildings?

c.

Does the cost of acquiring site as shown include any funds intended to repay such
outstanding indebtedness?
If so, how much? $______________________

d.

Are there any of these buildings to which you do not contemplate additions or
renovations under this project?

Not appl i cabl e a t t ime of or iginal application.

- 3-

III.

COST DATA (Estimated) - Continued

G.

Total Cost of Project (Sub'-total plus Line F3)

$_ _ _ _ __

H.

Less Contributions*

$_ _ _ _ __

I.

Adjusted Total Cost of Project

$_ _ _ _ __

Desired Period of Amortization
J.

------

Years

Financing Costs (Do Not Complete To Be Estimated By Authority)
$_ _ _ _ __

1.

Capitalized Reserve (Line I x

2.

Bond Discount and Miscellaneous (
% of Line I)**

$_ _ _ _ __

3.

Capitalized I nt erest

$_ _ _ _ __

4.

Total "J" Items

$_ _ _ _ __

)

K.

Total Amount to be Financed Through Authority (Line I + Line J4)

$- - - - - - -

L.

Estimated Annual Rental***

$

-------

Interest Rate used in Determining
Estimated Annual Rental - - - - - - - - - - - -

SHOW TOTAL OF CASH GRANTS ONLY. DO NOT INCLUDE IN THIS TOTAL ANY FEDERAL LOANS; SUCH
LOANS WILL BE PART OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT FINANCED BY VCBA BONDS WITH SUCH BONDS SOLD
DIRECTLY TO THE FEDERAL AGENCY, OR BY INTEREST SUBSIDY BY THE FEDERAL AGENCY, (SHOW
THE BREAKDOWN OF GRANTS AND FEDERAL LOANS AT PART IV, PAGE 5 OF THIS APPLICATION.)
INCLUDES COST OF BOND DISCOUNT, BOND COUNSEL, FINANCIAL ADVISOR, TRUSTEE, PRINTING AND
ADVERTISING.
THE AUTHORITY CHARGES THE INSTITUTION EXACTLY THE SAME INTEREST RATE IT PAYS ON THE
BONDS USED TO FINANCE THE PROJECT AS DETERMINED WHEN THE BONDS ARE SOLD. HOWEVER, IN
ORDER FOR THE AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER AND PROCESS THE APPLICATION IT IS NECESSARY TO
PROVIDE AN ESTIMATED RENT BASED ON A MAXIMUM INTEREST RATE AND SHORTEST PERIOD OF
AMORTIZATION. NEVERTHELESS, THE RENT SET FORTH IN THE LEASE WILL BE BASED UPON THE
ACTUAL INTEREST RATE.

-4-

IV.
A.

Private and Federal Grants
IDENTIFY EACH ITEM COMPRISING TOTAL CONTRIBUTION LISTED ABOVE AT LINE "H". (IF A
FEDERAL GRANT IS INVOLVED , THE INSTITUTION MUST SUBMIT, WITH THIS APPLICATION, A
COPY OF AN APPROVED GRANT AGREEMENT BEFORE THE CONTRIBUTION CAN BE CONSIDERED AS
DECREASING THE AMOUNT TO BE FINANCED BY THE AUTHORITY. FURTHERMORE, THE INSTITUTION
MUST BE PREPARED ON BID OPENING DAY FOR CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS TO PAY OVER TO THE
AUTHORITY, IN CASH, OR IN DEPOSIT IN A CUSTODIAL ACCOUNT UNDER CONTROL OF THE
AUTHORITY SECURITIES, IN THE AMOUNT OF ALL GRANTS, BOTH PRIVATE AND FEDERAL LISTED
AS CONTRIBUTIONS AT LINE "H" ABOVE. IT WILL THEN BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
INSTITUTION TO REIMBURSE ITSELF BY OBTAINING THE GRANT FUNDS AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.)

~

B.
~

Contribution and Federal Aid Data

Federal Loans - LIST ONLY FEDERAL LOANS FOR WHICH YOU HAVE AN APPROVED LOAN AGREEMENT
FOR THIS PROJECT. A COPY OF THE APPROVED LOAN AGREEMENT MUST BE SUBMITTED WITH THIS
APPLICATION. DO NOT INCLUDE SUCH LOANS AS A CONTRIBUTION AT LINE "H" ABOVE, SINCE
VCBA BONDS WILL BE ISSUED AND SOLD TO THE FEDERAL AGENCY IN THE AMOUNT AND AT THE
RATE IN THE APPROVED LOAN AGREEMENT,

-5-

-

-

ARCHITECT'S CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that the estimated costs of the items comprising
the total structure cost are considered to be realistic and have been made
according to accepted architectural practices for developing preliminary
estimates.

Signature of Architect

Date

Address

City

Telephone Number

(SEAL)

-6-

Zip Code

CERTIFICATION:
This certifies that the Board of Trustees of the

----------~-------------------------

College or University

-

By Resolution dated

19

authorized the filing of this Application

and that the information herein is correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

-

(SEAL)

Secretary of Board of Trustees
19
Address

City

Zip Code

ADDRESSES:
(No Signature required)
Telephone
Chairman of Board of Trustees:
Name

Street

City

Zip Code

Telephone Number
President of College or University
Name

Street

City

Zip Code

Telephone Number
Business Manager, College or University
Name

Street

City

-7-

Telephone Number

Zip Code

EXHIBIT "A"

-

Schedule of Enrollment
Include actual full-time enrollment during the regular academic term (September - June) for the 5 year period immediately preceding this application; and projected
full-time enrollment during the regular academic term (September - June) for the 5 year
period immediately following this application.

Academic Year

Undergraduate

Graduate
Actual

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
Projected
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

Total

EXHIBIT "B"
Schedule of Tuition and Fees
Include actual annual fees (two semesters) being charged in the current year,

-

and projected annual fees (two semesters) to and including either (a) the first year in
which the initial rental to this Authority is due, or (b) (in the case of revenue producing projects, such as dormitories, dining facilities, or parking facilities) the
first year in which income from all such facilities in the project are anticipated,
whichever shall be later.
Actual
Current Year

Tuition

Room and Board

Other (specify)

$

$

$

Tuition

Room and Board

Other (sped fy)

$

$

$

Projected
Year

(The above form may be altered so long as the data is presented in a brief schedule
form, appropriately footnoted if necessary.)

-

-

EXHIBIT "C"
Statement of outstanding indebtedness

-

(As of end of most recent full fiscal year)

Description

Date of
Obligation

Total

Amount
Issued

Amount
Retired

Amount
Outstanding

Annual
Debt Service~'c

$

$

$

$

$_ _

$_ _

$_ _ __

$_ _ _ _ __

*Required annual payments for principal and interest.

EXHIBIT "D"
Annual Fiscal Report

(As of end of each of the three most recent fiscal years, to include:)
Balance Sheet
Statement of Changes in Funds
Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements
Opinion of Auditors

EXHIBIT "E"
Budget Survey

Actual

Current
Year

First
Year
Following
Current
Year

Second
Year
Following
Current
Year

Proiected
Third
Fourth
Year
Year
Following
Following
Current
Current
Year
Year

Fifth
Year
Following
Current
Year

19

19_19_

19

19

19

19

$

$

$

$

$

$

!RESTRICTED ENDOWMENT INCOME

$

$

$

$

$

$

UNRESTRICTED GIFTS AND GRANTS

$

$

$

$

$

$

_JOSS PROJECT RECEIPTS**

$

$

$

$

$

$

GROSS STUDENT TUITION•'(

-

19

--

-19-

-19-

-

19

*

DEDUCT THEREFROM AMOUNT OF TUITION SPECIFICALLY PLEDGED FOR SECURITY OF
OUTSTANDING DEBTS. PLEASE INDICATE BY FOOTNOTE THE EXTENT OF ANY SUCH
PRIOR PLEDGE MADE ON ACCOUNT OF A FEDERAL LOAN,

**

PROJECTS INVOLVING DORMITORIES WILL SHOW OCCUPANCY CHARGES AS RECEIPTS,
PROJECTS INVOLVING CLASSROOM FACILITIES, GYMNASIUM, ETC. WILL NORMALLY
NOT SHOW PROJECT RECEIPTS,

--

-19-

.i'u.prtmt <!Jltttrlaf tJrt ~tb .i'tatts
, -ulfi:ttghm, ~. <!J. 20,?'1j
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 7, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair

Dear Lewis:
It sounds as if Washington and Lee's borrowing under
the Virginia Act which you describe in your memorandum of
May 4th would not, even under the most sweeping arguments
of the proponents of the Establishment Clause argument,
violate that clause. The only conceivable argument as to
Washington and Lee's interest in the outcome of this
decision, then, would be that if Virginia cannot make this
aid available to "sectarian" as well as to "non-sectarian"
colleges, it might repeal it altogether. This is so
speculative and remote that I certainly don't feel you
should disqualify yourself.
Sincerely,

,juprttttt <q ourt of tiT t ';P:nitdt ~t~ttts
~a:sftington.

gl. <!J.

2llbl"~.;l

CHAMBERS OF

May 7, 1973

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

Dear Lewis:

I have your memo on 71-1523,
Hunt v. MCNair.

I see no reason what-

soever for your disqualification to
sit in the case.

Mr. Justice Powell

ee:

The Conference

~u.pumt

C!Jourt ttf tqt ~ttittb jitlttts

Jfasfringtttn. ;!3.

<q.

20,;t>~$

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

May 7, 1973

RE: No. 71-1523 -Hunt v. McNair
Dear Lewis:
I can see no possible reason for your
disqualifying your self in the above for the
reason mentioned in your memorandum of
May 4.
Sincerely,

/!ftcl
Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

<Q:ttud ttf tlrt ~~h .itatts
,ras!ringtmt. ~. <Q:. 2ll£f){._;l

.ittpTttn~

C H AM BERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 7, 1973

No. 71-1523, Hunt v. McNair
Dear Lewis,
Based upon the information contained
in your thoughtful memorandum of May 4, I see
no reason whatever why you should disqualify
yourself in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr . Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

.iu:vrtttU (!Jltltrl ttf tqt ~nitt~ ,ihtttg
I

.Mftitt:ghttt. ~. <!J. 2llbt'l-.;l '

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

May 7, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1523

-

Hunt v. McNair

Dear Lewis:
This is in response to your memorandum of May 4.
I see no reason why you should disqualify in this case.
Sincerely,

;/. {L. ;J.
Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

/

.:iu:prttttt <!fttud 4lf tqt ~b .:§t~s

' 11Jasfrittgwn.l8. <If.

2llbt'l.~

CHAMBERS Of'

May 8, 197 3

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

Re:

No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair

Dear Lewis:
I

see no reason why you should

disqualify yourself in this case.
Sincerely, ~

T.M.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

Hunt v. McNair
Take a look at the opinion to see whether we have quoted the
language in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 at 685 on the difference
between secondard and higher education. This is an excellent quote and
at least should be put in a footnote to McNair.
I should also consider adding a note to theeeffect that the South
Carolina Court held - if it did (I must check) that the Act was not
questioned as to nonreligious schools. No such question was presented in
this Court, but I believe the South Carolina Court dealt with the point.
L. F. P., Jr.

lfp/ss

5/28/73

1 ew1s F. Powell, Jr.

McNair and Committee v.

~
Larry and I agree that we like for you to be the chambers
A.

.

"editor" of Nyquist.
In addition to your generally recognized qualifications,
like you to undertake this to be sure that our opinions in McNair and
'!iY_9..Uist lla.rmonize in every respect.

.iUVt"tmt Qj:llu.rt ltf t!rt ~ttittb .i~ta
' :.raafrittgbm.1f}. Qj:. 2llgt:J!.$
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 4, 1973

Re: No. 71-1523, Hunt v McNair
0

Dear Lewis,
I see no reason why the opinion should be reassigned
in this case
0

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

j;uptttttt Q}ttUtt of t4t ~niit~ •.;%tatts
~a:gfrittgton.

Ifl. <!}.

21lgi'-1~

CHAMBERS OF

J' ''"'-T ICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

June 4, 1973

Dear Lewis:
As respects your mexoo of June 4th

relative to Hunt v. McNair I see no possible
reason for you to recuse yourself.
the other way in the ease.

I voted

But I would be the

last to say you had a "conflict".

\jv

Willi~'o.
(_
Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

ougals

~u.;rrtmt

<!Jott.tt ttf tlft 'J!ittittlt ~bt!ts ,

~CUlfrittghttt, 18.

<!J.

20giJ!.~

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE WM . ..J. BRENNAN, ..JR.

June 4, 1973

RE: No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair
Dear Lewis:
I see no reason whatever for you to
recuse yourself.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

71-1523 Hunt v. McNair

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
....,

This supplements my note to the Conference of May 4.
At a recent meeting of the Board of Trustees of Washington and
Lee University, the possibility of financing several campus buildings
through the Authority created under the Educational Facilities Authority
Act of Virginia was discussed. The proper officers of the University
were authorized to continue discussions with the Authority with the
view of determining whether financing in this manner is feasible and
advantageous to W. & L. If the answers prove to be affirmative, I
think W. & L. will- perhaps by next fall- utilize the Authority.
In other respects, the situation outlined in my note of May 4
remains the same. I was in error, however, in saying that W. & L.
was at one time of "presbyterian origin". I am now informed that it
always has been strictly independent of ehureh and state.
I regret botering the Conference with what essentially is my
problem. As McNair comes to us only because of the Establishment
Clause issue, I see no conflict. Yet, especially in view of the Court's
division in this ease, I would respect and defer to any differing view.
If any Justice would prefer that the opinion be reassigned, I will
recuse myself.

L. F. P., Jr.

"!

•·.II·

' 'i"'
I

From:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
No. 71-1523 Hunt v. McNair

Here is my desk copy of the first draft, on which you will
note suggested changes or questions on the three pages indicated.
· In addition, what would you think of adding a note to the
effect thatJhe South CarolrWt Court held (as I believe it did) that
the validity of the Act wasAquestioned as to nonsectarian schools.
~

'

'

•

~·

"'

<

.,,

'•
;

~.·

~<,

~~

1 J us 1ce Brennan told me yesterday that he expected to have
his dlssent t'hi~. week. Mter we have seen it, and decided whether
it requires a reply, we can recirculate.

I believe you have checked already to be sure that the ·
language in McNair is consistent with that in Nyquist. I think
that it is, but we should be meticulous about this .

i''

.Jttpt"nnt ~ltltrl of t4t ~~ .Jtzdtg
,Jlrutfringhttt ~. <If. 2ilbi'!~ '
CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 5, 1973

PERSONAL

Re:

No. 71-1523 -Hunt v. McNair

Dear Lewis:
I contemplate joining you and will do so for the record
before Friday.

I want to see how this case and your Nyquist

affect my Levitt.

Mr. Justice Powell

.§u.prtutt <!Jltttd ltf t4t ,-mttb .§taftg
I

'~htgfri:ngtcn. ~• <!J. 2ll~'1~'

CHAMB'"RS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 6, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair

Dear Lewis:
I certainly see no reason why you should disqualify
yourself in this case.
Sincerely,

~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~lt}tUutt

(!Jttmt ltf tltt ~niftb j;htttg
, ._asJri:tt:ghm, ~. <!J. 2llp.)l..;l ,

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 7, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1523

-

Hunt v. McNair

Dear Lewis:
This is in response to your note of June 4.
reason for the opinion to be reassigned.
Sincerely,

)l.u.t
Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

I see no

.Jn.prtntt ~ourt of t4t 'Jnittb .Jtaftg
Jlufri:ttght~ ~.

<!f.

20bi'l>~ '

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 12, 1973

Re: No. 71-1523 -Richard W. Hunt v. Robert
E. McNair, et al

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.

Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

/

~ttprttttt <!J'ourl of tltt 'Jtlttiftb ~t~s
I

'"--"

'Basftington. ~. <!f.

2ll,?'l·~

CHAMBERS OF

June 12, 1973

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissenting
opinion.
Sincerely,

,...,j
VG~
T.M.

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

Conference

\
I

~u.putttt

'

<.!Jcu:rt of t~e ~ttitdt ~tates
Jrnoirmgton, tn. <.q. 2.ogr;~~ ·

I

CHAMBER S OF

-

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

Dear

June 15, 1973

Bill:
Please join me in your dissent

in 71-1523, Hunt v. McNair.

William 0. Douglas

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

/
/

~tmt

<qltttrlo-f t£rt ~nittb ,i~g
-M£rittgbm. ~. <q. 2ll~"$

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 18, 1973

Re: No. 71-1523

. . Hunt v. McNair

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your opinion,
I have been troubled about what you define on
page 12 as the 11 closer issue, 11 namely, the possible
involvement in day-to-day financial and policy decisions.
I was tempted to consider the rate and fee power as unconstitutional and to remand to have the state court
consider severability. What you have done, however,
seems about all that can be done on this sparse record.
Thus, with some uneasiness, I join.
Sincerely,

Mr.

Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

T :

/

r
1st DRAFT

~ tC'

Mr .
Mr .
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
...,. Mr.

Mr.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAf-m·

Ch ,"
Jl'~

J11,·t,~ce

""~,..,~la s

ic

Ju st~ ce

J'LlSt i ce
Jclst ice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Br ... m1.n ,

Stm:art
V:hi tP.
l~rsha ll

Blac'. mun
Po>,ell
Rehnquist
J •

ON

APPEAL

FROM 'l'HE SUPREME COUR'l' OF SOUTH CAR OLIN A
~o.

71-1523.

Drcickd Octobrr - , 1972

Mrt. JusTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
I dissent from the dismissal because, contrary to the
Court's holding, this appeal presents a substantial constitutional question.
The constitutional question presented is 'vhether
South Carolina's assistance to the Baptist College at
Charleston under the South Carolina Educational Facilities Authority Act constitutes constitutionally impermissible support by the State for this sectarian institution."'· The test to which I adhere for determining such
questions is whether the arrangement between the State
·l:·Thi::; case wa8 initial!~· decidC'd by thC' Comt of Common PlC'as
for Charleston County, South Carolina, which upheld ap;aiu~t Fir::;t
Amendment attack the validity of the South Carolina Educational
Fncilitie:; Authorit~· Act , whereby thr State Budget and Control
Board, acting aH the Authorit~·, is authorized to as;;iRt finnming for
in~titut ionH of higher learning; by its issuance of revenue bonds
r>ecmed by a mortgage on the projC'ct so fmnnced. The judgment
of that court wa::; affirmed by the Supremr Court of South Carolina
on October 22, 1970. Hunt v. McNair, 255 S. C. 71, 177 S. E. 2cl
362 (1970). Appellant appealed to this Court and on .Tunc 28,
1971, we vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of South
Carolina and rema ncled for "recon:;idcra t ion in I ight of this Court's
drci~ion~ in Lemon v. Kurtzman. Earley v. DiCenso, and Robinson v.
DiCenso, [403 U. S. 602]; and Tilton v. Richardson, f403 U. S.
6721." llunt v. lllcNair, 403 U . S. 945 (1971). On remand, the
Suprrmc Court of South Carolina again affirmed the judgment of
the Court of Common Pleas, Ilunt v. McNair, S. C. - , 187
S. E. 2d 645 (1972), and today this Court di~mi sHes npprllant's
appeal on the ground that the case docs not pre ·cut a subHtant in!
con~titutionnl question.
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a11d the Baptist College is foreclosed under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because among
"those involvements of religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the
organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to secure
governmental ends, where secular means would suffice." Abington School District v. Schempp, 374
U. S. 203, 294-295 (1963) (concurring opinion);
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 680-681
(1970) (concurring opinion).
It is obvious that under that test there is a substantial question whether South Carolina's statutory scheme
is constitutional.
The statute authorizes a financing arrangement between the Authority and the Baptist Co11ege at Charleston, a South Carolina educational corporation operated
by the South Carolina Baptist Convention. In accordance \Yith the provisions of the Act, the College would
convey a substantial portion of its campus to the Authority. with the Authority then leasing the property so
conveyed to the College at an agreed rental. The
Authority would then issue revenue bonds of South
Carolina in the anwunt of $3,500.000.00, which bonds
would be payable, principal and interest, from the rent
to be received by the Authority under the lease. The
proceeds of the sale of the bonds would be used to pay
off outstanding indebtedness of the College and to construct additional buildings and facilities for use in its
higher educatiou operations. When the bonds and interest arc paid in fu11, the Authority would be obligated
to convey title to the project and campus properties
to the College free and clear of all liens and encumbrances.
But this is not a mere mortgage arrangement. The Authority is also empo,Yerccl, inter alia, to determine the
location and character of any project; to construct;

IIUKT v. McKAin
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maintain, manage, operate, lease as lessor or lessee, and
regulate the san1e; to enter into contracts for the management and operation of such project; to establish rules
and regulations for the use of the project or any portion
thereof; and to fix and revise from time to time rates,
rents, fees and charges for the use of a project and for
the services furnished or to be furnished by a project or
any portion thereof. In other words, the College turns
over to the state agency control of substantial parts of
the fiscal operation of the school-its very life-blood.
This involves the State in a. policing of the affairs of the
College that presents the substantial question whether
this plan differs in any material aspect from those the
Court struck down in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Earley v.
DiCenso, and Robinson v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Sec Sanders v. Johnson, 319 F. Supp. 421, 431-432, aff'd,
403 U.S. 955 (1971).
Indeed, the many powers reserved to the Authority by
the South Carolina statute also create substantial questions whether this statute could survive the "impermissible entanglement" test applied by the plurality in
Lemon, Earley, and Robinson, supra, and Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). By providing the
College with the opportunity to issue tax-exempt bonds
under the State's name and then retaining the power to
oversee the use of the proceeds and the terms of repayment of such bonds, surely the statute presents a substantial question whether the State employs the organs
of government for essentially religious purposes and
creates an "intimate continuing relationship or dependency between government and religiously affiliated institutions." Tilton, supra, at 688 (plurality opinion of
BURGER, C. J.).
I would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for
oral argument.

Qief' Jr~M
Mr. hsitio~ ~Jfll~"""
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Mu. J u sTICE DouGLAS, with whom MR. JusTICE MARSHALL concurs, dissenting.
The dismissal of this appeal for want of a substantial
federal questio11 is a break with our constitutional traditions. For South Carolina is aHowed to finance a
religious school through the use of state revenue bonds.
Today the state finances a Baptist school. But the same
principle vvould apply to Mormon schools, where Mormons are politically in control of a State, to Catholic
schools where the Catholic voice is dominant, or to any
other religious school whose sponsors have sufficient political "clout." The race will now be on with a bitter
battle among religionists to obtain state aid for their
private schools. The casuaWes will be not merely minority religious groups nor nonbelievers who fear the
mixture of sectarian ideas and civil administration of
state affairs but those \vho deeply believe that when a
church becomes dependent on and involved vvith a State,
the secularization of a creed may ensue. Financial control usually means pervasive control; and churches that
seek state aid today may be vYhipsa"·ed by state politics
tomorrow.
These are problems that the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment '"~ sought to avoid. As stated
in Walz v. Tax C01nmis~c~~, 397 U. S. 664, 668, the
"establishment" of a religion in the mind of the Framers
"connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."
Under the South Carolina Educational Facilities Authority Act the State'sB
is employed in aid of private

- \ M~
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sectarian iustitutions of learning. The Authority established by the Act may issue state revenue bonds for the
benefit of an institution of higher learning on terms that
require the recipient institution to convey title to the
financed facilities to the Authority for the duration of
the bond repayment period. Here, a proposed loan to
the Baptist College at Charlcst~n would be financed
through state revenue bonds that 1vould issue after the
school had conveyed a substantial portion of the campus
to the Authority. Reconveyance to the college would
occur upon payment in full of the bonds and interest
subjC'ct to a condition that the facilities so financed not
be used by the college or by any voluntary grantee of
the college for sectarian instruction or as a place of \\"Orship. Liability of the State results from the Authority's
obligation o t 1c onclholclcrs to set ees and rentals at
levels sufficiently hiah to insure adequate revenues to
m~s.2..r, 1~ecty, t1roug 1_ t1e
State's 1eed to preserve its credit rating.
Under the test suggested by JValz there is "sponsorship" of a ~cctarian institution by the State. Financing
of it is an umbilical cord that ties C'hurch and State togethrr into an ongoing relationship.
The "financial support" mentioned in TV alz is not
restricted to secular activities of the church school. The
revenue bonds of the Rtate permit refinancing of current indebtedness some of which 'ms incurred for f'ectarian purposes.
The "active involvement" of the State in the activities
of the church school is vital to the scheme. There 1vill
be continuing supervision of the usc to which buildings
are put not only during the time that title rests with the
State, but also in perpetuity.
During the years \\·hen the bonds remain outstanding,
the Authority has the power and the obligation to see
that the fees charged by the college for the use of the
financed facilities are aclcq uatc to meet the rcpaymcn t
obligations to bondholders. That entails an on-going

I
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supervision of the College's financial wellbeing and control of the fees which it charges. Such an oversight of
an agency of a church is an entanglement in the affairs
of a sectarian institution that is repugnant to the Establishment Clause. As in Lemon v. Kurtzmann, 403 U. S.
602, 619, "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing
state surveillance will eventually be required to ensure
that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected."
A religious school operates on one budget. Money not
spent for one purpose becomes available for other purposes. A banker-here the State-who exercises surveillanc~budg~igious school may therefore insist to the religious group that it cut down on
its religious courses if the bonds are to be paid. Surveillance means the entanglement with the church that
the First Amendment was designed to avoid. That
entanglement may be a heavy cross for the devout to
carry, for with it comes an intrusion of civil authority
into ecclesiastical problems that Madison warned against
in his Remonstrance.>:.·
I ''"ould note this appeal and put the case down for
oral argument.

~·"We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no m:m's
right is abridged by the institution of Civil SociPty, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance. True it is, that no
other rule exists, by which any question which may deYide a Society,
ran be ultimately determined, but the will of the majority; but it is
also true, that the majority may trespass on the rights of the minority." Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted 397 U. S. 664, 71'9, 720.

~

iCier A, p. 2 (Hunt)

~/7/7~.

(j}
The College has applied to the Authority for the issuance
of revenue bonds pursuant to the provisions of the Act, and proposes
to convey without cost to the state a substantial portion of its
campus (the Project) to the Authority. It will then lease the
property so conveyed back to the College under a lease agreement
pursuant to which the College will be obligated to operate and
maintain the

oject property and to pay to the Authority rentals

in an amount sufficient to meet the payments of principal and
interest as they bee orne due on the proposed revenue bonds.
The Authority would issue the bonds and make the proceeds
available to the College for the Project purposes. Afterx~epqyxmn~
rep yment in full of the bonds, the Project would be reconveyed
to the College.
\

lfp/ss

Rider.A, p. 2A (Hunt) 4/7/73

The Act is quite explicit that the bonds shall not be
obligations of the state:
'~ K) Revenue bonds issued under the provisions
of this section shall not be deemed to constitute
a debt or liability of the State or of any political
subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith and
credit of the State or of any such political subdivision, but shall be payable solely from the
funds herein provided therefor from revenues.
All such revenue bonds shall contain on the face
thereof a statement to the effect that neither the
state of South Carolina nor the authority shall be
obligated to pay the same or the interest thereon
except from revenues of the project or the portion
thereof for which they are issued and that neither
the faith and credit nor the taxing power of the
State of South Carolina or of any politicallllllD:
subdivision thereof is pledged to the payment of
the principal of or the interest on such bonds.
The issuance of revenue bonds under the provisions
of this act shall not directly or indirectly or
contingently obligate the state or any political
subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any form
of taxation whatever therefor or to make any
appropriation for their payment. " South Carolina
Code .loui:Bk Ann. § 22-41(10) cum. supp. 1971
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Rider A, p. 4 (Hunt) 4/7/73

In accordance with the Act, the proposal contemplates that
simultaneously with the execution of the lease agreement, the
Authority and the trustee bank would enter into a talaatxiDdalx
Trust Indenture which would create, for the benefit of the bondholders,
a forecloseable mortgage lien on the pxm;m Project property including
a mortgage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority in and
to the lease agreement. " Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix B,
p. 50.

( Bill: I think there should be an additional reference with respect
to the mortgage on the property but I could not put my finger on it.)

Rider A,_ p. 6 (H!Jilt) 4/7/73

lfp/ss

The College and other private institutions of higher
education provide these benefits to the state.*

As of the school

year 1969-70, there were 1, 548 regularly enrolled students, in
addition to approximately 600 night students. ** It is also
undisputed that 95% of the students at the College are residents
of South Carolina who are thus receiving a college-level education
without "any financial support from the State of South

Carolina~***

*In Allen;- this Court commented on the importance of the role
of private education in this country:
"Underlying these cases, and underlying also
the legislative judgments that have preceded
the court decisions has been a recognition that
private education has played and is playing a
significant and valuable role in raising national
levels of knowledge, competency and experience. "
Alle~, sup~ 392 U. s. 236 at ___.
**Paragraph 11 of the Application to the Authority, which is not
questioned, App. 20. The application further shows that
BJIXiitieui enrollment has been increasing at a rapid rate.
*** App., p. 16.

lfp/ss

Rider A, p. 7 (~unt) 4/7/73

Consider adding the substance of a note, referenced to the point
indi~~t~.d <»?-_.P.:. ~L ~!oll.~ws: - - - - · _

It is to be noted that the "state aid" involved in this

case is different significantly from that before the Court in our
previous ilstablishment Clause cases. We have here no expenditure
of publicfunds, either by grant or loan, no reimbursement by a
state for expenditures made by a private or parochial school or
college, and no extending or committing a state's credit. Rather,
the only state aid consists, not of financial assistance directly or
indirectly which would implicate public funds or credit, but the

/

I

'
creation of an instrumentality (the Authority) through which educational

institutions may borrow funds on the basis of their own credit and
security upon more favorable interest terms than otherwise would
\
I

\

\

I

be available. The Supreme Court of New Jersey characterized the \
\

assistance rendered an educational institution under an act generally
similar to the South Carolina Act as merely being a "governmental

.
\

serviee. " Clayton_v. Kervick, 56 N. J. 523, 530-531, 267 A. 2d 503,

2.
506-507 ( 1970). The South Carolina Supreme Court, in its opinion
below, described the role of the state as that of a "mere conduit"
S.C. ·--- -· As we conclude that the primary effect of this
Act neither advances nor inhibits religion for the other reasons
stated in this opinion, we need not consider whether the "three test"
standard of Lel!lon invariably applies to the type of "aid" presently
before the Court.

lfp/ss

Rider A, p. 9 (Hunt) 4/7/73

On the record in this case there is no basis to conclude
that the c£ollege functions as a religious entity or that its operations
are oriented significantly towards sectarian rather than secular
education.

/

Rider A, p. 14 (Hunt) 4/7/73_

lfp/ss

Consider adding a footnote at point indicated, as follows:
The gravity of the entanglement problem is also related,
of course, to the extent to which the particular institution is
in fact church related. Although the record in this case is
abbreviated and not free from

JUriiGx

ambiguity, the burden is

on appellant and he has failed to show much more than a
/

'

formalistic church relationship. There are many colleges
throughout the country and especially in some of the southern
states, that were organized by religious denominations and are
still legally controlled by trustees designated by a

/

SEe

secular denominational body, as is true in this case. The trend irl
such colleges, especially in recent years, has been away from
religious emphasis or indoctrination and toward the providing of
conventional college level education leading to A. B. and B. S.
degrees, with a broadly based curriculum which may include
relatively few, if any ;x courses oriented to the particular
denomination which founded the college. So far as the record

2.
in this case goes, there is no showing that Baptist college places
any special emphasis on

Baptist~

denominational or

any other secular type of education. As noted above, both the
faculty and student body are open to persons of all (or no) religious
faiths.

Rider A, p.

lfp/ss

(Hunt) 4/7/73

The Supreme Court of South Carolina expressly found that
the bonds to be issued by the

201

Authority will "not [be] a debt

or obligation of the state''. That court also unequivocally
concluded that:

"There is no cost to the state incident to the entire

plan of financing. " Jurisdictional Statement, p. 19.

Rid~r ~__,P=-·-_ _,_(H_un---'t)---'4"-/7..;../_73

lfp/ss

g~J?.~~de:t:_addinJL~

footnote as follows:

There is nothing presented by this case which resembles the
cumulative impact of the entangelment described in Lemon as
follows:
"A comprehensive, discriminating and continuing
state surveillance will be inevitably be required
to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and
the First Amendment otherwise respected. "
403 U.S. at
.

lfp/ss

Rider A, p.

(Hunt) 4/7/73

The following excerpt from the lower court opinion (the
Court of Common Pleas for Charleston County) might be added
to a note at some appropriate place:
"Since it is conceded that the only remedies of
the bondholders in the event of default is to pursue
the rights of the authority to collect from its
lessee and if need be, to foreclose the Trust
Indenture and have the property sold, the state's
credit can never be adversely affected." Appendix
37.

** *
"I find that the credit of the state can in no way
be considered as aiding in any way the Baptist
College at Charleston. " Appendix 40.

lfp/ss

Rider A, p.

(Hunt) 4/7/73

Consider~ding a footncte as follows:

In

~llen,

this Court commented on the importance of the

role of private education in this country:
"Underlying these cases, and underlying also
the le slattve judgments that have preceded
the Court decisions has been a recognition that
private education has played and is playing a
significant and valuable UJeC role in raising
national levels of owledge, competency and
experience. " Hen, supra 392 U. S. 236 at

..
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would the Authority or the trustee be obligated to take further
action. In that event, the Authority or trustee might either
foreclose on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting

~

of rules, charges and fees. It may be that only the former would

"

be consistent with the Establishment Clause, but we do not now

chi-~ ~~ t..c.-..- H.u.- -~~. vv~l.. ~
have that situation before us;.. We-hold ~sly that ia its ppesent

~~)~~~~1:6~
posturQ , tag College's finaneing

,pPop~sal

does- not fstce excessive

-k~t.~~~~~ .
eBtangleineH:t beb,rQell tb.Q State and 1 eligion.

k~-f~~~

o-r_

1-k.st-

III.

a...

c3.-::::l ~ ~ ../..<)
~-~1-t~

a-...-~~at~

A.Er-w:e-:l~re-~m!=HH:~ea--at~~~Nb. lhi s case comes to ~~ ..
~d_A-/a_, d.e..J~ ~a<:- '
us -ia aH aw!QNaPd postuP~ i(s the court below pointed out,

- -S.C., at - - -·; 187 S.E.2d, at 651, the Act was patterned
~~

closely after the South Carolina Industrial Revenue Bond Act, the

.

~~~
~appears

cr
'

.

U.S.<..~~~ .. ~ .... /2.'"(

to conferA broad power and responsibility on the Authority.

Yet specific provisions of the Act, the Rules and Regulations of the
Authority, and the College's proposal ~ ~J

'

v. McNair, No. 71-1523
9, 1973
MR. JUSTICE POWELL

delivtered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant, a South Carolina taxpayer, brought

l

this action to challenge the South Carolina Educational

. +'' ) (
Facilities

S.C. CODE ANN. wiliiilii§J 22-41 et seq. (Cv?(J.

~upp· IQ/1))

as vit olative of the Establishment Glause of
the First Amendment insofar as it authorizes a proposed

~ ~c-(~~-fcr-&~
financing . . . transaction involvingAthe Baptist College at

0

Charleston.

\

The trial court's denial of relief

was affirmed v

ppzai by the Supreme Court

of South Carolina.
177 s.E.2d 362(1970).
Court

255 s.c. 71,

....-..

..~~.a

This

vacated the judgment and remanded

the case for reconsideration in light of the
intervening decisions in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s.
602(1971)a Earley v. DiCensov 403 u.s. 602(1971) a
Robinson v. DiCenso, 403 u.s. 602(1971); and
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 672(1971).
u.s. 945(1971).

403

On remand, the Supreme Court of

South Carolina adhered to its earlier position.

~
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I.
We begin by
of the Act.

s~ing

out

the

ge~eral

structure

The Act established an Educational Facilities

Authority(the "Authotity"), the purpose of which is "to
assist institutions for higher education in the construction,
financing and refinancing of projects • •

. . , S,C,CODE
II

ANN, .§ 22-41. 4(Cum, Supp. 1971), primarily through the
issuance of revenue bonds.

Under the terms of the

Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities, site
preparation and related items, but may not include
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian
instruction or as a place of religious worship nor
any facility which is used of to be used primarily
in connection with any part of the program of
a school or department of divinity for any religious
denomination. II s.c.CODE ANN.§ 22-41.2(b)(aum. Supp.
1971).
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While

r~venue

the Act is quite explicit that the . . , bonds shall not
be obligations of the State, directly or indirectlya
"( K) Revenue bonds issued under the provisions

of this section shall not be deemed to constitute
a debt or liability of the State or of any political
subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith and
credit of the State or of any such political subdivision, but shall be payable solely from the
funds herein provided therefor from revenues.
All such revenue bonds shall contain on the face
thereof a statement to the effect that neither the
State of South Carolina nor the authority shall be
obligated to pay the same or the interest thereon
except from revenues of the project or the portion
thereof for which they are issued and that neither
the faith and credit nor the taxing power of the
State of South Carolina or of any political _ . .
subdivision thereof is pledged to the payment of
the principal of or the interest on such bonds.
The issuance of revenue bonds under the provisions
of this act shall not directly or indirectly or
contingently obligate the State or any political
subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any form
of taxation whatever therefor or to make any
appropriation for their payment. " s..~ c;
Code ' *Ann. § 22-41(10( €um. J\ipp. 1971).
1

•

Furthermore, since all of the expenses of the Authority

•must

be paid from the revenues of the various projects

·'

·'

in which it participates, S.C.CODE ANN.

77 II

..§22-41.5(Cum. Supp. 1971), none of the general

'

~

l

--- lf
On January 6, 1973, the College submitted to
the Authority for preliminary approval an application for
the issuance of revenue bonds.

Under the proposal,

the Authority would issue revenue bonds and make the

J

proceeds available to the College fo~se in
connection with a portion of its campus to be
designated a project (the "Project") within the meaning
of the Act.

In return, the College would convey the

eroject, Without cost, to the Authority, Which would then
lease the pro• perty so conveyed back to the College.
After repa• yment in full of the bonds, the Project
would be reconveyed to the College.

1

-"to..The Authority granted preliminary approval
on January 16, 1970, 255 s.c., at 76; 177 s.E.2d, at 365.
In its present form, the application requests the
issuance of revenue bonds totaling $1, 250, 000, of which $1, 050, 000
would be applied

t~horl term financing orf5::~

capital improvements and $200, 000 would be applied to the completion
2

of dining hall facilities.

The advantage of financing educational

institutions through a state created authority derives from relevant
provisions of federal and South Carolina state income tax laws which
provide in effect- that the interest on such bonds is not subject
3

to income taxation.

The income tax exempt status of the interest

enables the Authority, as an instrumentality of the state, to market
the bonds at a significantly lower rate of interest than

ke

c~ t> '
_
~I
~
iT)
educationatlns 1fution)borrowed the money by conventional private
I)

·,

financing.

Because the College's application to the

l 1

Authority was __., a preliminary one, the details
of the financing arrangement have not yet been fully
worked out.

But Rules and Regulations adopted by

1

"obligating the Institution that neither the
leased land, nor any facility located thereon,
shall be used for sectarian instruction or as
a place of religious worship, or in connection
with any part of the program of a school or
department of divinity of any religion denomination."
S.C~at
; 187 S.E.2d,
at 647.
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agreement
must allow the Authority to conduct inspections, and any reconveyance to the College must contain a restriction against use for
sectarian purposes. 4 The Rules further provide that simultaneously
with the execution of the lease agreement, the Authority and the
trustee bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would create,
for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseable mortgage lien on
the Project property including a mortgage on the "right, title and
interest of the Authority in and to the lease agreement." Jurisdictional
Statement, Appendix C, p. 50.
Our consideration of appellant's Establishment Clause claim extends only to the proposal as approved preliminarily with such additions as are contemplated by the Act, the rules, and the decisions

-5-

II.
The Court has recently had occasion to
synthesize the principles which goKvern our
consideration of challenges to statutes as
~-' ,_ b/,..s,,_t!,.. +
violative of the
Clausea a
"Three • • • tests may be gleaned from our cases.
First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its ,principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion, • • •

1

finally,the statute must

not foster 'an excessive entanglement with
religion'." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403

u.s.,

With full rec ofgl nition that these are no more than
helpful si. gnposts, we consider

the 1111111

present statute and the proposed transaction
in terms of the three "tests"a purpose, effect, and
entanglement.
The purpose of the statute is manifestly a
secular one.
to all

The befnefits of the Act are available

in~utions

of higher education in South

at 613.

-6-

the introductory p:Raragraph of the Ac,t represents

---

I

anything other than a good faith statement of purposea

••JKJ It 1s 1hereby declared that for .the benefit of the
people of the State, the increase of their commerce, welfare
and prosperity and the improvement of their heal.th and
living conditions it is essential .t hat this and future generations of youth be given the fullest opportunity to learn and
.to develop their intellectual and menta:! capacities; that it
is essential that institutions for higher education within the
State be provided with appropriate additional means to
assist such youth in achieving the required levels of learning
and development of their intellectual and mental capacities;
and that it is the purpose of this section to provide a measure of assistance and an alternative method to en3ible
institutions for higher education in the State to provide the
facilities and· structures which are sorely needed to accomplish the puYiposes of ·t his act, aU to the public benefit and
good, to the extent and manner provided herein. I\

]

1
'

S,C,CODE ANN. j22.41(Cum, Supp, 1971).
The Col•lege and other private institutions
of higher education provide these benefits to the

tate,

As of the academic year 1969-70, there were 1,548
students enrolled in the College, in addition to
approximately 600 night students,

Of these students,

95 % are residents of South Carolina who are thereby
receiving a college education without financial support
from the State lof South Carolina.

B.
To identify "primary effect", we narrow ou•r
focus from the statute as a whole to the only
transaction presently before us.
its initial appeal, the

Whatever may be

-7-

proposition that the Establishment Clause prohibits
any program which in some manner aids an institution
with a religious affilation has consistently been
rejected.

~.,Bradfield

v. Roberts, 175

u.s.

291

(1899); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664(1970);
Tilton v. Richardson, supra.

"'ftated another way'/
•
sur I

I

................................., the Court has

~.A-- . . ~ 1~-1
\recurrent/
firlfti;;6,;.;;~ . . . the •
5
argument that
I

I

I

...

A

all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of
an institution frees

8t •l. .\._•
/ ••T•,-·'--·
' . . to spend

itl s other resourfees on religious ends.
~,

~

•
of

~

v

t-1-

h.o.v

~j

' id
advancing religion when

it flows to an institution • • • in which religion _ ,
is so pervasive that
all functions are subsumed in the religious mission
or when it funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a
specifically religious activity in an otherwise
substantially secular setting.

In Tilton v. Richardson,

supra, the Court refused to strike down ..., a direct

-8-

Connecticut,

MR. CHiHF JUSTICE

BUR~, f~r~lity,

concluded that ..111111..11111111111111..1111.,

..llllil..llllllllllllllllllll.., despite some institutional
rhetoric, none of the four colleges was pervasively
sectarian, but held open ................ that possibiilty
for future casesa
"Individual projects can be properly evaluated
if and when challenges arise with respect to
particular recipients and some evidence is then
presented to show that the institution does in
fact possess these characteristics." 403

u.s.,

at 682,

Appellant has introduced no evidence in the
present case llllllllllllllllllllllllllll.,placing the
i

I

I

College is such a category.

It is true that the llllll.,members of the College
Board of Trustees are elected by

\..,~.f' /South
~

Carolina Baptist Convention, that the approval of the
Convention is required for certain financial transact• ions,
and the the charter of the College may be amended only
1 ikewi.s.E'J

-9-

What little there is in the record concerning the
College establishes that there are no religious
qualification for faculty

me~bership

or student admission,

'is Baptist, a percentage roughly equivalent to
the percentage of Baptists in that area of South
Carolina.

255 s.c., at 85; 177 s.E.2d, at 369,

On the record in this case there is no basis to
cone lude nttzrttm#wtts rf

,

.

that the College's

operations are • oriented significantly towards sectarian
rather than secular education,

-10'

Non~llllll•'..a~;~&R&•a..az
..........£,can

we conclude

that • the proposed transaction will place the Authority
in the position of providing direct support for
religious activities,

The scope of the Authority's

power to assist institutions of higher education
extends only to "projects", and the Act specifically
states that a project "shall not include" any buildings
or facilities used for religious p~oses,

In the

absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume
that all of the

~reposed

financing and refinancing

relates to buildings and facilities within a properly
delimited project,

It is not at all clear from the

record that the portion of the campus to be conveyed by
the College to the Authority and leased back
is the same as that being
financed, but in any event it too must be part
of the ~oject and subject to the same prohibition
against ll~llllllllllf use for religious pijyposes,
In addition, as we have indicated, every lease agreement
must contain a clause forbidding religious use

-11-

c.
The final aaw

I 7

]"(§"

at question posed by

a~

there would beAunconstitutional degree of entanglement
between the State and the College,

Appellant

argues that the Authority would become involved in the
operation of

by inspecting the

project to insure that it is not being used for religious
purposes and by participating in the management
decisions of the College,

-12-

The Court's opinion in Lemon and the plurality
opinion in Tilton

are grounded on the proposition

that the degree of entanglement arising from
inspection of facilities as to use varies _...
in large measure with the extent to which religion
permeates the institution.

In finding excessive entanglement,

the Court in Lemon relied on the "substantial religious
character of these church-related" elementary schools.
11~ Cl/lf; r
i:Tus r~e. t;,
lo , l
of /w~l'l
403 u.s., at 616.

ev

I

/ ..f'()~

l

-lite

Tilton

pltJra/,Y

.......................

/,.,}

----~------ii

placed considerable emphasis on the
I& I

•••ziijt...........s•

5 fact that the federal aid there

S

7

approved would be spea nt in a college settinga
"Since religious indoctrination iKs not
a substantial p~ose or activity of these
church-related ....... colleges and universities,
there is less likelihood than in primary and
secondary schools that religion will permeate
the area of secular education." 403

~· JUSfH~fi WHI!JY ~

Although '

1•

saw

n~clear

u.s.,

distinction,

at 687.

-13-

the legislation here challenged."

u.s. ,

403

at 664.

A ma jority of the Court in Tilton , then, concluded
that on the facts of that case inspection • as to use
did not . . . . threas ten excessive entang• lement .
~·••••••l•t•s..........

As we have indicated above , there

is no evidence here to demonst• rate that the
College is any more an instrument of •. _............ .
religious indoctrination than . - were the colleges
and universities involved in

211&2 diE. 3

f

I

l"

dg • t

~~
t
1

:c. I: :·=
.... .............................

.
--~-I liJ
iii

.

au

~~

Tilto~

~I

I

7? F'fl 7 7

22

3
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I

II

~aI

;.:;; ~

: I I

J

presented by the contention that the Authority
<::6

(~

• ._Abecome

dee ~ly

involved in the day-to - day

financial and policy decisions

..,.

The ....~ .-·...ia Authority is
5

2 21¢21@

\..+4f/

of~ Col£se .

4;-w._

~

empowered !n~
· .
r .tilt. . . . . .

A

"(g) generally, to fix and revise from time
to time and charge and collect rates , rents . fees

I

L

k

l

-14-

person, partnership, association or co- rporation
or other p ' ? '

body public or private in respect

thereof;
(h) to establish rules and regulations for
the use of a project or any p~tion thereof and to
designate a participating institution for higher
education as its agent to establish rules and
regulations for the

use of a project undertaken

for such participating institution for higher
'{_oiiC ~

education • • • •

II

s.c.-a~

u,:):!f_J

.

22-41.4C PH Cum.

These powers are sweeping ones, and were there

Supp~.

&:~

1

~
.A likelihood that they ._ would be exercised in
their full detail, the entanglement problems with

The opinion of the South Carolina Supreme Court,

•t•e•·_...._sg.-

however,

I

reflects a . .

~nterpretation ................ of

~............ operation of~

practical ............

' ~Accor

powers.

the

d'Lng

to that . . . court,

l

-1r-

"Counsel for plaintiff argues that the broad
language of the Act causes the ~ate, of necessity,

\

to become excessively involved in the operation ,

I

management• and administration of the College ,
We do not so construe the Act .

• • • • [ T.]he

basic function of the Authority is to see
• • • that fees are charged sufficient to meet

the bond payments, " sts a

qf- 6.s-l.

_._

..__
.xr• _..zr•m

M

5. C J a.T--; /87 S.l;,c.?d
at n *sr a
a
J

* ,.

2±
••

As we read the College ' s proposal , the Lease Agreement
between the Authority and the College will place on
the College the ......7E777. responsibility for making

1

the detailed decisions regarding the government of
the campus and the fees to be charged _... for

\_po.r-11 tv/a r J

BWitiik~services.

~~~f~s~s~;..
lt-..-fi.......t•g~nM&ss•t•a•a•z•IL

JI

I

-16Specifically, the proposal

states ~

that the Lease

Agreement

I

"will unconditionally obligate the College
(a) to pay sufficient rentals to mee• t the
principal and interest requirements as they become
due on such bonds, (b) to impose an adequate
schedule of charges and fees in order to provide
adequate revenues with which to operate and
maintain the said facila ities and to make the
rental payments • • •

o

II

..

'

Appendix, p. 18.

In short, under the proposed Lease Agreement, neither

I

the

Authority nor a trustee bank

would

~

:;

~ ~LJ~_,~g _ L-..

a=n-- '

?£iw(rt;z=,

I

taking action

.

I

~~
or~ unless the College fails to make.... rental payments/~ tA-L t-4
.
--,~~~

Only if the College refused to meet rental payments
or was unable to do so

-17would the Authority or the trustee be obligated to take
fu• rther action.

In that event, the Authority or -

trustee might either foreclose on the mortgage or take
a hand in the setting of rules, charges and fees.

t iV

~may

be argued that only the former would be

consistent with the Establishemnt Clause, but we do
not now have that situation before us.
III.
This case comes to us as an action for
injunctive and declaratory relief to test
the constitutionality of the Act as applied to a
proposed--rather than an actual--issuance of
revenue bonds.

As the Court below pointed out,

ill:lill?•lllii?.-.P• _ _ _ s. c.

,

at _ _ ; 187 S,E,2d, at 651, the

Act was patterned • • • closely after the South
Carolina Industrial Revenue Bond Act, and
perhaps for this reason appear• s to confer unnec~arily
broad power and responsibility on the Authority,
Ye:st specific provisions of the Act, the
Rules and Regulations of the Authority, and the

-18all as interpreted by the South Carolina Supreme Court,
delimit narrowly those otherwise untrammeled provisions,
and no evidence has been submitted by appellant to
undermine this narrowing.

Accordingly, we affirm

the

holding of the court below that the Act is constitutional
as inta erpreted and applied in this case.

FOOTNOTES

1. At various points during this litigation, appellant has made
reference to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
but has made no arguments specifically addressed to violations
of that Clause except insofar as this Courtrs approach to cases
involving the Religion Clauses represents an interaction of the
two clauses.

2.

As originally submitted by the College and approved by the Authority,
the proposal called for the issuance of "not exceeding $3, 500,000
of revenue bonds .... " 255 S.C., at 75; 177 S.E.2d, at 364. As
indicated by a stipulation of counsel in this Court, the College subsequently secured a bank loan in the amount of $2 , 500, 000 and now
proposes the issuance of only $1, 2 50, 000 in revenue bonds under
the Act, the proceeds to be used:
"(i) to repay in full the Colleger s Current Fund
for the balance (approximately $250, 000) advanced
to the Colleger s Plant Fund as aforesaid; (ii) to
refund outstanding short-term loans in the amount
of $800,000 whose proceeds were to pay off indebtedness incurred for ~ capital improvements,

-2-

3. Gross income for federal income tax purposes does not include
interest on "the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession
of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the
foregoing .... " 26 U.S. C.

l03(a)(l).

§

4. Rule 4 relating to the Lease Agreement provides in part that:
"If the Lease Agreement contains a provision

permitting the Institution to repurchase the
project upon payment of the bonds, then in such
instance the Lease Agreement shall provide that
the Deed of reconveyance from the Authority to the
Institution shall be rm de subject to the condidtion
that so long as the Institution, or any voluntary
grantee of the Institution, shall own the leased
premises, or any part thereof, that no facility
thereon, financed in whole or in part with the proceeds of the bonds, shall be used for secta.rian
instruction or as a place of religious worship, or
used in connection with any part of the program
of a school or department of divinity of any
religious denomination."
S.C., at
--187 S.E.2d, at 647-648.
The Rule goes on to allow the institution to remove this option in
the case of involuntary sales:
"The condition may provide, at the option of the
Institution, that if the leased premises shall become the subject of an involuntary judicial sale,
as a reEUlt of any foreclosure of any mortgage,
or sale pursuant to any order of any court, that
the title to be vested in any purchaser at such
judicial sale, other than the Institution, shall be
in fee simple and shall be free of the condition
applicable to the Institution or any voluntary
grantee thereof."
S.C. , at
; 187 S. E.
?.n

!:It f14R

~1:11:1

not1:1

inf-r_!:l_ _

-'35,

In

Boar~

of Education v. Allen, 392 u.s.

236unftll(l968), this Court commented • on the
importance of the role of private

~education

in

this country a
"Underlying these cases, and underlying
also
the legislative judgments that have preceded the
court decisions, has been a recognition that
private ._ education has played and is playing
a significant and valuable role in raising national
levels of knowledge, competency and
experience." 392 U.S. , at 24 7.

-"t-

-

Appellant also takes issue with the Authority's rule allowing
a purchaser at an involuntary sale to take title free of
restrictions as to religious use. See note _ _ , ante.
Appellant's reliance on . - t Tilton v. Richardson , supra,
in this respect is misplaced. There, the Court struck down
a provision under which the church-related colleges would have
unrestricted use of a federally-financed project after 20 years.
In the present case, by contrast, the restriction against religious

use is lifted not as to the institution seeking the assistance of
the Authority nor as to voluntary transferees, but only as to a
purchaser at a judicial sale. Because some other religious
institution bidding for the property at a judicial sale could purchase the property only by outbidding all other prospective purchasers, there is~~~--.(j)c~dhUTI~th:

\~ ~

use

8t

-~~~~

limitation~
to religion {~-~ ~~
A
·
7.~--......- ~l:i:;i-~

Iii S&iihii&il£1 g

*b

~~~<
* ~~
. ~ i.rz!l:~tH
I
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The

11

state aid 11 involved in this case is a

of a very special sort. We have here no expenditure
of public/funds, either by grant or loan, no reimbursement by a

\

state for expenditures made by a

f}¥~:7Jiril 8r

parochial school or

~
college, and no extending or committing a state's credit.

Rather,

"
the only state aid consists, not of financial assistance directly or
indirectly which would implicate public funds or credit, but the
creation of an instrumentality (the Authority) through which educational
institutions may borrow funds on the basis of their own credit and

~
rt ~ q"W'IA.. ~
securityAupon more favorable interest terms than otherwise would

A

be available.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey characterized the

assistance rendered an educational institution under an act generally
similar to the South Carolina Act as merely being a "governmental
service. " Clayton v. Kervick, 56 N.J. 523, 530-531, 267 A. 2d 503,

I

--o506-507 ( 1970).

:\~he ~
The South Carolina Supreme Court, 1n~

opinion below, described the role of the State as
that of a "mere conduit".
187 S.E. 2d, at

~650-651.

S.c. , at
Because we conclude

that the primary effect of the assistance afforded
here is neither to advance nor to inhibit religion»
for the other reasons stated in this opinion, we

present case is controlled by the decision in
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, where this eourt
upheld a property tax exemption which included religious
institutions.

-?-

~·

~

Although the record in this case is

abbreviated and not free from ambiguity, the
burden rests on appellant to show the extent to
which the College is church-related, and he has failed to
show more than a formalistic church relationship,
As Tilton established, formal denominational
control over a liberal arts college does not render
all aid to the institution a violation of the
Establishment elause,
-

here

So far as the record

*

£1&5

is concerned, there is no showing

that the Collge places any special emphasis on
Baptist denominational or any other sectarian type
of education,

As noted above, both the faculty and

the student body are open to persons of any(or no)
religious affiliation,

which the College would be forced to a pay on the
open market.
Under the Act, the Authority would be accorded

~wers

over the project, including the powers

to determine the fees to be charged for the

\. r<!J'cJitt-1-t~"J/

use of the project and to ~stablish ~
.5ee
an 'fe.. •
! g 1
?for its
adopted by the
I

'

Authority prescribe that • every lease agreement
ttlil$ f
COil fa:f'l
A
afo. V .S e.,
"obligating the ~~titution that neither the leased
land,nor any fac~lity located thereon, shall
be used for sectarian instruction or as
a place of religious worship, or in connection with
any part of the program of a school or
department of divinity of any religious
denomination." ~ ------:' ) . C,..J .., "f- )·

. 18? S, £; Jd). t.t't ' '11
To ~nsure that th~s co• venant

.
~s

\ hon?r:'d J

•

1

1

•

each lease agreement must allow the authority

,

-4~The

proposal contemplates that simultaneously

with IR the execution of the lease agreement,
the Authority and
Trust Indenture, which "shall mortgage
the right, title and interest of the Authority
in and to the Lease Agreement",

flpP~"

ot,:tf, ...ro .
..

]f

2973

I

I

I

S'

On January 6, 1970, the College submitted its
proposal to the Authority for preliminary approval._
and indicated that ................~......~~.......
.................... it would present specific
forms for a Lease Agreement and a . . . Trust Indenture
if preliminary approval was forthcoming.
Appendix, pp, 16-21.
The Autho~ty granted preliminary ,approval
t97D1 J.f.I"S:'-.,t:J&+7C;t11 J".E.l.t11 .,+
on January l6,
but no final terms
have been setr•h•ta_.t•c:..........~~r•n•s_.t_.E....•s~a•z........
.

-17-

would the Authority or the trustee be obligated to
take further act ion.

In that event , kilt &AdJ 2

1

'mr•

the Authority or trustee might
either

fomolos~

mortgage or take a hand in the

setting of rules, . . charges and fees.

\ I t may be that

hi

L .it 5

?

1

j

61

only the former would

be consistent with the Establishment Clause,

jut

we do not now have that situation before us.
\ve hold only that in its present post~e, the
College • s financing proposal does not
force excessive
~between the State and religion,
III.
:uausaa:aa

7

SIB

entanglement~

As we have emphasized throughout, this case
comes to us in

....i_......a.awkward posture.

an~J. .•a•t~·

l)

Ind~strial

Revenue Bond Act, the Act appears to

confer broad

ant power and responsibility on

-

.

- 3"obligating the Institution that neither the
leased land, nor any facility located thereon,
shall be used for sectarian instruction or as
a place of religious worship, or in connection
with any part of the program of a school or
department of divinity of any religion denomination."
S.C. at
; 187 S.E.2d,
at 647.
, __

To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agreement
I

must allow the Authority to conduct inspections, and any reconveyance to the College must contain a restriction against use for

l
simultaneously with the execution of the lease agreement, the
Authority and the trustee bank would enter into a . .lllilllillllll•
Trust Indenture which would create, for the benefit of the bondholders,
a forecloseable mortgage lien on the t

j

a Project property including

a mortgage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority in and
to the lease agreement. " Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix

l

p. 50.
Ovr
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FOOTNOTE TO HUNT, 'PAGE 1

I

At various points during this litigation,

appe. llant has ...- - - made reference to the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
but has •

made no arguments

1 ' 5I

33§ specifically

addressed to violations of that Clause except insot far
as this Court's approach to cases involving the
Riligion Clauses represents an
the two clauses.

i ~teraction

of

FOOTNOTE TO HUNT, PAG

2a
tm College and

approved by the Authority, .._ the proposal called
for the issuance of "not exceeding $3,500,000
of revenue bonds •••• " 255 S.C., at 75; 177 S.E.2d, at 364.
As indicated by a stipulation of counsel in this
Court, the College subsequently secured a

ba~k

loan in the amount of t?2 ,500, 000 and now

'a

...a

proposes the issuance of only $1,250,000 in

revenue bonds under the Act, the proceeds to be used'

,,
, (i) to repay in full the-cOllege's urrent
Fun or e balance (approximately $250,000) advanced
to the College's Plant Fund as aforesaid; (ii) to refund
outstanding short-term loans in the amount of $800,000
whose proceeds were to pay off indebtedness incurred for
capital improvements, and (iii) to finance the completion
of the dlping hall facilities at a cost of approximately
$200,000.

Appendix, p. 49.

FOOTNOTE TO HUNT, PAGE 2a
Gross income for federal income tax purposes
does not include interest on "the obliga• tions
of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United
States, or any political subdivia sion of any of the
foregoing • • • ,"

26 u.s.c. J l03(a)(l).

FOOTNOTE TO HUNT, PAGE THREE.
Rule• 4 relating to the Lease Agreement
provides in part thats
''•· If the LeaseA.greement contains a provision permitting the Institution to repurchase the project upon payment of the bonds, then in such instance the Lease Agreement shall provide that the Deed of reconveyance from the
Authority to the Institution shall be made subject to the
condition that so long as the Institution, or any voluntary
grantee of the Institution, .shall own the leased premises,
or any part thereof, that no facility thereon, financed in
whole or in part with the proceeds of the bonds, shall be
used for .sectarian instruction or as a place of religious
worship, or used in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity of any religious
denomination. ,. . 11

_

S: c ,,_a:r_ j I 8 / .S: t?.. ;J~ q·t - ( 4 7- C 'f8.

The Rule goes on to allow the institution to remove
this• option in the case of involuntary saless
~

fhe condition may provide, at the option of
the Institution, that if the leased prernises shall become the
subject of an involuntary judicial sale, as a !l'esult of any
foreclosure of any mortgage, or sale pursuant to any order
of any court, that the title to be vested in any .p urchaser at
,such judicial sale, other than the Institution, shall be in fee
simple and shall be free of the condition applicwble to the
Institution or 1any vo'luntary grantee thereof."

See..

FOOTNOTE TO HUNT, PAGE TEN.

~Appellant

also takes issue with the Authority's

a•• a

rule allowing . . .

purchaser at an involuntary sale

to take title free of restrictions as to religious use,
, ante. Appell* ant's reliance on

See note

supra, in tQis respect is misplaced.
There, the Court struck down a provision under which
the church-related colleges would have unrestricted use
of a

federally-f ~ ed

l'h& st , trni'Mid z

1
,

project after 20 years.
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In the present case, -
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by contrast,

the restriction against religious use is lifted
.

not as to th

2 ,? g

the institution seeking the

assitance of the Authority nor as to volutary
trasnferees, but only as to a purchaser at a
judicial sale.

Because -•~~t~••••• some

other religious i • nstitution bidding for the property
at a judicial sale could purchase the property only

.,

I

FOOTNOTE TO HUNT, PAGE FOURTEEN

6,

In summarizing the role of the state in

the proposed transaction, the court stated:
"The State plays a passive and very limited role
in the implementation of the Act, serving
principally as a mere conduit through which

--

insv titutions may borrow funds for the purposes
of the Act on a tax-free basis,"

S C,
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

STAT~

No. 71-15:23
Richard W. Hunt, Appellant,

On Appeal from the ~u 
preme Court of South
Robert E. Mc:\lair, Governor
Carolina.,
of South Caroliua, et al.
1'.

[April - . H)73J
MR.
Court

JusTJCB

PowE:LL delivered thP opinion of the

Appellant. a ::-louth Caroli11a taxpayt:>r. brought thlt'
action to challenge the ~outh Carolina Educational
Facilities Act (the "Act"). ~. C. Code Ann. ~~ :2:2-41
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1971). as violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment insofar as it authorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the
issuance of revenue bonds for the beuefit of the BaptiRt
College at Charleston (the "College") .' Thf' trial court'R
denial of relief was affirmed by the ~upreme Court of
South Carolina. 255 S. C. 71. 177 S. E. 2d :3o2 ( HJ70) .
This Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case
for reconsideration in light of the interveniug dPcisions in
Lemon \'. Kurtzman, 403 F. S. 602 ( 1971); Earle.y ,.
DiCenso, 403 r. S. 602 ( 1071) ; Robinson "· DiCenso ,
403 e. S. 602 ( 1971); and Tilton , .. Richardson, 40:3
G. D. 672 (1971). 403 P. S. 94.5 (l~l71J . Ou r(>marHl,
the SupremE' Court of South Carolina adhPn'd to its
1
A1 \'a rtou~ pomt~ dunng tht~ ltttgatton. aptwllnnt hm; uuul<·
rderrHcP to tlw FrPP Ext>rrt~l' Cia 11~r of tlw Fir~t Am<>ndnwnt .
but ha,.; madE' no arguml'llt~ ~pPrifirall~· addn•H,.;<'d to viOlation" of
that ria u~p ('XC'C'jlt tn:sofn r lit' t lu,.; Court'" a ppron eh to C':t"<'" mvoh·)ng thP HPl!gton ( 'Jau,.;p" rrprp,.;pnt" an intNaetwn of tlw t wu

rJHI I ~P:O:,
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earlier position. S. C. - , 187 S. E. 2d 645 ( Hl7:2.\ ,
We now hold that the Act is constitutional.

I
We begin by setting out the general structure of th<'
Act, The Act established an Educational Facilities Au~
thority (the "Authority"), the purpose of which is "to
assist institutions for higher education in the construe·
tion, financing and refinancing of projects , . , .", 8. C.
Code Ann. § 22-41.4 (Cum. 8upp. 1971 ), primarily
through the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms
of the Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities,
site preparation and related items, but may not include
"any facility used or to be used for sectaria11 instruction or as a place of religious worship nor any·
facility which is used or to be used primarily in:
connection with any part of the program of a schoof
or department of divinity for any religious denomination," S. C. Code Ann. ~ 22-41.2 (bl (Cum,
Supp, 1971).
Correspondingly, the Authority is accorded certain powers over the project, including the powers to determinEt
the fees to be charged for the use of the pro.iect and to
establish regulations for its use. See pp. - - - , infra.
While revenue bonds to be used in connection with
a project are issued by the Authority, the Act is quit~
explicit that the bonds shall not be obligations of the
State, directly or indirectly:
"Revenue bonds issued under the provisions of
this chapter shall not be deemed to constitute a
debt or liability of the State or of any political sub-.
division thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit
of the State or of any such political subdivision, but
shall be payable solely from the funds herein provided therefor from revenues. AU such revenue:
honds shall con tai.n ou the face therf'of a staternf'nt
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to the effect that neither the ~tate of :-)outh Car~
olina nor the Authority shall be obligated to pay
the same or the interest thereon except from revenues of the project or the portion thcr·eof for which
they are issued and that neither the faith and credit
nor the taxiJJg power of the Stat<' of South Caroli11a
or of any political subdivision thereof is pledged W
the payment of the principal of or the interest on
such bonds. The issuance of revenue bonds u ncler'
the provisions of this act shall not dir(:\ctly or in~
directly or contingently obligate the ~tate or any
political subdivision thereof to levy or to pledgt' any
form of taxation whatever therefor or to make any
appropriation for their payment." S. C. Code Ann,
~ 22-41.10 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
Moreover. since all of the expense>s of the Authority
must be paid from the revenues of the various projects
in which it participates. S.C. Code Ann.~ 22-41.5 (Cum .
~upp. 1971 ). none of the general revenuPs of ~outh
Carolina is used to support a project.
On January 6, 1970, the College submitted to thC'
Authority for preliminary approval an application for
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the proposal. thC"
Authority would issue the bonds and make the proceeds available to tlw College for usr in connection with
a portion of its campus to be designated a project ( tht>
"Project") within the meaning of the Act. fn rrturn.
the College would convey the Project. without cost, ta
the Authority, which would then lease the property so
conveyed back to the College. After repayment in full
of the bonds, the Project ,,·ould be reconvcyf'd to tlw
College. The Authority granted preliminary approval
on January 16. 1970. 251) i-1. C .. at 76; 177 ~ - E. 2d. at 3ti5
In its present form. th<' application rPquests the issuance of revenue bonds totaling $1.250.000. of which
$.1,0,1)0,000 would lw applied to refund short tt'rm finane ·
ing of r.api tal im provenwu tR and $200 .000 would h~
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applied to the completion of dining hall facilities." Thfi
advantage of financing educational institutions through
a state created authority derives from relevant provisions of federal and South Carolina state income tax
laws which provide in eft'ect that the interest on such
bonds is not subject to income taxation." The income tax
exempt status of the interest enables the Authority, as
all instrumentality of the State, to market the bonds at
a significantly lower rate of interest than the educa~
twnal ii1stitution would be forced to pay if it borrowed
the money by conventional private financing.
Because the College's application to the Authonty was
a preliminary one, the details of the financing arrange~
ment have not yet been fully worked out. But Rules
and Regulations adopted by the Authority govern cer~
taiu of its aspects. See Jurisdictional Statement, Ap2

As onginally submitted by the College and ;1pproved by thr
Authority, the proposal called for the issuance of "hot exceeding
$3,500,000 of rrvenue bonds. . . .'' 255 S. C., at 75; 177 S. E.
2d, at 364. As indicated by a stipulation of counsel m this Court,
the College subsequently :secmrd a bank loan ·m the amount of
$2,500,000 and now proposes the Issuance of only $1,250,000 in
n•venue bonds under the Act, the proc~'eds to br i.tsf'rl.
'· (i) to rrpay m full the Collrge's CurrE:>nt Fund for tlw balanct'
(approximately $250,000) advanced to the CollE>ge's Plant Fund al:l
aforE:>said ; ( ii) to refund outstanding short -term loans iu the amount
of $800,000 whose proreeds werE> to pay ofT indebtednes;; mcurrNI
for capital tmp1'overnents, and (iii) to finance thr completion of the
dming hall facilities at a cost of approximately $200,000." (Emphasis m anginal.) App., p. 49.
"Gros:-; incoml' for federal incorm· tax }JUrposes does not include
interest on "thr obrigations of a State, a Territory, or a pos~e~~tOil
of tlw 1Jnited States, or any polittcal i:iubdivision of any of the
foregoing .. . .'' 26 0. S.C. §103 (a)(l). For statE> tncome tax
purposel:i, gross mcome does nor mcludr interel:it " upon obhga twn~
of the Umted Statel:i or Jtl:i posse8l:iions or of thts State or auy
p olitical :-;ubdivibion thereof
., S. C. Code· Ann. ~ 65-25:3 (4)
(Cum. Supp. 1971)
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pendix C, pp. 47-51. Every lease agreement between the
Authority and an institution must contain a clause
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased
land, nor any facility located thereon, shall be used
for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious
worship, or in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity of any
religious denomination.'' 8. C., at - : 1~7
S. E. 2ct. at 647.
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agreement must allow the Authority to conduct inspections,
and any reconveyance to the College must contain a
restriction against use for sectarian purposes. 1 The Rules
further provide that simultaneously with the executi011
Rulr 4 rrlatmg to thr Lem;e Agreement provide~ 1n part that:
''If the Lea~e Agreemrnt contains a provision prrmitting thr Instil ution to repurchase the projrct upon payment of the bonds, thrn
in such instance the Lease Agreement shall provide that the Deed
of reconvryancr from the Authority to the Institution shall be mach•
subject to the condition that so long as the lnstitutwn, or any
voluntary grantee of the Institution, shall own the leased prt>m1se::;,
or any part thereof, that no facility thereon, financed m whole or
in part w1th the proceeds of tht> bond;;, ~;hall be used for secranan
instrnct1011 or a;,; a placr of religious worsh1p, or used 111 connection
with any part of the program of a school or department of divmit~ ·
of any religiou~ denomination." S. C., at - ; 187 S E. 2d, at
647-(:\48.
'1

The Rule goe~ on to allow the institution to remove th1s optwn Ill
the case of involuntary sales:
"The condition may prov1de, at the option of tht> Institution, that
i[ the leased premises shall become thr subject of an mvoluntar~ ·
judicml ~alt>, as a result of any foreclosure of any mortgnge, or ::;a]('
pursuant to any order of any court, that the titlr to be vested in
any purchn~er at such Judicial tiHle, otlwr than the lnstitutwn, shall
bt> m fee simple and shall br free of tlw condition applirnble to thP
Inst1tutwn or any voluntary granter thereof'" S. C., at - · :
IH7 S E 2d, at 04N. Set' n. fi, infra..
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of the lease agreement, the Authority and the trustee
bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseablE'
mortgage lieu on the Project property including a mortgage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority in
and to the lease agreement." Jurisdictional Statement.
Appendix C', p. 50.
Our consideration of appellant's Establishment Clause
claim extends only to the proposal as approved preliminarily with such additions as are contemplated by
the Act, the rules, and thP decisions of thP courts below.
II
This Court has recently had occasion to synthesize thE'
principles which govern our consideration of challenges
to statutes as violativE' of the Establishment ClausP ·
"Three . . . tests may be gleaned from our cases.
First, the statute must have a secular legislativ(:'
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits rehgion, . . . ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive entanglement with religion.' ,. Lemon \r.
Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., at 612-fH3.
With full recognition that these are no more than helpful signposts, we consider the present statute and the
proposed transaction in terms of thP threP "tests" . purpose, effect. and entanglement.
A

The purpose of the statute is manifestly a secular mw
ThP benefits of the Act are available to all institutious
of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not
having a religious affiliation. While a legislature's declaration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to it!).
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true intent, appellant makes no suggestion that the in~
troductory paragraph of the Act represents anything
other than a good faith statement of purpose ·

"It is hereby declared that for the benefit of thE~
people of the State, the increase of their commerce,
welfare and prosperity and the improvement of
their health and living conditions it is essential that
this, and future generations of youth be given the
fullest opportunity to learn and to develop theil'
intellectual and mental capacities; that it is essential that institutions for higher education within
the State be provided with appropriate additional
J'!leans to assist such youth in achieving the required
levels of learning and development of their intellectual and mental capacities; and that it is the
purpose of this section to provide a measure of aR~
sistance and an alternative method to enable institutions for higher education in the State to provide the facilities and structures which are sorely
needed to accomplish the purposes of this act, all
to the public benefit and good, to the extent and
manner provided herein." S. C. Code Ann. ~ 22.41
(Cum . Supp. 1971).
The College and other private institutions of higher
eduqation provide these benefits to the State.'' As of the
academic year 1969-1970, there were l.M8 studentR
In Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 2:36 ( 19ok) , thir; Com1
commrnted on the importance of the rolr of privatr educatwn w
this country:
5

"Underlying thr~e caRes, and underlying also the lrgisla!ivr judgment::; .that havr preceded the court decisions, has been a recognition
that pnvate educatwn has played and i8 playing a tligmficant and
wtluable rolr in nosing natiOILc'll lrvrl~ of knowlrdge , com]wtrnrP, and
e'xpenenrr." :{92 F. 8., at 247.
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enrolled in the College, in addition to approximately 600
night students. Of these students, 95% an~ residents of
Routh Carolina who are thereby receiving a college education without financial support from the Stat<' of South
C'arolina.

B
To identify "primary effect," we narrow our focus fron1
the statute as a whole to the only transaction presently
before us. Whatever may be its initial appeal, the proposition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any program which in some manner aids an institution with a
religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. E. y.,
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Tilton \'. Richardson ,
supra. Stated another way, the Court has not accepted
the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden becausE>
aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its
other resources 011 religious ends.
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect
of advancing religion when it flows to an institution iu
which religion is so pervasive that all functions are subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially
secular setting. In Tilton v. Richardson, supra, th0·
Court refused to strike down a direct federal grant to
four colleges and universities in Connecticut. MH.
CHIEF JusrJcE BuHGEH, for the plurality, concluded that
despite some institutional rhetoric, noue of the four
colleges was pervasively sectarian, but held open that
possibility for future cas0s .
"Individual projects can be properly
and wheu challenges arise with respect
rPcipients and some evidence is then
show that the institution Joes in fact
c:baractPristics.·· 403 11. S .. at fiR~.

evaluated 1f
to particular
presented to
possess thesf';
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Appellant has introduced uo evidence in the preseut
case placing the College in such a category. It is truE\
that the members of the College Board of Trustees an=1
Plected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention, that
the approval of the Convention is rPquired for certain
financial transactions, and that the charter of the Collegt>
may be amended only by the Convention. But it was
likewise true of the institutions involved in Tilton that
they were "governed by Catholic religious organizations.''
403 U. S., at 686. What little there is in the record con~
cerning the College establishes that there are no rc·ligious qualifications for faculty membership or student
admission, and that only 60% of the College student body
is Baptist. a percentage roughly equivalent to the percentage of Baptists in that area of South Caroliua.
255 S.C., at 85; 177 S. E. 2d, at 369. On the record i1f
this case there is no basis to couclude that the Collegers
operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian·
rather than secular educatioll.
Nor can we conclude that the proposPd transactiolf
will place the Authority in the position of providing:
direct support for religious activities. The scope of tlw
Authority's power to assist institutions of highPr educatiOn extends only to "projects," and the Act. specifically
states that a project "shall not include" any buildings or
facilities used for religious purposes. In the absence of
evidencP to the contrary, we must assume that all of
the proposed financing and refinancing relates to buildings and facilities within a properly delimited project .
1t is not at all clear from the rPcord that thP portion
of the campus to be conveyed by tlw College to the Au thority and leased back is the same as that being financed.
but in any eveut it too must be part of the Project a1HI
subjPct to thP same prohibition against use for religiou::;
purposes. In addition, as we have indicated. every least·
agrePnwnt must nontaill a clausP forhidding religiow~ U1-\e
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aml another allowing inspC'ctions to enforce the agrec3 -'
ment." For these reasons. we are satisfied that implementation of the proposal will not have the primary rft'ec·t
of advancing or inhibiting religiou.'
"Apprllant al::>o takl'::> I::>l:iUt' wtth tl1l' Authonty'~ rule allowutp; :1
purrha:,;n at an mvoluntary "'alr to takt' ltlll' fn't' of rr:,;tnctiOn~ :t:<
to rl•ligiou~ u"'r. t:lee n. 4. aute. AppPllant',; rdtHJlCl' Oil 'l'1lt011
v. ltu:harrl8on, 8upra. in thi::> re::;prct I::> mt~placrd. Thc•re, tlw Court
::>truck down a provi~ion under whtch thr church-rrlate•d college·~
would ha V<' unrr~t rlcted u;;r of a fpderally fin a IH'Pd pro.ie'rt a ftrr
20 yt'a r::>. In tl1C' prt>::>ent ra;;r, b~· coni ra,;t, 1he re~t rict 1011 aga in~l
religion:; u::>e I::> lifted not a:s 1o t lw in~lttutwn ::>Peking i ht' a;;::>I~tanec•
of thr Authority nor a~ to voiuntar~· t ran~frrrr;; , but only as to a
purcha;;er at a judicial t::alr. Bc'cau::>e ;;ome other religiou~ 111::> 1It utwn
bidding for the propNty at a judicial ;;ale· could JHircha;;r thr propen~· only by out bidding all other pro::;pect tvr purcba::>t'rs , thpre ~~
onl.1· a ~peeulat ive possibiht ~· that t lw a.b:srnce of a use lunita t ioll
would ever afford :ud to rdtgtoll. Evc'll 111 ::;uch a11 PvPnt, the
acquinng rel!gwu:s in;;tJtlltiO!l pn•sumabi~· would have· had to pay
the tlH'tl f:ur valup of thr propPrt~· .
'Tl1C' "::;tate aid" mvolvrd in th1,; ca,;e 1:,; of a vrry tiJWCial sort
We have here no expenditun' of public fund::; , eithrr b~· grant or
loan, no rrnnbur::;pmpnt by a Statr for expPmliturr:s made by a
parochial ::;chool or colh·gP, and uo Pxtendmg; or commit t mg of a
Statr ';; rrrdti. Hathrr , tlw onl~· ::;tatc• mel coutii:st~. not of finanr11tl
a~ti i"tancr directly or mc!Ircctly wh1rh would nrplicate public fund:-:
or rrPdit , but tlw crPat1on of an tn;;trumruta!tty (thP Authority)
through wlllch PducatiOnal Ill~tit utton,.; may borrow fund:-: on thP
ha~i" of thc'Ir own credit nud thr ;;Pctlrit~· of tlwll' own propNiy
upou more favorablP mten':st tenn~ than othprwi::;P would he~ avaiiabk. The Supr<'mP Court of New .Je·r~<'~· dJHrartcnz<'d thl' a:-:tit::;tanct· rC'nclen'd an t~clucational m;;titutiOn undPr an act gc'IH'rHll~·
~imtlar to the South Carolina Art ati mpr('[y bemg a "govrrnnwntal
~NvirC' " Clayton v K ermrk. 5o ~ .. J. 52:~ . 5:30- 5:31, :257 A. :2cl
50:3. 50{i- 507 (1970). Tlw South Cnrollna 8upn'll1l' Court, 111 tht>
op1n10n bPlow. de::;rnbed tlw role• of the State a;; that ol a "nwn·
condtut. " S. C. , at - ; 1S7 S. E. :Zd. nt H50. Becau::;c• w<·
('Ollrlude thnl tlw primilr~· c•ff<'ct of the ati::;t:-:lance afforded hrrc• i~
lWithPr to aclvnnrl' nor to inll!blt n•hgwn under Lemo·n and Tiltoli.
W<' tH•ed not d('cidr whl'ther. n:-: appellC't· :11·gm·;;, Appl'llee '::; Bm{ ]J
I.} , thn nnportaiH'C' of thl' tax c•xPnlption 111 the' South C.\nohna
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'rhe final question poseu by this case is whether unckr
the arrangement there would be an unconstitutional cle~
gree of entanglement between the State and the CollP~H' .
Appellant argues that the Authority would become .illvolved in the operation of the College both by inspecting
the project to insure that it is not being used for religious
purposes and by participating in the management decisions of the College.
The Court's opinion in Lemon and the plurality opinion in Tilto·n are grounded on the proposition that the
degree of entanglement arising from inspection of faM
cilities as to use varies in large measure with the extent
to which religion permeates the institutiou. In finding
excessive entan.g lement, the ' Court in Lemon relied on
the "substantial religious character of these ch urchM
related" elementary schools. 403 U. S., at '616. MR.
CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER's opinion for the plurality in
Tilton placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the
federal aid there approved would be spent in a colle~e
setting :
"'~ince

religious indoctnnation .is not a substantial purpose or activity of these church-related col ~
leges and universities, there is less likelihood than
in primary ancl secondary schools that religion vvill
permeate thP area of secular education." 403 U.:...;.
at f\H7.
Although MR. JusTICB WHITB saw nu such clear distinrtion. he concurred in the result, stating
"It 1s enough for me that ... the Federal Govemment I is I financing a separable functiop of OV('r;;clwmc bnug~ tlw prl'~<·nt ra~<' UJI(IN Wa/z \' . Tax C01run'u , snprn.
wlwrr th1~ Comt uplwld a local prop<'rty l<IX <'X<'mption whirh 111

<'ludcd rrhgJous

Justit\Jtion~ .
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ndi ng im portaiH'P i 11 order to sustain the IPgislatioi t
here challenged." 403 t:. S .. at ()04
A 1najority of the Court in 'l'illo11, tlH'Il. concluded that
on the facts of that case inspection as to usc did not.
thn•aten c•xcc•ssive entangknwnt. As W<' have indicated
abow. there is no evidenc<' here to dc•monstrate that the
College> is any more an instrUinent of religious indoctrination than were tlw eolleges and universities in vol V('d in

T'ilto11 .'
r\ closc•r ISsue liiHler our precedents is presented by

the contentiou that the Authority could become deeply
involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions
of the College. The Authority is empowNed by the Act.
" (g) lg Ieiierally. to fix and revise from tinlt' to
time and charge and collect rates. n~nts. fees and
charges for the• use of a1td for the servicPs furnishPd
or to ])(' furnished by a project or any portion tht•rcof
and to contract "·ith any perso11, partitership. association or corporation or other body public or pnvate i11 r<'Sl)('Ct tlwreof;
"(h) to establish rulc•s a1td regulatwns for the U!::C'
of a pro.JPCt or a11y portion thereof and to designate'
a participating institution for higher education as
its agent to establish rulE's and n•gulations for the
'Althoulo(h the n·C'ord 111 thi>< c·;)~t· 1~ HhiJn•vJHtc•d a11d 11ut fn•t·
from amllilo(tlil.\', llw hurdc•11 n·><t" 011 appeiiHIIt to ~ho\\' ilw c•xtent
to which tlw ('ollc•gt· 1~ !'hurrh-rPIHtc·cl. d. Board of Hdtu·atiull ,.,
A/leu. &U/11'11. :m:2 l'. :-;., :tt :2-J.:-:, :tnd he• ha~ failrd to ~how mon•
than :t formali,tH· ('hurC'h rC'Iatiollt<lllp . ..-\~ Tilton P~tHhli,hcd. formal dc·nomJn<tl ion:tl C'ont rol uyc•r a lil)('r:tl art~ collc·~?;P doC'' not
rrndf•r all aid to iiH· in,.;tttlltton a nolalwn of thp J<:,tahli,.;hntl•nt
Clau,.;l'. Ro far a~ IIH• rc·C'onl hPn· It< c·otH·t•rnrd. tlwrP 1,.; no ~bowing
that lhc• C'ollc·gc· plael·~ an~ · "Jll'elltl t•lnpha"l" on Bapt1,.;1 cll'IIOllltll;t ttOll<ll or :111~ · other ,.;(•c·tnnan t~ ' ]H' of f•clucation . !\~ notc>d ai>Ovc·.
both tlw faC'ult~ · and tlw "tudC'Jlt hod~ · an· opPn to p('l',.;on" of an:
( tll' 110) rPitgtoll" :dfiita I ton.
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usc' of a pro.wet undertaken for such participating
i11Stitution for higlwr eclucatiou.
S. C. Code
Ann. ~ :2:2- 41.4 (C'ulll. Supp. 1071 ).
These powers are sweeping ones. and we're there !:l
realistic likelihood that thPy would be exercised in thei1·
full cktail. tlH' rntanglelllent problems \\·ith the proposed transaction would 110t be insignificant.
AI' the ~outh Carolina ~uprcme Court pointC'd out.
the Act was patterned closely after the South Carolina
fnctustrial Revenue Bond Act. ~. C .. at ; 187
S. E. :2d. at ()51. and perhaps for this reason appears to
confer UlllWCCssarily broau power and responsibility on
th~ Authority. The opinion of that court. howevc•r. r<'flects a narr<m interpretation of the practical OJWratioJI
of thesf' powers.
"CouJJsel for plaintiff argues that the broad language of the Act causes the StatE'. of nec<'ssity. to
lwconw <'xeessi ve ly involved in the operation. maJJagement and administration of the College. We do
IT Ihe basic fulletion
not so c·onstrue the Act. . .
of the Authority is to see ... that fees arc charged
sufficient to meet the boud payments." S. (' ..
at : 1R7 ~. E. :2d, at 651
As \H' read the ( 'ollege's proposal. the Lease Agn'cment
between the Authority and the College will place on the
( 'ollege the responsibility for making the detailed dE'ci8ions regarding the govprnment of the campus and tlw
fees to be charged for particular services. Specifically.
the proposal states that the Lease Agreenwn t
"will unconditionally obligate the College (a) to
pay sufficient rentals to meet tlw principal and in.
terest requirPments as they become due on such
bonds. I andl (b) to impose an adequate schedule of
charges and fees in order to provide' adequatP reve,
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nues with which to operate and maintain tlw said
facilities and to make the rental paynH'Jits . . . :·
App., p. 1~ .

Jn short. under the proposed Lease Agreement. neither
the Authority nor a trustee bank would be j ustificd in
taking action unless the College fails to make the pn•scribecl rental payments or otherwise defaults in it::;
obligations. Only if the College refused to meet rental
payments or was unable to do so would the Authorit_,.
or the trustee be obligated to take further actio11. In
that (-'vent, the Authority or trustee might either fore close on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting of
rules. charges. and fees. It may be argued that only
the former would be consistent with the Establishment
Clause, but we do not now have that situation beforr us

HI
This case comes to us as an actwn for Ill.Juncbve and
declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of thr
Act as applied to a proposed-rather than an actualissuance of revenue bonds. The specific provisions uf
the Act under which the bonds will be issued. the Rules
and Regulations of the Authority, and the College's proposal- a!J as interpreted by the South Carolina :-luprE'nw
Court- confine the scope of the assistance to the secular
aspEcts of this liberal arts college and do not foreshad<)IY
excessive entanglement between the State and religio11 .
Accordingly. v,:c affirm the holding of the court below
that the Act is constitutional as interpreted and applied
ll\ this case .
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Appellant, a South Carolina taxpayer, brought this
action to challenge the South Carolina Educational
Facilities Act (the "Act"), S. C. Code Ann. §§ 22-41
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1971), as violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment insofar as it authorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the
issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of the Baptist
College at Charleston.t The trial court's denial of relief was affirmed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. 255 S. C. 71, 177 S. E. 2d 362 (1970). This
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of the intervening decisions in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Earlery v.
DiCenso, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Robinson v. DiCenso,
403 U. S. 602 (1971); and 1'ilton v. Richardson, 403
U. S. 672 (1971). 403 U. S. 945 (1971). On remand,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina adhered to its
1

At various points during this litigation, appellant has made
reference to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
but has made no arguments specifically addressed to violations of
that clause except insofar as this Court's approach to cases inYolving the Religion Clauses represents an interaction of the t\v()
clauses.
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earlier position. S.C.-, 187 S. E. 2d 645 (1972).
We now hold that the Act is constitutional.
I

We begin by setting out the general structure of the
Act. The Act established an Educational Facilities Authority (the "Authority"), the purpose of which is "to
assist institutions for higher education in the construction, financing and refinancing of projects .... ", S. C.
Code Ann. § 22--41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971), primarily
through the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms
of the Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities,
site preparation and related items, but may not include
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious worship nor any
facility which is used or to be used primarily in
connection >vith any part of the program of a school
or department of divinity for any religious denomination." S. C. Code Ann. § 22-41.2 (b) (Cum.
Supp. 1971).
Correspondingly, the Authority is accorded certain powers over the project, including the powers to determine
the fees to be charged for the use of the project and to
establish regulations for its usc. See pp.-- -,infra.
While revenue bonds to be used in connection with
a project arc issued by the Authority, the Act is quite
explicit that the bonds shall not be obligations of the
State, directly or indirectly:
"(K) Revenue bonds issued under the provisions
of this section shall not be deemed to constitute a
debt or liability of the State or of any political subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit
of the State or of any such political subdivision, but
shall be payable solely from the funds herein provided therefor from revenues. All such revenue
bonds shall contain on tho face thereof a statement

71-1523-0PINION
HUNT v. McNAIR

to the effect that neither the State of South Carolina nor the authority shall be obligated to pay
the same or the interest thereon except from revenues of the project or the portion thereof for which
they are issued and that neither the faith and credit
nor the taxing power of the State of South Carolina
or of any political subdivision thereof is pledged to
the payment of the principal of or the interest on
such bonds. The issuance of revenue bonds under
the provisions of this act shall not directly or indirectly or contingently obligate the State or any
political subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any
form of taxation whatever therefor or to make any
appropriation for their payment." S. C. Code Ann.
§ 22-41 (10) (Cum. Supp. 1971).
Furthermore, since all of the expenses of the Authority
must be paid from the revenues of the various projects
in which it participates, S. C. Code Ann. § 22-41.5 (Cum.
Supp. 1971), none of the general revenues of South
Carolina is used to support a project.
On January 6, 1973, the College submitted to the
Authority for preliminary approval an application for
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the proposal, the
Authority would issue revenue bonds and make the proceeds available to the College for use in connection with
a portion of its campus to be designated a project (the
"Project") within the meaning of the Act. In return,
the College would convey the Project, without cost, to
the Authority, which would then lease the property so
conveyed back to the College. After repayment in full
of the bonds, the Project would be reconveyed to the
College. The Authority granted preliminary approval
on January 16, 1970, 255 S.C., at 76; 177 S. E. 2d, at 365.
In its present form, the application requests the issuance of revenue bonds totaling $1,250,000, of w·hich
$1,050,000 would be applied to refund short term financing of capital improvements and $200,000 would be
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applied to the completion of dining hall facilities. 2 The
advantage of financing educational institutions through
a state created authority derives from relevant provisions of federal and South Carolina state income tax
laws which provide in effect that the interest on such
bonds is not subject to income taxation.R The income tax
exempt status of the interest enables the Authority, as
an instrumentality of the State, to market the bonds at
a significantly lower rate of interest than the educational institution would be forced to pay if it borrowed
the money by conventional private financing.
Because the College's application to the Authority was
a preliminary one, the details of the financing arrangement have not yet been fully worked out. But Rules
and Regulations adopted by the Authority govern certain of its aspects. See Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix C, pp. 47-51. Every lease agreement between the
Authority and an institution must contain a clause
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased
land, nor any facility located thereon, shall be used
2 As originally submitted by the College and approved by the
Authority, the proposal called for the issuance of "not exceeding
$3,500,000 of revenue bonds. . . . " 255 S. C., at 75; 177 S. E.
2d, at 364. As indicated by a stipulation of counsel in this Court,
the College subsequently secured a bank loan in the amount of
$2,500,000 and now proposes the issuance of only $1,250,000 in
revenue bonds under the Act, the proceeds to be used:
"(i) to repay in full the College's Current Fund for the balance
(approximately $250,000) advanced to the College's Plant Fund as
aforesaid; (ii) to refund outstanding short-term loans in the amount
of $800,000 whose proceeds were to pay off indebtedness incurred
for capital improvements, and (iii) to finance the completion of the
dining hall facilities at a cost of approximately $200,000." App.,
p. 49.
a Gross income for federal income tax purposes docs not include
interest on "the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession
of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the
foregoing . . . . " 26 U. S. C. § 103 (a) (1).
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for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious
worship, or in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity of any
religion denomination." -S.C., at-; 187 S. E.
2d, at 647.
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agreement must allow the Authority to conduct inspections,
and any reconveyance to the College must contain a
restriction against use for sectarian purposes. 1 The Rules
further provide that simultaneously with the execution
of the lease agreement, the Authority and the trustee
bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseable
mortgage lien on the Project property including a mortgage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority in
Rule 4 relating to the Lease Agreement provides in part that:
''If the Lease Agreement contains a provision permitting the Institution to repurchase the project upon payment of the bonds, then
in such instance the Lease Agreement shall provide that the Deed
of reconveyance from the Authority to the Institution shall be made
subject to the condition that so long as the Institution, or any
voluntary grantee of the Institution, shall own the leased premises,
or an~r part thereof, that no facility thereon, financed in whole or
in part with the proceeds of the bonds, shall be used for sectarian
instruction or as a place of rrligious worship , or used in connection
with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity
of any religious denomination." S. C., a t - ; 187 S. E. 2d, at
647-648.
The Rule goes on to allow the institution to remove this option in
the case of involuntary sales:
"The condition may provide, at the option of the Institution, that
if the leased premises shall become the subject of an involuntary
judicial sale, as a result of any foreclosure of any 'mortgage, or sale
pursuant to any order of any court, that the title to be vesLed in
any purchaser at such judicial sale, other Limn the Institution, shnll
be in fee simple and shall be free of the condition applicable to the
Iust itution or any voluntary grantee thereof." S. C., at - ;
187 S. E. 2d, at 648. See n. - , infra.
4
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and to the lease agreement." Jurisdictional Statement,
Appendix C, p. 50.
Our consideration of appellant's Establishment Clause
claim extends only to the proposal as approved preliminarily with such additions as are contemplated by
the Act, the rules, and the decisions of the courts below.
II

The Court has recently had occasion to synthesize the
principles which govern our consideration of challenges
to statutes as violative of the Establishment Clause:
"Three . . . tests may be gleaned from our cases.
First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither· advances nor· inhibits religion, ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v.
Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., at 613.
With full recognition that these are no more than helpful signposts, we consider the present statute and the
proposed transaction in terms of the three "tests": purpose, effect, and entanglement.

A
The purpose of the statute is manifestly a secular one.
The benefits of the Act are available to all institutions
of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not
having a religious affiliation. While a legislature's declaration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its
true intent, appellant makes no suggestion that the introductory paragraph of the Act represents anything
other than a good faith statement of purpose:
"It is hereby declared that for the benefit of the
people of the State, the increase of their commerce,
welfare and prosperity and the improvement of
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their health and living conditions it is essential that
this and future generations of youth be given the
fullest opportunity to learn and to develop their
intellectual and mental capacities; that it is essential that institutions for higher education within
the State be provided with appropriate additional
means to assist such youth in achieving the required
levels of learning and development of their intellectual and mental capacities; and that it is the
purpose of this section to provide a measure of assistance and an alternative method to enable institutions for higher education in the State to provide the facilities and structures which are sorely
needed to accomplish the purposes of this act, all
to the public benefit and good, to the extent and
manner provided herein." S. C. Code Ann. § 22.41
(Cum. Supp. 1971).
The College and other private institutions of higher
education provide these benefits to the State." As of the
aeademic year 1969-1970, there were 1,548 students
enrolled in the College, in addition to approxima.tely 600
night students. Of these students, 95% are residents of
South Carolina who are thereby receiving a college education without financial support from the State of South
Carolina.
B
To identify "primary effect," we narrow our focus from
the statute as a whole to the only transaction presently
5 In Boatd of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 ( 1968), this Court
commented on the importance of the role of private education in
this country:

"Underlying theF<e case<', and underlying also the legi~lnti,·e judgments that have preceded the court decision~, hns been a recognition
that printte education has played and is playillg a significant and
valuable role in raising national levels of knowledge, competency and
experience." 392 U. S., at 247.
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before us. Whatever may be its initial appeal, the proposition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any program which in some manner aids an institution with a
religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. E. g.,
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Tax
Cornrn'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Tilton v. Richardson,
supra. Stated another way, the Court has not accepted
the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because
aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its
other resources on religious ends.
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect
of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in
which religion is so pervasive that all functions are subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially
secular setting. In Tilton v. Richardson, supra, the
Court refused to strike down a direct federal grant to
four colleges and universities in Connecticut. MR.
CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER, for the plurality, concluded that
despite some institutional rhetoric, none of the four
colleges was pervasively sectarian, but held open that
possibility for future cases:
"Individual projects can be properly evaluated if
and when challenges arise with respect to particular
recipients and some evidence is then presented to
show that the institution does in fact possess these
characteristics." 403 U. S., at 682.
Appellant has introduced no evidence in the present
case placing the College in such a category. It is true
that the members of the College Board of Trustees are
elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention, that
the approval of the Convention is required for certain
financial transactions, and the charter of the College
may be amended only by the Convention. But it was
likewise true of the institutions involved in 'Pilton that
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they were "governed by Catholic religious organizations."
403 U. S., at 686. What little there is in the record concerning the College establishes that there are no religious qualifications for faculty membership or student
admission, and that only 607o of the College student body
is Baptist, a percentage roughly equivalent to the percentage of Baptists in that area of South Carolina.
255 S. C., at 85; 177 S. E. 2d, at 369. On the record in
this case there is no basis to conclude that the College's
operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian
rather than secular education.
Nor can we conclude that the proposed transaction
will place the Authority in the position of providing
direct support for religious activities. The scope of the
Authority's power to assist institutions of higher education extends only to "projects," and the Act specifically
states that a project "shall not include" any buildings or
facilities used for religious purposes. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, we must assume that all of
the proposed financing and refinancing relates to buildings and facilities within a properly delimited project.
It is not at all clear from the record that the portion
of the campus to be conveyed by the College to the Authority and leased back is the same as that being financed,
but in any event it too must be part of the Project and
subject to the same prohibition against use for religious
purposes. In addition, as we have indicated, every lease
agreement must contain a clause forbidding religious use
and another allowing inspections to enforce the agreement.6 For these reasons, we are satisfied that imple6
Appellant abo ta kes issue with t he Authori ty's rule allowiug a
purchaser at an involuntary sale t o take t itle free of restrictions as
to religious use. See n. - , ante. Appellant's reliance on Tilton
v. R ichardson, supra, in this respect is misplaced. There, the Court,
struek down a provision under which t he church-related colleges
would ha1·e unrestricted usc of a federally financed project a fter
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mentation of the proposal will not have the primary effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion. 7

c
The final question posed by this case is whether under
the arrangement there would be an unconstitutional de20 ~·enrR. In the present cnse, by contrnst, the rrstriction nl!;ninst
rrligions uRe is lifted not as to the inst itntion serking the aRsistnnre
of the Authorit~r nor as to voluntnry trnnsfrrees. but only ns to a
Jlurrhnser nt n ,iudicinl sale. Becnuse f'ome othPI' religions institution
bidding for the property nt a jndirial sale could purchase the propNt~r only by outbidding all other pro>:perti1·e purcha~ers, there is
only n speeulntiw possibilit~· thr~t the r~bRrlwe of a usr limitation
would evrr nfford aid to rrli~tion. En:•n in such nn e1·cnt , the
nrquiring religion" institution prrsumnbl~· would hnYr hnd to pn~·
the then fnir vnlue of the propert~· ·
7
The "state aid" involved in this cnse is of n very special sort.
We hnvc here no exprnditme of public funds, either by grnnt. or
lor~n, no reimbmsement b~· a State for expenditures mr~de b~· a
pnrochinl school or college, and no extending or committing of a
Str~tc's rredit. Rather, the on!~· stnte nid ronsists, not of finnnrinl
nssistnnre dirrrtly or indirertl~· whirh would implicnte public funds
or credit, but the rrention of an instrumentality (the Anthorit~·)
through which rducntionnl institutions mn~· borrow funds on the
bn~is of their own credit and the srrurit~' of their m1·n proprrty
upon morr f:n·ornhlc interest terms thnn otherwise \Yatud be nvnilnble. The Suprcmr Court of New .Tcr~ry chnrnrtcrized the [tssistnnre rendcrrd rtn educntional institution undrr nn net gcncrnlly
~imil::tr to thr Routh Carolinn Art ns mere!~· bring n "govcmrncntnl
scn·irc." Clayton "· Krrvick. 56 N . .T. 52::l. 530-531, 267 A. 2d
503. 506-507 ( 1970). Thr So nth Cnrolinn Supreme Court, in the
opinion below, dcRcribcd the role of the Stnte fiR thrtt of n "mere
rondnit." S. C., nt. - ; 1~7 8. E. 2d, nt 650-6f>l. Bcrnnse
\Ye conclude thnt llH' primnr~· effect of the nssistance nffordrd here
i~ ncithrr to nd1·anre nor to inhibit religion for the otb<'l' rrnson~
stntcd in t hiR opinion. \\' P nrNl not drridr wbrthcr. ns nppcllcr n rgurs,
Apprllcc's Brief, p. 14. the prc~cnt rnsc i~ controlled b~· the drrision
in TValz "· Comm'n. supra. whrrr thi~ Comt upheld n propcrt~· tnx
exrmption which inrludcd rrli!):ions institutions.
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gree of entanglement between the State and the College.
Appellant argues that the Authority \Yould become invoi\red in the operation of the College both by inspecting
the project to insure that it is not being used for religious
purposes and by participating in the management decisions of the College.
The Court's opinion in Lemon a11d the plurality opinion in Tilton are grounded on the proposition that the
degree of entanglement arising from inspection of facilities as to use varies in large measure with the extent
to \Yhich religion permeates the institution. In finding
excessive entanglement, the Court in Lemon relied on
the "substantial religious character of these churchrelated" elementary schools. 403 U. S., at 616. Mr..
CHIEF J usTICE BeRGEn's opinion for the plurality in
Tilton placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the
federal aid there approved would be spent in a college
setting:
'"Since religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of these church-rela.ted colleges and universities, there is less likelihood than
in primary and secondary schools that religion will
permeate the area of secular education." 403 U. S.,
at 687.
Although Mn.. JusTICE WHITE saw no such clear distinction, he concurred in the result, stating:

"It is enough for me that ... the Federal Government [is] financing a separable function of overriding importance in order to sustain the legislation
here challenged." 403 U. S., at 664.
A majority of the Court in Tilton, then , concluded that
on the facts of that case inspection as to use did not
threaten excessive entanglement. As we have indicated
above, there is no evidence here to demonstrate that the
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College is any more an instrument of religious indictrination than were the colleges and universities involved in

Tilton. 8
A closer issue under our precedents is presented by
the contention that the Authority could become deeply
involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions
of the College. The Authority is empowered by the Act:
"(g) generally, to fix and revise from time to
time and charge and collect rates, rents, fees and
charges for the use of and for the services furnished
or to be furnished by a project or any portion thereof
and to contract with any person, partnership, association or corporation or other body public or private in respect thereof;
"(h) to establish rules and regulations for the use
of a project or any portion thereof and to designate
a participating institution for higher education as
its agent to establish rules and regulations for the
use of a project undertaken for such participating
institution for higher education . . . . " S. C. Code
Ann., § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
These powers are sweeping ones, and were there a
realistic likelihood that they would be exercised in their
full detail, the entanglement problems with the proposed transaction would not be insignificant.
8 Although the record in this case is nbbrcviatrd and not free
from ambiguity, the burden rests on appellant to show the extent
to which the College is church-related, and he has failed to show
more than a formalistic church relationship . As Tilton rRtablished,
formal denominational control over a liberal arts college does not
render all aid to the institution a violation of the E8tnblishment
Clause. So far as the record here iR concerned, there is no showing
that the College places nny special emphasis on Baptist denominational or any other sectarian type of education. As noted above,
both the faculty and the student body arc open to persons of any
(or no) religious affiliation.
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The opmwn of the South Carolina Supreme Court,.
however, reflects a narrow interpretation of the practical
operation of these powers. According to that Court,
"Counsel for plaintiff argues that the broad language of the Act causes the State, of necessity, t(}
become excessively involved in the operation, management and administration of the College. We do
not so construe the Act. . . . [T]he basic function
of the Authority is to see ... that fees are charged
sufficient to meet the bond payments." S. C.,
at - ; 187 S. E. 2d, at 651.
As we read the College's proposal, the Lease Agreement
between the Authority and the College will place on the
College the responsibility for making the detailed decisions regarding the government of the campus and the
fees to be charged for particular services. Specifically,
the proposal states that the Lease Agreement
"will unconditionally obligate the College (a) to
pay sufficient rentals to meet the principal and interest requirements as they become due on such
bonds, (b) to impose an adequate schedule of charges
and fees in order to provide adequate revenues with
which to operate and maintain the said facilities a.nd
to make the rental payments . . . . " App., p. 18.
In short, under the proposed Lease Agreement, neither
the Authority nor a trustee bank would be justified in
taking action unless the College fails to make the prescribed rental payments or otherwise defaults in its
obligations. Only if the College refused to meet rental
payments or was unable to do so would the Authority
or the trustee be obligated to take further action. In
that event, the Authority or trustee might either foreclose on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting of
rules, charges, and fees. It may be argued that only
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the former would be consistent with the Establishment
Clause, but we do not now have that situation before us.

III
This case comes to us as an action for injunctive and
declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of the
Act as applied to a proposed- rather than an actualissuance of revenue bonds. As the Court below pointed
out, S. C., at - ; 187 S. E. 2d, at 651, the Act was
patterned closely after the South Carolina Industrial
Revenue Bond Act, and perhaps for this reason appears
to confer unnecessarily broad power and responsibility
on the Authority. Yet specific provisions of the Act, the
Rules and Regulations of the Authority, and the College's
proposal, all as interpreted by the South Carolina Supreme Court, delimit narrowly those otherwise untrammeled provisions, and no evidence has been submitted
by appellant to undermine this narrowing. Accordingly,
we affirm the holding of the court below that the Act is
constitutional as interpreted and applied in this case.
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MR. JusTICE: Pow·ELL delivered the op1mon of the
Court.
Appellant, a South Carolina taxpayer, brought this
action to challenge the South Carolina Educational
Facilities Act (the "Act"), S. C. Code Ann. §§ 22-41
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1971), as violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment insofar as it authorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the
issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of the Baptist
College at Charlestol).; 1 The trial court's denial o relief was affirmed by the Suprcn1e Court of South Car. olina. 255 S. C. 71, 177 S. E. 2d 362 (1970). This
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of the intervening decisions in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Eaf7e.y v.
DiCe·nso, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Robinson v. DiCe·nso,
403 U.S. 602 (1971); and Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U. S. 672 (1971). 403 U. S. 945 (1971). On remand,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina adhered to its
1
At various points during this litigation, appellant has made
reference to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
but has made no arguments specifically addressed to violations of
that clause except insofar as this Court's approach to cases involving the Religion Clauses represents an interaction of the two
clauses.
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earlier position. S.C. - , 187 S. E. 2d 645 (1972).
We now hold that the Act is constitutional.
I

We begin by setting out the general structure of the
Act. The Act established an Educational Facilities Authority (the "Authority") , the purpose of which is "to
assist institutiolls for higher education in the construction, financing and refinancing of projects .... ", S. C.
Code Ann. § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971), primarily
through the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms
of the Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities,
site preparation and related items, but may not include
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious worship nor any
facility which is used or to be used primarily in
connection with any part of the program of a school
or depart1nent of divinity for any religious denomination." S. C. Code Ann. § 22- 41.2 (b) (Cum.
Supp. 1971).
Correspondingly, the Authority is accorded certain powers over the project, including the powers to determine
the fees to be charged for the use of the project and to
establish regulations for its use. See pp. - - - , infra.
While revenue bonds to be used in connection with
a project arc issued by the Authority, the Act is quite
explicit that the bonds shall not be obligations of the
State, directly or indirectly:
~

Chtlf -/C!' r

Revenue bonds issued u11der the provisions
, ~ shall not be deemed to constitute a
debt or liability of the State or of any political subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit
of the State or of any such political subdivision, but
shall be payable solely from the funds herein provided therefor from revenues. All such revenue
bonds shall contain on the face thereof a statement

r
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to the effect that neither the State of South Carolina nor th
uthority shall be obligated to pay
the same or the interest thereon except from revenues of the project or the portion thereof for which
they are issued and that neither the faith and credit
nor the taxing power of the State of South Carolina
or of any political subdivision thereof is pledged to
the payment of the principal of or the interest on
such bonds. The issuance of revenue bonds under
the provisions of this act shall not directly or indirectly or contingently obligate the State or any
political subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any
form of taxation whatever therefor or to make any
appropriation for their payment." S. C. Code Ann.
§ gg 4],(1Q) (Cum. Supp. 1971).
since all of the expenses of the Authority
must be paid from the revenues of the various projects
in which it participates, S. C. Code Ann. § 22-41.5 (Cum.
Supp. 1971), none of the general revenues of South
Carolina is used to sup )Ort a project.
n anuary 6, 1 , the College submitted to the
Authority for preliminary approval an application for
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the proposal, the
c~
Authority would issue reven1:1e bonds and make the pr~ ~-
ceeds available to the College for use in connection with
a portion of its campus to be designated a project (the
"Project") within the meaning of the Act. In return,
the College would convey the Project, without cost, to
the Authority, which would then lease the property so
conveyed back to the College. After repayment in full
of the bonds, the Project would be reconveyed to the
College. The Authority granted preliminary approval
on January 16, 1970, 255 S. C., at 76; 177 S. E. 2d, at 365.
In its present form, the application requests the issuance of revenue bonds totaling $1,250,000, of which
$1,050,000 would be applied to refund short term financing of capital improvements and $200,000 would be

- .1:'-H-f'iifl-ei:'H*WC,
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applied to the completion of dining hall facilities. 2 The
advantage of financing educational institutions through
a state created authority derives from relevant provisions of federal and South Carolina state income tax
laws which provide in effect that the interest on such
bonds is not subject to income taxation.a The income tax
exempt status of the interest enables the Authority, as
an instrumentality of the State, to market the bonds at
a significantly lower rate of interest than the educational institution would be forced to pay if it borrowed
the money by conventional private financing.
Because the College's application to the Authority was
a preliminary one, the details of the financing arrangement have not yet been fully worked out. But Rules
and Regulations adopted by the Authority govern certain of its aspects. See Jurisdictional Statement, Ap~
pendix C, pp. 47-51. Every lease agreement between the
Authority and an institution must contain a clause
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased
land, nor any facility located thereon, shall be used
2
As originally submitted by the College and approved by the
Authority, the proposal called for the issuance of "not exceeding
$3,500,000 of revenue bonds . . . . " 255 S. C., at 75; 177 S. E.
2d, at 364. As indicated by a stipulation of counsel in this Court,
the College subsequently secured a bank loan in the amount of
$2,500,000 and now proposes the issuance of only $1,250,000 in
revenue bonds under the Act, the proceeds to be used:
"(i) to repay in full the College's Current Fund for the balance
(approximately $250,000) advanced to the College's Plant Fund as
aforesaid; (ii) to refund outstanding short-term loans in the amount
of SSOO,OOO whose proceeds were to pay off indebtedness incurred
for capital improvements, and (iii) to finance the completion of the
dining hall facilities at a cost of approximately $200,000."~
p. 49.
ross income for federal income tax purposes docs not include
interrst on "the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession
of the United Sta.tes, or any political subdivision of any of the
foregoing . . . . " 26 U. S. C. § 103 (a) (1). fOr- 51~ 1(9.
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for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious
worship, or in connection with any part of the pro,..gram of a school or department of divinity of any
rQligioo denomination." -S.C., at-; 187 S. E.
2d, at 647 .
....__

It

To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agreement must allow the Authority to conduct inspections,
and any reconveyance to the College must contain a
restriction against use for sectarian purposes. 4 The Rules
further provide that simultaneously with the executio:n.....----of the lease agreement, the Authority and the trustee
bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseable
mortgage lien on the Project property including a mortgage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority in
Rule 4 relating to the Lease Agreement provides in part that:
''If the Lea e Agreement contains a provision permitting the Institution to repurchase the project upon payment of the bonds, then
in such instance the Lease Agreement shall provide that the Deed
of reconveyance from the Authority to the Institution shall be made
subject to the condition that so long as the Institution, or any
voluntary grantee of the Institution, shall own the leased premises,
or any part thereof, that no facility thereon, financed in whole or
in part with the proceeds of the bonds, shall be used for sectarian
instruction or as a place of religious worship, or used in connection
with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity
S. C., a t - ; 187 S. E. 2d, at.
of any religious denomination." 647-648.
The Rule goes on to allow the institution to remove this option in
the case of involuntary sales:
"The condition may provide, at the opt ion of the Institution, that
if the leased premises shall become the subject of an involuntary
judicial sale, as a result of any foreclosure of any mortgage, or sale
punmant to any order of any court, that the title to be vested in
any purchaser at such judicial sale, other than the Institution, shall
be in fee simple and shall be free of the condition applicable to the
Institution or any voluntary grantee thereof." S. C., at - ;
187 S. E. 2d, at 648. Sec n.
infm.
4
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and to the lease agreement." Jurisdictional Statement,
Appendix C, p. 50.
Our consideration of appellant's Establishment Clause
claim extends only to the proposal as approved preliminarily with such additions as are contemplated by
the Act, the rules, and the decisions of the courts below.
II

(J../--~T-1-'fit-ee Court has recently had occasion to synthesize the
principles which govern our consideration of challenges
to statutes as violative of the Establishment Clause:
"Three . . . tests may be gleaned from our cases.
First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principa1 or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive entanglement \Yith religion.' " Lemon v.
Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S., at

m...________,.J ~ 1-;) -( IS ..

With full recognition that these are no more than helpful signposts, we consider the present statute and the
proposed transaction in terms of the three "tests": purpose, effect, and entanglement.
A

The purpose of the statute is manifestly a secular one.
The benefits of the Act are available to all institutions
of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not
having a religious affiliation. While a legislature's declaration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its, /
true intent, appellant makes no suggestion that the introductory paragraph of the Act represents anything
other than a good faith statement of purpose:
"It is hereby declared that for the benefit of the
people of the State, the increase of their commerce,
welfare and prosperity and the improvement of
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their health and living conditions it is essential that
this and future generations of youth be given the
fullest opportunity to learn and to develop their
intellectual and mental capacities; that it is essential that illstitutions for higher education within
the State be provided with appropriate additional
means to assist such youth in achieving the required
levels of learning and development of their intellectual and mental capacities; and that it is the
purpose of this section to provide a measure of assistance and an alternative method to enable institutions for higher education in the State to provide the facilities and structures which are sorely
needed to accomplish the purposes of this act, all
to the public benefit and good, to the extent and
manner provided herein." S. C. Code Ann. § 22.41
(Cum. Supp. 1971).
The College and other private institutions of higher
education provide these benefits to the State." As of the
academic year 1969-1970, there were 1,548 students
enrolled in the College, in addition to approximately 600
night students. Of these students, 957o are residents of
South Carolina who are thereby receiving a college education without financial support from the State of South
Carolina.
B

-

To identify "primary effect," we narrow our focus from
the statute as a whole to the only transaction presently
"In Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), this Court
commrnted on the importance of the role of priYate education in
this country:
" Underlying these cases, and underlying also the legislnti\·e judgments that have preceded the court decisions, has been a recognition
that private education has played and is pla~·ing a significant and
valuable role in raising national levels of knowledge, ~and 1
experience." 392 U. S., at 247.
'---1 Cof'l'l pe

f
en

Ct!!. J
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before us. Whatever may be its initial appeal, the proposition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any program which in some manner aids an institution with a
religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. E. g.,
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Tilton v. Richardson,
supra. Stated another way, the Court has not accepted
the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because
aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its
other resources on religious ends.
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect
of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in
which religion is so pervasive that all functions are subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially
secular setting. In Tilton v. Richardson, supra, the
Court refused to strike down a direct federal grant to
four colleges and universities in Connecticut. MR.
CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER, for the plurality, concluded that
despite some institutional rhetoric, none of the four
colleges was pervasively sectarian, but held open that
possibility for future cases:
"Individual projects can be properly evaluated if
and when challenges arise with respect to particular
recipients and some evidence is then presented to
show that the institution does in fact possess these
characteristics." 403 U. S., at 682.
/
Appellant has introduced no evidence in the present
case placing the College in such a category. It is true
that the members of the College Board of Trustees are
elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention , that
the approval of the Convention is required for certain
financial transactions, and ~he charter of the College
may be amended only by t o Convention. But it was
likewise true of the institutions involved in Tilton that

..
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they were "governed by Catholic religious organizations."
403 U. S., at 686. What little there is in the record concerning the College establishes that there are no religious qualifications for faculty membership or student
admission, and that only 60 % of the College student body
is Baptist, a percentage roughly equivalent to the percentage of Baptists in that area of South Carolina.
255 S. C., at 85; 177 S. E. 2d, at 369. On the record in
this case there is no basis to conclude that the College's
operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian
rather than secular education.
Nor can we conclude that the proposed transaction
will place the Authority in the position of providing
direct support for religious activities. The scope of the
Authority's power to assist institutions of higher education extends only to "projects," and the Act specifically
states that a project "shall not include" any buildings or
facilities used for religious purposes. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, we must assume that all of
the proposed financing and refinancing relates to buildings and facilities within a properly delimited project.
It is not at all clear from the record that the portion
of the campus to be conveyed by the College to the Authority and leased back is the same as tha.t being financed,
but in any event it too must be part of the Project and
subject to the same prohibition against use for religious
purposes. In addition, as we have indicated, every lease
agreement must contain a clause forbidding religious use/
and another allowing inspections to enforce the agreement.6 For these reasons, we are satisfied that imple6
Appellant also takes issue with the Authority's rule allowing a
purchaser at an involuntary sale to take title free of restrictions as
to religious use. See n.
, ante. Appellant's reliance on 'l'itton
!C tanlson, supra, in this respect is misplaced. There, the Court
struck down a provision under which t he church-related colleges
would haYe unrestricted use of a federally financed project after

71- 152:3-0PINION
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mentation of the proposal will not have the primary effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion. 7

c
The final question posed by this case is whether under
the arrangement there would be an unconstitutional de20 years. In the prrsrnt rase, by contrast, the re~triclion ngninst
rrligious use is ~not ns to the instttutwn see kmg the a ~SJRtance
of the Authority nor as to voluntary tram: feree~ . but only as to a
purrha er at a judicial sale. Because some other religious institution
bidding for the property at a judicial sale could purchase the proprrty only by outbidding all other prosp<:>ctive purchn~rrR, there i~
only a speculative possibility thnt the nbsenr<:> of a usc limitntion
would ever afford aid to religion. Even in such an rvrnt, the
nrquiring religious institution prrsumabl~· would hnw had to pn~r
the thrn fair vnlue of the propert~·.
1 The "state aid" involved in this case is of a very sperifll sort.
We have here no expenditure of public funds, either by gmnt or
lonn, no reimbursement br a State for rxpcnditurrs mnde b~· a
parochial school or rollrgc, n nd no ext<:>nding or commit! ing of a
Rtnte's credit. Rather, the onl~r stnte aid consists. not of financial
:tssistflnce directly or indirertl~· which would impliratc pnblir funds
or crrdit, bnt the crrlltion of an instrumentalit~r (thr Authority)
I hrongh which educnt ionnl institutions mny borrow funds on the
ba~is of their own credit and the security of t hrir own prop<'rty
upon more fnvorabl<' interest trrms than otherwise would br nvailnble. The Supreme Court of New .J<:>rscy charnrterized the nssista nee rendered nn educational institution under nn net grnrrnlly
~imilar to thr South Cnrolina Art as mrrely being n "govrmmental
service." Clayton v. Ke1'vir·lc. 56 N . .T. 523. 530-531 , 267 A. 2d
503 , 506-507 (1970). The South Carolina Suprrme Comt, in the
· · ~.~dow, desrribed the .rol<:> of the State ns thnt of a ''~
conchnt.
S. C. , at - , 187 S. E. 2d, nt 65~we ronrludr thnt the primnry rffrrt of the assistance affordrd here
is neither to ndvance nor to inhibit religion
,
Uti rJ.- r1..>"-..l:.:l.t.QQ..~-t.fi'~~I'H{l.U. wr nrrd not decidE' wlwthrr. :18 app~?ller argurs,
171 /I
Appellee's Brief. p. 14, ti-tQ preH!:Rt ~tt~e ir etmtrg!led P? ' iRe tlel"~~
o.,)
m._I£!ilz & Cli!:llWi lji...M'fit'!i 1 ·,.[w>re +okifilo~•r*'~PIHI'fi""' 'l'f'Mt~:.'"""'""..._-v

Le, o'1

the importance of the tax ~ption in the South~
Carolina scheme brings the present case under
Walz v.Tax Comm'n, supra, where this Court upheld
a local property tax exemption which included
religious institUions.
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gree of entanglement between the State u.nd the College.
Appellant argues that the Authority would become involved in the operation of the College both by inspecting
the project to insure that it is not being used for religious
purposes and by participating in the management decisions of the College.
The Court's opinion in Lemon and the plurality opinion in Tilton are grounded on the proposition that the
degree of entanglement arising from inspection of facilities as to use varies in large measure with the extent
to which religion permeates the institution. In finding
excessive entanglement, the Court in Lemon relied on
the "substantial religious character of these churchrelated" elementary schools. 403 U. S., at 616. MR.
CHIEF JusTICE BrRGER's opinion for the plurality in
Tilton placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the
federal aiel there approved would be spent in a college
setting:
"'Since religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of these church-related colleges and universities, there is less likelihood than
in primary and secondary schools that religion will
permeate the area of secular education." 403 U. S.,
at 687.
Although MR. JusTICE WHITE saw no such clear distinction, he concurred in the result, stating:

"It is enough for me that ... the Federal Government [is] financing a separable function of over-/
riding importance in order to sustain the legislation
here challenged." 403 U. S., at 664.
A majority of the Court in Tilton, then, concluded that
on the facts of that case inspection as to use did not
threaten excessive entanglement. As we have indicated
above, there is no evidence here to demonstrate that the
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College is any more an instrument of religious indctrination than were the colleges and universities involved in
TiUor0

A closer issue under our precedents is presented by
the contention that the Authority could become deeply
involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions
of the College. The Authority is empowered by the Act:
L--~'....;'(:..liog.._)_j;"":enerally, to fix and revise from time to
time and charge and collect rates, rents, fees and
charges for the use of and for the services furnished
or to be furnished by a project or any portion thereof
and to contract with any person, partnership, association or corporation or other body public or private in respect thereof;
"(h) to establish rules and regulations for the use
of a project or any portion thereof and to designate
a participating institution for higher education as
its agent to establish rules and regulations for the
use of a project undertaken for such participating,...
institution for higher education . . . . " S. C. Code
>"-o_ _ _A_n_n_..;; § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971).

£:1] t

/

These powers are sweeping ones, and were there a
realistic likelihood that they would be exercised in their
full detail, the entanglement problems with the proposed transaction would not be insignificant.
8

Although the record in this case is abbreviated and not free
from ambiguity, the burden rests on appellant to show tho extent
- -"'"'o which the College is church-related, "ft'nd he has failed to snow
more than a formalistic church rel::ttionship. As Tilton established,
formal denominational control over a liberal arts college does not
"'---::r~
on~ er all aid to the institution a violation of tho E8tablishmont
Clause. So far as the record here iR concerned, there is no showing
that the College places any special emphasis on Baptist denominational or any other sectarian type of education. As noted above,
both tho faculty and the student body arc open to persons of any
(or no) religious affiliation.

l

0

AS

~ne

~oa~n ~aro1~na

~upreme cour~
1

po~n~ea

ou~,

the Act was patterned closely after the South Carolina
Industrial Revenue Bond Act,
S.C., at
; 187
S.E.2d, at 651, and perhaps for this reason appears
to confer unnecessarily broad power a~d responsibility
~ the ~ uthority.,The opinion of that court, however,
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1~

~he opinion ef the Ssl:lt'R CaroliJ;~:8s ~w~reme C~niF~
reflects a narrow interpretation of the practical
operation of these powerS: Aeetmhllg to th11:t CQurt _<_
"Counsel for plaintiff argues that the broad language of the Act causes the State, of necessity, to·
become excessively involved in the operation , management and administration of the College. We do
not so construe the Act. . . . [T] he basic function
of the Authority is to see ... that fees are charged
sufficient to meet the bond payments." S. C.,
at - ; 187 S. E. 2d, at 651.

~~~O@f\

As we read the College's proposal, the Lease Agreement
between the Authority and the College will place on theCollege the responsibility for making the detailed decisions regarding the government of the campus and thefees to be charged for particular services. Specifically,.
the proposal states that the Lease Agreement

l

~ v')~

"will unconditionally obligate the College (a) to
pay sufficient rentals to meet the principal and interest requirements as they become due on such
----~b:o~
:.:,nd~s~ll\(b) to impose an adequate schedule of charges
and fees in order to provide adequate revenues with
which to operate and maintain the said facilities and
to make the rental payments . . . ." App., p. 18.
In short, under the proposed Lease Agreement, neither
the Authority nor a trustee bank would be justified in
taking action unless the College fails to make the prescribed rental payments or otherwise defaults in its
obligations. Only if the College refused to meet rental
payments or was unable to do so would the Authority
or the trustee be obligated to take further action . In
that event, the Authority or trustee might either foreclose on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting of
rules, charges, and fees. It may be argued that only

71-1523-0PINION
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the former would be consistent with the Establishment
Clause, but we do not now have that situation before us.

III
This case comes to us as an action for injunctive and
declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of the
Act as applied to a proposed-rather than an actual- _
issuance of revenue bonds. r-

The specific provisions of the Act under which the bonds
will be issued, the Rules and Regulations of the
Authority, and the College's proposal--all as interpreted
by the South Carolina Supreme Court--confine the
scope of the assistance to the secular aspects of
this liberal arts college and do not foreshadow
excessive entanglement between the State and religion.
Accordingly, we affirm the holding of the court below
that the Act is constitutional as interpreted and
applied in this case.

;L~~
J.ai'DRAF1'

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-1523
R ichard W. Hunt, Appella n t.

On Appeal from tJw Supreme Court of South
Robert E. McNair, Govemor
Caroli na.,
of So uth Caroli na, et al.

v.

~-. 1 973]

Mn. Jus'l'JCB PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Appellant, a South Carolina taxpayer. brought this
action to challenge the · South Carolina Educational
Facilities Act (the "Act"), S. ('. Code AmL ~ ~ 22-41
et seq . (Cum. Supp. 1971 ), as violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Ame ndment insOfar as it authorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the
issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of the Baptist
College at Charleston (the "Coll ege") . The trial court's
denial of relief was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
South Carolina. 256 S. C. 71. 177 S. E. 2d 362 ( 1970).
This Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case
for reconsideration in light of the intervening decisions fn
Lemon ,.. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1071); Earle.y \',
DiCenso, 403 U. S. 602 ( 1971); Robin.sO'II v. DiCerr1so,
403 U. S. 602 ( 1971); and Tilton \'. Richardson, 4o:3
U.S. 672 (1971). 403 U.S. 945 (1971). On remand,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina adhen'd to its
1

1 At vano11~ point~ dunng tht~ litigatiOn , <l]lprllanl il:1~ mad1·
rderencc to thl' Frrr Exrrci~(· CJau~c of thP Fir~t AmrndmP11t.
bur has mndP no argumcnt~ :-;pccificall~· acldrc•H,.:ed to violation~ of'
that clau:-;<' <'X('Pp1 in~ufar a~ thi~ Court·~ appruaeil 10 <'ii~C'~ tttvoh·)ng; thr HP!ig;10n
dntl~t'~.

Clnn~<'~

rpprP~Pnt ..;

an int<'rnrtwn of th1· twu
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earlier position. - S . C . - , 187 S. E. 2d 645 (1972) ,
Hw:u ~t$id tlrzttl tlhe Ae~ ie B8AI!titutiQJ<&l:

. e
W

I
We begin by setting out the general structure of thfl
Act. The Act established an Educational Facilities Au"
thority (the "Authority"), the purpose of which is "t6
assist institutions for higher education in thE' construe·
tion, financing and refinancing of projects , . , .'', 8 . C.
Code Ann. § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971), primarily
through the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms
of the Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities,
site preparation and related items, but may not include
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian instructiou or as a place of religious worship nor any
facility which is used or to be used primarily irr
connection with any part of the program of a schooT
or department of divinity fQr any religious denomiM
nation," S. C. Code Ann. ~ 2;2-41.2 (b) (Cum ,
Supp, 1971).
Correspondingly, the Authority is accorded certain powers over the project, including the powers to determine
the fees to be charged for the use of the project and to
establish regulations for its use. See pp. - - - , infra.
While revenue bonds to be used in connection with
a project are issued by the Authority, the Act is quit~
explicit that the bonds shall not be obligations of the
State, directly or indirectly:
"Revenue bonds issued under the provisions of
this chapter shall not be deemed to constitute a
debt or liability of the State or of any political sub-·
division thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit
of the State or of any such political subdivision, but
shall be payable solely from the funds herein provided therefor from revenues. All such revenue·
oonds shall con tai11 on the face therf'of a statement.

I

I'll" '
CJ.1'tlf'l"\11

ij-152;~-0Pl:'-JlO:-i

HUNT v :\lc:'\AIH

to the effect that neither the State of 8outh Car=
olina nor the Authority shall be obligated to pay
the sanw or the interest thereon except from revt'n ues of the project or the portion thereof for which
they are issued and that neither the faith and credit
nor the taxing power of the State of South Carolina
or of any political subdivision thereof is pledged tu
the payment of the principal of or the interest on
such bo11ds. Tlw issuance of revenue bonds under'
the provisions of this act shall not directly or indirectly or contingently obligate the Ntate or any
political subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any
form of taxatio11 \vhat{'ver therefor or to make any
appropriation for their payment." ~- ('.Code Ann,
~ 22- 41.10 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
Moreover, since all of the expenses of the Authority
must be paid from the revenues of the various pro.i<'ets
in which it participates. S.C. Code Ann.~ 22- 41.5 (Cum .
Supp. 1971). none of the general revenues of South
Carolina is used to support a project.
On January 6, 1970. the College submitted to tlw
Authority for preliminary approval an application for
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under thP proposal. tlw
Authority would issue the bonds and makP the proceeds available to the College for usc in connection with
a portion of its campus to be designated a project ( tlw
"Project") within the meaning of the Act. fn return.
the College would convey the Project, without cost. to
the Authority, which would then lease tfw property so
conveyed back to the College . After repayment in full
of the bonds. the Project would be rPCOJlveyed to tlw
College . The Authority granted preliminary approval
on .January 16. 1H70. 255 S.C.. at 76; 177 S. E. 2d. at :3!-H) .
111 its present form. thP application requests the is
suance of rPvenuc bonds totaling $1.250.000. of which
$.1,0M),000 would lw applied to refu1Hl short term finane.
ing of rapital improvcmruts and $~00 . 000 would he
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applied to the completion of dining hall facilities.~ The
advantage of financing educational institutions through
a state created authority derives from relevant provisions of federal and South Carolilla state income tax
laws which provide in effect that the interest on such
bonds is not subject to income taxation." The income tax
exempt status of the interest enables the Authority. as
an instrumentality of the State, to market the bonds at
a significantly lower rate of interest than the educa~
tional ii1stitution would be forced to pay if it borrowed
the money by conventional private financing.
Because the College's application to the Authority was
a preliminary one, the details of the financing arrange~
ment have not yet been fully worked out. But Rules
and Regulations adopted by the Authority govern cer~
tain of its aspects. See Jurisdictional Statement, Ap~
~A:; onginally :;ubmJtted by the College and approved by tlw
Authority, the J)roposal called for the lssuance of ''hot exceeding
$3,500,000 of rrvenue bonds. . . . '' 255 S. C., at 75; 177 S. E.
2d, at 364. At> indicated by a stipulation of counsel m this Cour1,
the College :;ub::;equently ::;ecurrd a bank loan ·in the amount of
$2,500,000 and now proposes the 1ssuance of only $1,250,000 in
revenue bonds under the Act, the procred~:> to br iJsrd.

'· (i) to repay m full the Collrge':; Current Fund for the balanet·
(approximatrly $250,000) advanced to the College's Plant Fund a~
afore,;aid; (ii) to refund outstanding ::;hort-term loans ill the amount
of $800,000 who:;P proceeds were to pay off mdebtedne::;:-; mcurrrd
for capital tmp1'ovements, and (iii) to finance the completiOn of the
dming hall facilitir:; at a cost of approximately $200,000 ." (Empha-·
::;i::; m original.) App., p. 41:.1.
a Gro:;s incomP for federal mcome tax })Urposes dor:; not include>
interest on '' the obrigatiom; of a State, a Territory, or a po::;;;c~::<Ion
of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of thr
foregoing .. .. '' 26 U. S. C. § 103 (a) ( 1). For statC' mcome tax
purpose:;, gro::;s mcome doC's nor mcludC' interest ··upon obligation ~
of the Umted States or Its po:;s(':;:;ion~ or of this State or anr
pc.Jit1cal subdivi:-ion thereof .. . .'' S. C. Codr Ann. § (i5- 25:{ (4)
(Cum . Supp . 1971)
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pendix C, pp. 47-51. Every lease agreement between the
Authority and an institution must contain a clause
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased
land, nor any facility located thereon, shall be used
for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious
worship, or in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity of any
religious denomination.'' fl. C., at - : 1M
S. E. 2d, at 647.
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agreement must allow the Authority to conduct inspections.
and any reconveyance to the College must contain a
restriction against use for sectarian purposes.' The Rules
further provide that simultaneously with the executiOIJ
1

Rulr 4 rrlatmg to thr Lraor Agrermrnt providr::; m part thai :

''If the Lease Agreemrnt contains a provision prrmitting thr Institution to rrpurchase the project upon paymrnt of the bonclti, thrn
in such instance the Lrase Agrerment shall J1rovidr that t hr Dred
of reconveyance from the Authority to the Institution shall be madr
subjrct to the condition that l:iO long ao the lnstitut10n, or auy
~·oluntary grantPe of thP Institution, shall own tlw leai:iPd JH'Pmlse:;,
or any part thereof, that no facility thereon, financPd m whole or
in part w1th tlw procPeds of tlw bondo, Hhall be u ·eel for ~ectanan
inst rnct iou or as a place of religiouo worohlp, or used m connectiOn
with any part of the program of a ::;chool or departmpnt of divmity
of any rPligiou:s denomination." S. C .. a t - ; 187 S E. 2d, at

647-648.
The Rule goe:; on to allow the inotitution to removr th1s opt10n m
the case of involuntary sales:

'' Tlw condition may prov1dP, at the option of thP lnstJtution , that
if the leased premises :;hall bPcomP the :;ubjPct of an mvoluntary
judicwl ::;ale, as a result of any foreclo ·ure of any mortgagr , or saJr
pun;uant to any ordf'I' of any court, that the title to be vrsted in
any purcha:ser at ::;uch Judicial ::;ale, other than the lnstitut10n, :;hall
bP 111 feP :;unplP and shall bP frre of the condition applicablp to tlw
ln::;t itut10n or any voluntary granteP therrof." S C ., at -·~
!~7

S. E :Zd, at 64R Scr n. 6, infra.
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of the lease agreement, the Authority and the trustee
bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseablt>
mortgage lieu on the Project property including a mortgage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority in
and to the lease agreement." Jurisdictional Statement.
Appendix C, p. 50.
Our consideration of appellant's Establishment Clause
claim extends only to the proposal as approved preliminarily with such additions as are contemplated by
the Act. the rules, and the decisions of thP courts bPiow.

II
This Court has recently had occasion to synthesize the
principles which govern our consideration of challenges
to statutes as violative of the Establishment Clause :
"Three . . . tests may be gleaned from our cases,
First, the statute must have a secular legislativE'
vurpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive eatanglement with religion.' ·· Lemon ''·
Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., at 612- 613.
With full recognition that these are no more than helpful signposts, we consider the present statute and the
proposed transaction in terms of the threp "tPsts" : purpose, effect. and entanglement.

A
The purpose of the statute is manifestly a secular 01w,
The benefits of the Act are available to all institutions
of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not
having a religious affiliation. While a legislature's decla~
ration of purpose may not always be a fair guidP to it~?.

71- 1523-0PINlON
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true intent, appellant makes no suggestion that the in~
troductory paragraph of the Act represents anything
other than a good faith statement of purposc> ·
"It is hereby declared that for the benefit of the
people of the State, the increase of their commeree,
welfare and prosperity and the improvement of
their health and living conditions it is essential that
this and future generations of youth be given thr
fullest opportunity to learn and to develop theit
intellectual and mental capacities; that it is es~
sential that institutions for higher education within
the State be provided with appropriate additional
I!leans to assist such youth in achieving the required
levels of learning and development of their intellectual and mental capacities; and that it is the•
purpose of this section to provide a measure of as~
sistancc and an alternative method to enable in~
stitutions for higher education in the State to provide the facilities and structures which are sorely
needed to accomplish the purposes of this a~t. all
to the public benefit and good, to the extent and
manner provided herein." S. C. Code Ann. ~ :22.41
(Cum . Supp. 1971).
The College and other private i11stitutious of higher
provide these benefits to the State.'' As of thP
academic year 1969-1970, there were 1.548 students

edu~ation

qn Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 2:36 (19(:\k), thi~ Court
commrnted on thr importance of the role of private rducalwn iu
this country:
" Underlying the~e caset>, and underlying alt;o the ll'gi;;]ativr judgments .that havr preceded the court drcisions, has bern a recognition
that private educatiOn has played and i::; playing a ;;igmficant and
valuable role in raising national leveb of knowledgr , compe1 enc·<', and
c'x penenre.'' :{02 P . R., at 247.
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enrolled in the College, in addition to approximately 600
night students. Of these students, 95% are residents of
South Carolina who are thereby receiving a college education without financial support from the ~tate of Routh
Carolina.

R
To identify ''primary effect," we narrow our focus fron1
the statute as a whole to the only transaction presently
before us. Whatever may be its initial appeal, the proposition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any program which in some manner aids an institution with a
religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. E. y.,
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Ta:t
Com.m'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Tilton v. Richardson,
S'upra. Stated another way, the Court has uot accepted
the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because
aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its
other resources ou religious ends.
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect
of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in
which religion is so pervasive that
unctions are subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially
secular setting. Jn Tilton v. Richardson, supra, th«:>·
Court refused to trike down a direct federal grant to
four colleges and universities in Connecticut. MR.
CHIEF JusTICE BUIWER, for the plurality, concluded that
despite some institutional rhetoric, none of the four
colleges was pervasively sectarian, but held open that
possibility for future cases .

"1 ndividual projects can be properly
and when challenges arise with respect
recipients and some evidence is then
show that the institution does in fact
cbaracteristics.' ' 403 TT. S .. at 6R~ .

--
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Appellant has introduced 110 evidence in the present
case placing the College in such a category. 1t is tru(:l
that the members of the College Board of Trustees ar0
elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention. that
the approval of the Convention is required for certain
finaucial transactions. and that the charter of the Collegr
may be amended only by the Convention . But it was
likewise true of the institutions involved in Tilton that
they were "governed by Catholic religious organizations. ''
403 U. ~ .. at 686. What little there is in the record con "'
cerning the College establishes that there are no religious qualifications for faculty membership or student
admission, and that only 60% of the College student body
is Baptist. a percentage roughly equivalent to the percentage of Baptists in that area of South Carolina.
255 S. C., at 85; 177 S. E. 2d, at 369. On the record i11'
this case there is no basis to conclude that the College 's
operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian·
rather than secular education .
Nor can we conclude that the proposed transaction
I will place the Authority in the position of providin ·
dire.etJ SMf3J.39rt fm re ligiel1':'1 aebiviti:tS The scope of t e
/ Authority's power to assist institutions of higher education rxtends only to "projects," and the Act specifically
states that a project "shall not include'' any buildings or
facilities used for religious purposes. In the absencf' of
evidencP to the contrary. we must assume that all of
the proposed financing and refinancing relates to buildings and facilities within a properly delimited project.
1t is not at all clear from the record that the portion
of the campus to be conveyed by the College to the Authority and leased back is the samr as that being financed .
but in any event it too must be part of the Project and
subject to thr same prohibition against usc for religious
purposes. In addition, as we have indicated. every leas<·
agreemc~llt must ~ontaill a (dauRP forhidding religious use

/
71-15:2:3-0PlNJOt!

10

HllNT

1'

Mc1\AIH

and another allowing inspections to enforce the agre("""
ment." For these reasons. we are satisfied that implPmentation of the proposal will not have the primary effeet
of advancing or inhibiting rPligion .'
"Appellant al~o takro; t~;;u<· wtth tlw Authonn··~ rulr allow!llg :(
at an mvoluntary ,;:dr to takr t1tiP frN· of rp~tnctwn K a,.:
to rrligiou;; tl~<'. ~rr 11 . .J. . ante. Appellaut'::; rPha11ce ou 'i'?ltull
v. fttchardsun, supra. m thi;; rr;;pect 1~ mt~placPcl. Therr, thr Comt
::;truck down a provi:::ion under winch tlw church-rrlatPd college•,.:
would have unrl':strlctPd u~r of a f!'clrrnlly finanerd pro.i<•ct afiPr
20 yrn r::;. I u tlw pn'~Pni ca~e, by contra~!, t hr rr;;trictton agn m~t
religiou~ u ·e 1:s lifted not a::; to the lntitJtutton ::;pekmg Ow a;;HJ::>t:ulc<'
of thP Authorit~· nor a~ to voluntar~· tran~feree::; , but only a>< to a
purcha:ser at a judlcut! :::alP. BPcau:::e :>Otn<' otlwr religious 111:>t 1tution
bidding for t hr pro pert~· at a judicial :sale could purcha::;r rlw propPrt)· only by out bidding all ot hrr pro. ·prct tve purcha::;N,;, t hPre 1 ~
on]~- a sp('cttlative llO~><ibiltt~ · that tlw ab;;encP of a u,;p limitation
would Pvrr afford rucl to rcltgton. Even 111 ~uch an Pv<•nt, th<'
acqumng rrhg10u::; i11:st1tutton prr"umabl~· would havP hnd to p:t,\'
t hr t hPn f:ur value of tlw propNt ~· .
'Tlw ";;tatr aid" mvolvrd in th1~ ea~<' is of a very ~rwcial ::;ort .
We havr hrrP no rxpenditun' of public fund,.;, rither b~· grant or
loan, no rPJtnbur~emPnt by a Statr for Pxpemliture:s mad<' u.\· a
parochial ~chool or co !leg<', aud uo PXtPnding or commit t 111g of a
Statr';; credtt. Hather, tlw on!~· :statt• ;ucl coH:::i::<t::;, not of financial
a~~i,.;tancr dtrrctl~· or mclm•ctly wlueh would nrplicate publ1c fund:;
or crt>dit, but the crPatwn of an tn::;trum<•utnltty (tlw Authority)
through wllleh Pducatwual lllKtlt ut tou ~ ma~ borrow fu11d" on tlH'
IJa,.;i" of thr1r own credtt nud tlw K<'<'ttrity of tlwll' own jH'OfWl't)'
upou more favorabiP 111trrP~t t<•rm" than otlwrwl~e would he· avatlablc·. Thr Suprrme Court of NPw .kn:><·~· l'haractenzl'd tlw aK~:>t::::t
:lllC<' rrndPrPd an l'ducational tn;;titutJOII under an net gen<'rall~·
~im tlar to tlw Soul h Cnrolina Act a::: ITIN<'l~· bring a "govr rnmpntal
,.;ervicP." Clayton \' KerV1tk. 5() :-: . .J. 52:~, 5:30-5:31, :2()7 A. ld
50:3, 506- 507 (1970). Tlw South Carolwa SuprPITI<' Comt, lll thP
optlllOtl bPlow, drt;crtbPd tht• roll' of thP Stat<' a:; that ot a "m<•rc·
concltut ." S. C. , at - ; 1K7 S. E. :ld. at ()50. BPc:tu:::P w<·
concludP that t h<' pnma ry rtf ret of the <lti:>I"tau ce afforded hrrl' 1~
tH'lthc•r to :tdv:t net· nor to inlubtt r<'hgtou unc!Pr /,enu)'// :llld 7'zltol•,
w<· u<·Pd not ckcide whether. a::: appriiP<' :t rgu e;;. Ap1wllep':; Bnrf, p
14. tlw tmportan<·P of t}l(' t:tx <·xentptioll 111 the South Carohna
purcha~rr

--
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The final question posed by this case is whether under
the arrangement there would be an unconstitutional degree of entanglement between the State and the College.
Appellant argues that the Authority would become involved in the operation of the College both by inspecting
the project to insure that it is not being used for religious
purposes and by participating in the management decisions of the College.
Th<" Court's opinion in Lemon and the plurality opinion in Tilton are grounded on the proposition that the
degree of entanglement arising from inspection of facilities as to use varies in large measure with the extent
to which religion permeates ,the institution. Jn finding
excessive entanglement, the Court in Lemon relied on
the "substantial religious character of these churchrelated" elementary schools. 403 U. S., at '616. MR.
CHIEF Jus'riCE BuRGER's opinion for the plurality in
Tilton placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the
federal aid there approved would be spent in a college
setting :
'"~ince

religious indoctnnation is not a substantial purpose or activity of these church-related col ~
leges and universities, there is less likelihood thau
in prim ary and secondary schools that rrligion will
permeatr thr area of secular education." 403 U. ~ .
at. f\R7 .
Although MR. JusTICE WHITE saw no such clear
tion. he concurred in the result, stating

d1stinr ~

"It 1s enough for me that .. . the Federal Govemment I is I finanr,ing a separable function of owr::~ rhrm<' brmg~ 1 lw pr<'~ <'nl ra~t'

uJJcl<'f ll'alz \' . Tax Cumm ·u. :; upm .
wbrrr lht~ C'omt uplwld a local proprrt\· 111x rxrmption whirl! 111
clnd<'d

religton~ tn~tit\1t ion:;.

i l-L5:2:{-0l'I:\IO~
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riding 1111 portance in order to sustain tlw l<>gislatiou
Jwrc challenged." 403 C !:-1 •• at (i(i4
A majority of the ('ourt in 1'ilto11, then, concluded that
on the facts of that case inspection as to us<' did not.
thrc'aten excPssive <'ntanglemrnt. As w<' have indicated
aboVP. ther<' is no evidence here to d0monstrate that tlw
C'ollcge is any more an instru1nent of religious indoctrination than were the' C'olleges and unive1·sities involv('d in

1'1:/ton .'
r\ closer lSSU<' under our precedents is presented hy
th0 contentioll that the Authority could bPeoiH<' d<'eply
involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions
of the Coll0ge. Th0 Authority is empowered by the Aet.
''(gl lgje1wrally . to fix and n'vise from time to
tin1e and charge and collect rates. re11ts. fpes and
chargef' for the use of a11d for th0 sl'rvice::; furnished
or to ))(' furuish0d by a project or any portion thereof
and to eontract \\'ith any perso11, partnl'rship, asso('iation or corporatio11 or other body public or pnvate i11 n'stwet thcr<'of,
" (h) to establish rulrs and regulatwns for the use
of a proJect or any portion thereof and to designat<'
a participating i11stitution for higher education as
its ag<'nt to establish rult's and regulatioilS for th<'
'A lthough the n·(·ord 111 thi~ (':1~<' 1~ ;lhhn•vwtt•d illld uot fn•t·
from ambiguit~ ·. llw IHII'dl'll n·~t~ 011 app<'ll:tnl to .- how tlw l'Xll'nt
to whirlt till' Colll'gt• 1~ cltl!rrh-rrlatl•d. d. Boal'd of 8duratio11 ,.,
Allen , &upm. :l!J:Z l'. S., '' ' 1-li-i, :1nd lw llil ~ faihl to ~how mor('
than a fonn:di~tH· ehur('li n·latiomd11p. A~ Tilton t•stahli~lwd. 1'01'mal dt·nolllllliillona I l'Oiit rol o1·<·r :t libl'fili art~ roll<•gp dol '~ not
rrnd<·r all aid to till' in~t1111tion a ,-,olatlon of thl' E~tahli,dmwnt
C lall ~l'. So l'i!r a~ tilt• l'l'l'OI'd hl·n· 1 ~ l'OII<'<'I'Ilrd. tht•n• ~~ no ~howing
that llw ( 'olll'gl' plae<·~ a 111· ~Jll'l'Jal ('lll]JII<I~i~ on Bapt 1st dl'IIO!lllll:l ·
twnal or an~ · oth('f' ~l'l' l ill'lilll t~· JH ' of (•duealion . A~ not<•d abO\'('.
hath till' fil('lllty :tlld till' ~tlldl' llt hod~· :11'<' OJH' Il to Jlf'I',.;QII~ of an;
(OI' 110) I'C'iJg[OII~ aJJiiJat lOll.
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usc' of a pro.icet undertaken for such participating
institutio11 for higlwr <'ducatiou.
S. C. Cock
Ann. ~ 22- 41.4 (C'UJn. Supp. 1971 ).
These powC'rs are SvYeepi ng ones. and we're then' a
realistic likelihood that th<>y would be' pxcrcisc,d in tlwiJ·
full detail. the eJJtanglement problems with the pro~
posed transaction would not be insignificant.
As tlH' South Carolina Supreme Court pointed out.
the Act was pattemed closely after the South Carolina
fnctustrial Revenue' Bond Act. S. C .. at - ; 187
S. E. 2d. at ()51. a1HI perhaps for this reason appears to
confH unnecessarily broad power and responsibility on
th~ Authority. The opinion of that court. howcvPr. rPfiects a narnm interpretation of the practical opPratioJl
of thc'SE' J)OW(')':S .
''Counsel for plaintiff argues that the broad lan guage of tlw Act causes the State'. of necessity. to
beconw c·xeessively involved in the operation. tnaJl agement and administration of the College. We do
IT Ihe basic function
not so COIJStruC' the Act. . .
of the Authority is to sec ... that fees are charg<'d
suff:icic'Jit to meet tlw bond payments." S. ( ' ..
at ; 1R7 ::-i. E. 2d, at 651
As we read thP ( 'ollege 's proposal. the Lease Agreement
bet,~·een the Authority and the College will place on the
( 'ollege the respon sibility for making the detailed decisions regardi11g the govprnmC'nt of the cam pus and the'
fees to b<' charged for particular services. :-lpecifically.
thP proposal states that the Lease Agreem<'n t
"will UIICOtHiitiona1ly obligate the College (a) to
pay sufficie nt rentals to meet the principal and interest requirPments as they become clue on such
bonds. Iandi (b) to impose> an adequate sch edu l<' of
~harges and fe'<'S in order to provide· adequatP rPve-
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nucs with which to operate and mai11tain tlw said
facilities and to make the rental paynlC'nts . . . .:·
App .. p. 18.
In short, under the proposed Lease Agreement. neither
the Authority nor a trustee bank ;vould b0 justified i11
taking action unless the College fails to make the pn·scrib('d rental payments or otherwise defaults in it::;
obligations. Only if the College refused to nwet rental
payments or was unable to do so would the :\uthorit.1·
or the trustee bf' obligated to take further action. In
that t'vent. tlw Authority or trustee might eitlwr foreclosf' on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting of
rules. charges. and fees. It may be argued that only
the former would be consistent with the Establishmrn t
Clause. but wr clo not now have that situation beforr us

lli
1'his case comes to us as an actwn for lll.Junctlw and
declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of thr
Act as applied to a proposed-rather than an actualissuance of revenue bonds. The specific provisio11s uf
th( Act under which the bonds will be issu0d, tlw Rules
and Regulations of the Authority, and the College's proposal-all as interpreted by the South Carolina ~uprenw
Court- confine the scopf' of the assistance to the sPctilar
aspects of this liberal arts college and do not foreshadoll'
Pxcessivc entanglement between the State and religion .
Accordingly. ,,.o affirm the holding of the court below
that the Act is constitutional as intf'rpret<>rl and applied
u1 this case.
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The question presented in this case is whether South
Carolina's assistance to the Baptist College at Charlestown under the South Carolina Educational Facilitief'
Authority Act constitutes constitutionally impermissibh~
aid by the ~tate for this sectarian institution.' The test
to which I adhere for determining such questions 1s
whether the arrangement between the State and tht>
Baptist College is foreclosed under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment because among
"those involvements of religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious
activities of religious institutions; (b) em ploy the
organs of ~overnment for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to
secure governrnental ends. wherr secular means would
suffice." Abinyton School District v. Schempp, 374
F . S. 203. 294-295 (1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Walz v. Tax· Commission, 397 U. S. 664 .
680- oRl (1970) (BRENNAN, J .. concurring); Lemon
'No one
"~rctariau"

de111r~

that tlw

m~tltution -'t.

e ..

Baptt~t
OIH'

Collrgp at

Charlr~town

1,; il

"m whtrh tht• propogntton and

advancement of a particular religion are a function or purpo~e of thr
in~titutwn ." Tiltou v. llirhardsrm. 40:-l tJ S fi72, (i59 (1971)
( ~P j)Hratr O]Hnton of RHENNA I' . . I,)

'i 1- L5:2::l- D ISRENT

,,..,

HlfNT v. -:\IIcNAin

v. K-urtztnan.

40a 1) . ~. l:i02, 643 (1971)

(Le-mon I)

(separate opinion of BHENNAN , J. ).

7

Because under that test it IS clear to me that the :::ltate's
proposed scheme of assistance to the Baptist College is
violative of the Establishment Clause, I dissent.
The act authorizes a financing arra11gement between
the Authority" and the Baptist College at Charlestowu,
a ~outh Carolina educational corporation operated by the
~outh Caroli11a Baptist Convention .
Under that arrangement, the College would convey a substantial portion of its campus to thf' Authority, ancl the Authority
would lease back the property to the College at an agreed
rental. The Authority would then issue revenue bonds
of the ~tate of 8outh Carolina i11 the amount of
$3,500,000.00. which bonds would be payable, principal
and interest, from the rents paid by the College to tht>
Authority under the lease. The proceeds of the sale.
of the bonds would be used to pay off outstanding indebtedness of the College " and to construct additional
buildings ancl facilities for use in its higher education
operations. Upon payment iu full of the principal and
interest on the bonds, the arrangement requires that the
Authority reconvey title to the r.ampuR properties to the
The Sonth Carolina EdueatJOJHtl Fnril1t1E'H Authority i~ (·omof the mrmbrr;; of t hr Statr Budgrt and Control Board, who
are thP Governor. the StntC' Trra~urrr, thP Statr Comptrollrr GeuNal.
thr Chmrmnn of thr Finanre Committ<>r of tlw Statr S<>nate. and thr
Chamnan of thr Wn~·~ nnd :Vfran~ Conumttrr of thr Statr Hou~r of
Hrprr~entnt1vr~ .
Thr HCl ~tatP~ that "all I hr funrtwu~ and powpr~
of the Atlthont\· an• her<>b~ · grautrd to thr 8tatr BudgPt and Control
Board a~ an mc1drnt of 1t~ funrt1on~ til eonnertwu w1th thr publ1r
fimmcr~ of tlw StatP " S (' Coclr Ann . ~ :2:2- 41.:2 ( [)) (Cum . Supp.
1971) .
a Thi~ oul~tamlmg m<kbtednr~s pPrlalll~ to ('C'rt ;un uuspPcJfird
"capital improvrm(•nt~ " App ., p 49 Thu~. 11 may br th<~t the
indrbtrdness wn~ JnrurrPd for Jlll[H' OVPm<•nt ~ to faril1lt<'~ usN[ for
rehg1011~ pu rpm<P~ ,
2
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College free and clear of all lieus and encumbrances:
The arrangement does not. however, amount merely to a
mortgage on the campus property. The Authority is also
empowered, inter alia, to determine the location and
character of any project financed under the act; to con~
struct, maintain. manage, operate, lease as lessor or
lessee, and regulate the same; to enter into contracts for
/;\
the management and operation of such project!\ to es~ )
tablish rules and regulations for the use of the project
or any portion thereof; and to fix and revise from time
to time rates, rents. fees and charges for the use of a
project and for the services furnished or to be furnished
by a project or any portion thereof. In other words,
the College turns over to the ~tate Authority control of
substantial parts of the fiscal operation of thP schoolIts very life's blood
It is true that the act expressly provides that ~tatr,
financing will not bf' provided for
''any facility used or to be used for sectarian ill.;;
struction or as place of religious worship nor any
facility which is used or to be used primarily in
connection with any part of the program of a school
or department of divinity for any religious denOlm nation ." ~ - C C'odP Ann . ~ 22~41.2 (b) (Cum .
8upp. 1D71) "
And tt IS also true that the Authonty, pursuant to
granted rule-making power, has adopted a rule requiring
that each leasf-' agrepment contain a covenant
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased
land, nor any facility locatPd thereon, shall be used
for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious
worship, or in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity of any
rPhgious denomination " .Jurisdictional ~tatement..
p. 4H ,-

No

...
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But policing by the Authority to ensure compliance
with these restrictions is established by a provision required to be included in the lease agreement allowing the
Authority to conduct on-sitr inspections of the facilities
financed under the ad.
Thus, it is crystal clear. l th1nk. that this scheme involves the State in a degree of policing of the affairs of
the College far exceeding that called for by the statutes
struck down in LC'mon I. supra. See also Johnson v.
Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421 (Conn . 1H70), aff'd, 403 U. S.
955 (1971 ). indeed. under this scheme the policing by
the foltate can become so etxensive that the State may
well end up in complete control of the operation of the
College, at least for the life of the bonds. The College 'R
freedom to engage iu religious activities and to offer religious instruction is necessarily circumscribed by this
pervasive state involvement forced upon the College if
it is not to lose its benefits under the Act. For it seems
inescapable that the content of courses taught in facilities financed under the agreement must be closely monitored by the State Authority in discharge of its duty to
ensure that the facilities are not being used for sectanan
mstruction. The Authority must also involve itself
deeply m the fiscal affairs of the College. even to the
point of fixing tuition rates, as part of its duty to assure
sufficient revenues to meet bond and interest obligations.
And should thr College find itself unable to meet these
obligations. its continued existence as a viable sectarian
institution is almost completely in the hands of thP
State Authority . Thus, this agreement. with its consequent state surveillance and ongoing administrative
relationships, inescapably entails mutually-damaging
Church-Statt> involvements. Abington School District
v . Schempp, supra, 374 U. S .. at 295 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ; Lemon I , supm, 403 {l ~ .. at 649 (separate
opinion of BRENN AN . .J I,
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In support of Its contrary argument, the Court adopts
much of the reasoning of the plurality opinion in Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 ( 1971 ). I disagreed with
that reasoning in Tilton because, as in this case. that
reasoning utterly failed to explain how programs of surveillance and inspection of the kind common to both
cases differ from the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
programs invalidated in Lemon I . What I said in Tilton
is equally applicable to the present case.
"I do not see any significant difference in telling
the secta.r ian university not to teach any nonsecular
subjects in a certain building, and Rhode Island's
telling the Catholic school teacher [in Lemon I j not
to teach religion . The vice is the creation through
subsidy of a relationship in which the government
polices the teaching practices of a religious school
or university .'' 403 U. S .. at 660 (separate opi!1io1i
of BRENN AN, ,) ) •
In any event , Tilton is clearly not controlling hen:.
The plurality opinion in Tiltor1 was expressly based on
the premise. erroneous in my view . that the Federal
Higher Education Assistance Act contained no significant
intrusions into the everyday aft'airs of sectarian educational institutions. Thus, it was said in the plurality
opinion :

" I U J nlike the direct and continumg payments under
the Pennsylvama program lin Lemon fl, and all
the mcidents of regulatwn and surveillance, the
Government aid here is a one-time, single-purpos<'
construction grant. There are no continuing finan Cial relationships or dependencies, no annual audits,
and no government analysis of an institution's expenditures Oll secular as distinguished from reli~iow<
arti vi ties " 4();3 l '. :-\ . at oRR,
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But under the South Carolina s~he1ne, "conti'nuing finaflcial relationships or dependencies,'' "annual audits, "
"government analysis,' ;· and "regulation and surveillance''
are the core features of the arrangement. In short, the
'South Carolina statutory scheme as applied to this sectarian institution presents the very sort of "intimate continuing relationship or dependency between government
and religiously affiliated institutions" that in the plurality's view was lacking in Tilton. lb·id.
Nor is the South Carolina arrangement between the
State and this College auy less offensive to the Constitution because it involves, as the Court asserts, no "direct"
financial support to the College by the State. The Establishment Clause forbids far more than payment of public
funds directly to support sectarian institutions. It forbids any offici~l.l involvement with religion, whatever its
form, which tends to foster or discourage religious worship or belief. The cases are many in which we have
struck down on establishment grounds state laws that
provided, not direct financial support to religious institutions, but various other forms of assistance. McCollum
v. Board of Education, 333 U. 8. 200 (1948) ("release
time " program); Engel v. ll1tale, 370 U. ::3. 421 ( 1962)
(prayer reading 111 public schools); Abington School Dtstrict v. Schempp, 374 U. ::3. 203 ( 1963) (Bible reading in
public schools). Moreover, any suggestion that tht·
constitutiOnality of a statutory program to aid sectarian
institutions is dependent on whether that aid can be
characterized as direct or indirect IS flatly refuted by
the Court's decisions today m Committee for Public Educatwn v. Nyqu1st, U. S. ( 1!:173), and Sloan v.
Lemon, U. ::3.- (1973) . ln those cases, we went
behind the mere assertiOn that tuition reimbursement
and tax exemption programs provided no direct aid to
sectarian schools and concluded that the "substantive

,
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impact" of such programs was essentially the same as a
direct subsidy from the State.
, The South Carolina arrangement has the identical
constitutional infirmities. The State forthrightly aids
the College by permitting the College to avail itself of
the State's unique ability to borrow money at low interest rates, and the College, in turn, surrenders to the
State a comprehensive and continuing surveillance of
the educational , religious, and fiscal affairs of the College. The conclusion is compelh'cl that tlus involves thP
State in the "essentially religious activities of religious
institutions" and "employlsJ the organs of government
for essentally religious purposes. " I therefore dissent
and would reverse the JUdgment of the 8upreme Court of
South Carolina,
(

t_ -1. (/l.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Appellant, a South Carolina taxpayer, brought th1s
action to challenge the South Carolina Educational
Facilities Act (the "Act"), S. C. Code Ann. ~ ~ 22-41
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1971), as violative of the Establish ment Clauo::e of the First Amendment insofar as it authorizes a proposed financing transaction involving th e
issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of the Baptist
College at Charleston (the "College").' The trial court's
denial of relief was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
South Carolina. 255 S.C. 71, 177 S. E. 2d 362 (1070l
This Court vacated the judgment and remanded the cas<>
for reconsideration in light of the intervening decision s in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 F. S. 602 ( 1971); Earle.y '
DiCenso, 4o:i U. S. 602 (1971); Robin.so11 v. DiCe·nso,
403 U. S. 602 ( 1971); and Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U . S. 672 (1971). 403 U.S. 945 (1971). On remand,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina adhered to Its
1
At various pomt" dunng tlu" ht 1gation, appellant ha" made·
reference to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
but has made no arguments specifically addressed to vwlations of
that clause except insofar as this Court's approach to rases involv ·
ing the Religion Clau::;es represents an iJ:Iteract ion of the two,
clauses.
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earlier position.
We affirm.

- S . C . - , 187 S. E. 2cl 645 (1972).

I
We begin by setting out the general structure of the
Act. The Act established an Educational Facilities Authority (the "Authority"), the purpose of which is "to
assist institutions for higher education m the construction, financing and refinancing of projects . . ." . S. C.
Code Ann. § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971), primarily
through the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms
of the Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities,
site preparation and related items, but may not include
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian mstruction or as n, place of religious worship nor any
facility which is used or to be used primarily in
connection with any part of the program of a school
or department of divinity for any religious denomination.'.' S. C. Code Ann. ~ 22-41.2 (b) (Cum.
Supp. 1971).
Correspondingly, the Authority is accorded certam powers over the project, including the powers to determine·
the fees to be charged for the use of the project and to·
establish regulations for its use. See pp. - - - , infra.
While revenue bonds to be used in connection with
a project an' issued by the Authority, the Act is quiteexplicit that the bonds shall not be obligations of the
State, directly or indirectly·
"Revenue bonds issued under the provisions of
this chapter shall not be deemed to constitute a
debt or liability of the State or of any political subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit
of the State or of any such political subdivision, but
shall be payable solely from the funds herein provided therefor from revenues. All such revenue
bonds shall contain on the face thereof a statement.
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to the effect that neither the State of South Carolina nor the Authority shall be obligated to pay
the same or the interest thereon except from revenues of the project or the portion thereof for which
they are issued and that neither the faith and credit
nor the taxing power of the State of South Carolina
or of ally political subdivision thereof is pledged to
the payment of the principal of or the interest
such bonds. The issuance of revenue bonds under
the provisions of this act shall 11ot directly or indirectly or contingently obligate the State or any
political subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any
form of taxation whatever therefor or to make any
appropriation for their payment." S. C. Code Ann
§ 22-41.10 (Cum. Supp. 1971) .

on

Moreover, since all of the expenses of the Authonty
must be paid from the revenues of the various projects
in which it participates, S. C. Code Ann. ~ 22- 41.5 (Cum.
Supp. 1971), none of the general revenues of South
Carolina is used to support a project.
On January 6, 1970, the College submitted to the
Authority for preliminary approval an application for
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the proposal, thP
Authority would issue the bonds and make the proceeds available to the College for use in connection with
a portion of its campus to be designated a project (the
"Project") within the meaning of the Act. In return ,
the College would convey the Project, without cost, to
the Authority, which would then lease the property so
conveyed back to the College. After repayment in full
of the bonds, the Project would be reconveyed to the
College. The Authority granted preliminary approval
on January 16, 1970, 255 S.C., at 76; 177 S. E. 2d, at 365.
In its present form, the application requests the issuance of revenue bonds totaling $1,250,000, of which
$1,050,000 would be applied to refund short term financinlj'; of capital improvements and $200,000 would b~
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applied to the completion of dining hall facilit1es. 2 The
advantage of financing educational institutions through
a state created authority derives from relevant provisions of federal and South Carolina state income tax
laws which provide in effect that the interest on such
bonds is not subject to income taxation.'1 The income tax
exempt status of the interest enables the Authority, as
an instrumentality of the State, to market the bonds at
a significantly lower rate of interest than the educational institution would be forced to pay if it borrowed
the money by conventional private financing.
Because the College's application to the Authority wal:>
a preliminary one. the details of the financing arrang;<'
ment have not yet been fully worked out. But RulPb
and Regulations adopted by the Authority govern celtain of its aspects. See Jurisdictional Stat~:ment, Ap2 As originally ~ubmitted by the College and appro\'rcl hy t hr
Authority, the• proposal callrcl for the issnnnrr of ''not rxrrrding
$3,500,000 of revenue bonds. . .'' 255 S. C., at 75; 177 S. E
2d, at 364. As mdicated by a sttpulation of counsel 111 tin;; Court ,
the College ~ubsequrntly :;rcmed a bank loan 111 t hr amount of
$2,500,000 and 11ow propose::; til(' issuanrl' of only :)1 ,:2.50,000 m
revrnue hone!~ under t hr Art, the proceed::; to hr n~rcl.
" (i) to repay 1n full thr Collc•gp'~ Currrut Fund for the balamP
(approximately 8:250,000) advanred to the Collegr ';; Plant Fund H:i
aforr ·aid; (ti) to rrfund out:>tanding short-term loan~ in the amount
of $800,000 whoHC' prorrrcb WPrP to pay off indrbtrchw:-;~ 11H'Ilrr<•d
for capital im w ovrments, and (iti) to financr thr romplrtion of the
d111ing hall facthtir:,; nt a co~t of approximatrl~· ;ll;200,000." (Emph:t
siH in ongimd.) App .. p. 49 .
" Grosl:l incomt· for federal mromt• tax purpo~r:,; dorl:i not mrludt•
interest on " thr obligation:> of a Statr, a Terntory , or a po~;;e~~ton
of the United State:>, or any political l:lubdivi~ion of any of thr
foregoing. . ." 2t) U. S. C. § 10:3 (a) (1). For l:ltatr incomr tax
purpol:le::;, grm;l:i mromr dors not include interrl:lt "upo11 obliga t ionH
of tlw United Statr::; or itl:l JlOi:il:lel:ll:liOlll:i or of thts State or an~
political i:iUbdivil:lion thereof .
" S. C. C'odr Ann. § 65- :25:3 (4)1
(Cum. Supp. 1971)
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pendix C. pp. 47-51. Every lease agreement between the
Authority and an institution must contain a clause
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased
land, nor any facility located thereon, shall be used
for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious
worship. or in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity of any
religious denomination." S. C. , at --; 187
S. E. 2d, at 647.
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agreement must allow the Authority to conduct inspections,
and any reconveyance to the College must . ~ontain a
restriction against use for sectarian purposes.' The Rules
further provide that simultaneously with the execution
4

Rulr 4 rrlating to the Lease Agreement prov1rle~ m part that ·

"If the Lease Agreement contains a provision prrm1tting the Inst itution to rrpurchase the project upon paymrnt of the bond~, tlwn
in such inRtancr tlw Lease Agrrrment ~hall provHir th;d thr DC'ed
of reconveyance from the Authority to t be lnst1t u t 1011 shall be mad('
subject to the condition that so long a::; the Institution, or any
voluntary grantre of the Institution, shall own t hr !rased prrm1~rs,
or any part t hrreof, that no facility tberron, financed in wholr or
in part with the proceeds of the bond~. ~hall l>r usrd for sectanan
instructiOn or as a placr of rrligious worship, or used in connrctwn
with any part of the program of a school or drpartment of divinitr
of any rrligiou~ drnomination" S. C'., at li\i S. E. :Zd , at
647-64.'1.
The H.ule go(·~ on to allow the institutiOn to rrmovP tlns optl()ll
the case of Jllvoluntary salrs :

Ill

"The conditiOn may provide, at the option of llw lnstitutwn, that
if the leased premises shall become the subject of an involuntary
judicial sal<' , a;; a result of any foreclosme of any mortgage, or tmlr
pun;uant to any order of any court, that the t1tlr to be vrstrd m
any purchasrr at :;ncb judicial ::;ale, other than thr Institution , shall
be in fee ::;imple and shall be free of the conditwn applicable to tlw
Institution or any voluntary grantee thrreof." S C., at ;

187 S. E. 2d, at G48. Ser n. 6. infra.
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of the lease agreement, the Authority and the trustee
bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseable
mortgage lien on the Project property including a mort~
gage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority iu
and to the lease agreement.'' Jurisdictional fitatement .
Appendix C, p. 50.
Our consideration of appellant's Establishment Clause
claim extends only to the proposal as approved pre~
liminarily with such additions as are contemplated by
the Act, the rules, and the decisions of the courts below.

II
This Court has recently had occasion to synthesize the
principles which govern our consideration of challenges
to statutes as violative of the Establishment Clause .
"Three . . . tests may be gleaned from our cases.
First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, . . . ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive entanglement with religion.' " Lemon v.
Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., at 612-613.
With full recognition that these are no more than helpful signposts, we consider the present statute and the
proposed transactiou in terms of the three "tests". purpose, effect, and entanglement.

A
The purpose of the statute is manifestly a secular one.
The benefits of the Act are available to all institutions
of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not
having a religious affiliation. While a legislature's declaration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its.
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true intent. appellant makes no suggestion that the introductory paragraph of the Act represents anything
other than a good faith statement of purpose:

"It is hereby declared that for the benefit of the
people of the State. the increase of their commerce,
welfare and prosperity and the improvement of
their health and living conditions it is essential that
this and future generations of youth be given the
fullest opportunity to learn and to develop their
intellectual and mental capacities; that it is essential that institutions for higher education within
the State be provided with appropriate additional
means to assist such youth in achieving the required
levels of learning and development of their intellectual and mental capacities; and that it is the
purpose of this section to provide a measure of assistance and an alternative method to enable institutions for higher education in the Rtate to provide the facilities and structures which are sorely
needed to accomplish the purposes of this act, all
to the public benefit and good, to the extent and
manner provided herein. " S. C. Code Ann. ~ 22.41
(Cum. Supp. 1971) .
The College and other private institutiOns of higher
education provide these benefits to the State." As of the
academic year 1969-1970, there were 1,54~ students
5ln Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. . 2:3G ( 19fl8), this Court
commented on the importance of the role of private rducation m
this country:
"Underlying thesP cases, and undrrlying also tlw IPgislativf' judgments that have preceded the court dPcisions, has brPn a recogmtion
that private education has played and is playing a significant and
valuable rolf in raising national levels of knowledge , competence, and
experience." 392 U. S., at 247.
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enrolled in the College, in addition to approximately 600
night students. Of these students, 95% are residents of
South Carolina who are thereby receiving a college education without financial support from the State of South
Carolina.
B
To identify "primary effect," we narrow our focus from
the statute as a whole to the only transaction presently
before us. Whatever may be its initial appeal, the proposition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any program which in some manner aids an institution with a
religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. E. g.,
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Tilton v. Richardson,
supra. Stated another way, the Court has not accepted
the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because
aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its
other resources on religious ends.
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect.
of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in
which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion
of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or·
when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting. In Tilton v. Richardson, supra, the Court refused to strike down a direct
federal grant to four colleges and universities in Connecticut. Mn. CHIEF JuSTICE BuRGER, for the plurality,
concluded that despite some institutional rhetoric, none
of the four colleges was pervasively sectarian, but held
open that possibility for future cases:
"Individual projects can be properly evaluated if
and when challenges arise with respect to particular
recipients and some evidence is then presented to
show that the institution does in fact possess these.
cha.,racteristics." 403 U. S., at 682.

I
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Appellant has introduced no evidence in the present
case placing the College in such a category. It is true
that the members of the College Board of Trustees are
elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention, that
the approval of the Convention is required for certaiu
financial transactions, and that the charter of the College'
may be amended only by the Convention. But it was
likewise true of the institutions involved in 'l'ilton that
they were "governed by Catholic religious organizations.!'
403 U. S., at 686. What little there is in the record concerning the College establishes that there are no religious qualifications for faculty membership or student
admission, and that only 60 <,Yr of the College student body
is Baptist. a percentage roughly equivalent to the p<'l
centage of Baptists in that area of South Carolina.
255 S.C., at 85; 177 S. E. 2d, at 369. On thE' record 11 1
this case there is no basis to conclude that the College's
operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian
rather than secular education.
Nor ca.n we conclude that the proposed transactiOn
d
will place the Authority in the position of proviclinJ'i'cc•
the religious as opposed to the secular activities of th~: \
College. The scope of the Authority's power ·to as~H>t
institutions of higher education exte nds only to "pro,1
ects." and the Act specifically states that a project "shall
not includ p" any buildings or facilities us<'d for t<' ligio tl~
purposes . In the absence of c•vidence to th<> contrary .
we mu~t assume that all of the proposed finaucing all(!
refinancing relates to buildings and facilit!Cs within a
properly delimited project. It is not at all clear from
the record that the portion of the campus to be conveyed
by the College to the Authority and leased back is th<'
same as that being financed. but in any event it too must
be part of the Project and subject to the same prohibition
against usC' for religious purposes. In addition. as wP
have indicatf'd . f'vcry lPase agrecnwnt must contain a,

ft~
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clause forbidding religious use and another allowing in·
spections to enforce the agreement.u For these reasons,
we are satisfied that implementation of the proposal will
not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion. 7
0

Appf'llant also takes issue with thf' Authority's rule allowing a
purchaser at an involuntary ,;ale to take title free of restrictions as
to religious use. Sec n. 4. ante. Appellant's rrlianre on Tilton
v. Richardson, supra, in this respect is misplacf'd. There , the Court
strnck down a provision under which the churrh-relatf'd colleges
would have unrr~trirted use of a federally financed project after
20 ~·ea r,;. In the present case, b~· contrast, the restriction against
religious use is lifted not as to the institution seeking the assistance
of the Authority nor as to voluntary transferees, but only as to a
purchaser at a judicial sale. Because some other religious institution
bidding for the property at a judicial sale could purchase the property only by outbidding all other prospective purchasers, there is
only a speculative po~sibility that the absence of a use limitation
would ever afford aid to religion. Even in .such an event, the
acquiring religious institution presumably would have had to pay
the then fair value of the property.
7 The "state aid" involved in this case is of a vrry special sort.
We have here no expenditure of public funds, either b~· grant or
loan, no reimbursement by a State for expenditures made b~· a
parochial school or college, and no extending or committing of a
State'~ credit. Hather, the on!~· state aid consists, not of financial
assistancr direct!~· or indirectly which would implicatr public fund s
or credit, but the creation of an instrumentality (thr Authorit~·)
through which rduf'a tiona! institutions ma~· borrow funds on thr·
ha;;iH of th(•ir own credit and thr sccmit~· of their own property
upon morr favorablt• interr:<t term~ thnn otherwise would be availablr. The Suprrme Court of New Jer::;ey characterized the assistance rendered an rducational institution undrr an act generally
,;imilar to the South Carolina Art
mere!~· being a "governmental
,;ervire." Clayton v. Ketvick. 56 N . .T. 523, 530-531, 267 A. 2d
503, 506-507 (1970). The South Carolina Supreme Comt, in the
opinion below, de~rribed the rol(' of the State as that of a "mere
conduit." S. C., at - ; 1R7 S. E. 2d. at 650. Because we
conclude that the primar~· effect of the al:'::;i~tance afforded h('re is
neither to advanrr nor to inhibit religion under Lemon and Tilton,
we need not decide whether, n:; appellee argues, Appellee's Brief, p.

a"
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c
The final question posed by this case is whether under
the arrangement there would be an unconstitutional degree of entanglement betv.-een the State and the College.
Appellant argues that the Authority would becomr involved in the operation of the College both by inspecting
the project to insure that it is not being used for religwm;
purposes and by participating in the management decisions of thr College.
The Court's opinion in Lemo11 and the plurality opwion in Tilton arc grounded on the proposition that the
degree of entanglement arising from inspection of facilities as to use varies in large measure with the extent
to which religion permeates the institution . In findmg
excessive entanglement, the Court in Lemon relied ou
the "substantial religious character of these churchrelated" elementary schools. 403 U. ::-3 •• at 616. MR.
CHIEF JusTICE BunGER's opinion for the plurality 1n
Tilton placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the
federal aid there approved would be spent 111 a college
setting :
"'Since religious IIH.loctrmation 1s not a substantial purpose or activity of these church-related colleges and universities, there is less likelihood than
m primary and secondary schools that rrligion will
permeate tlw area of secular educatiOn ·· 403 1'. :..;
at. 6R7
Although MIL JusTICE WHITE saw no such clear chstll1('
tion, he concurred in tlw result, statin11,
"It 1s enough for me that . . the .Frderal Govrn1
ment lis] financing a separable fuuctwn of over14, the Importance' of thC' tax exemptiOn m the South Carohna
scheme bring~ the present ca;;r undl'r Wa/z v. Tax C'omm'n, supm,
whC're th1~ Conrt upheld a !oral property tax Pxc>mpt 1011 whirh lll rluded rrligwu~ mstit ut10no<.
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riding importance in order to sustain the legislation
here challenged." 403 U. S., at 664.
A majority of the Court in Tilton., then, concluded that
on the facts of that case inspection as to use did not
threaten excessive entanglement. As we have indicated
above, there is no evidence here to demonstrate that tho
College is any more an instrument of religious indoctrina.,
tion than were the colleges and universiti0s ipvolved it)

TiUon" 8
A closer 1ssue under our precedents is presented .by
the contention that the Authority could become deeply
involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions
of the College. The Authority is empowered by the Act :
"(g) [g]enerally, to fix and revise from time to
time and charge and collect rates, rents, fees and
charges for the use of and for the services furmshed
or to be furnished by a project or any portion thereof
and to contract with any person, partnership, association or corporation or other body public or pnvate in respect thereof;
"(h) to establish rules and regulatwns for the use
of a project or any portion thereof and to designate
a participating institution for higher education as
its agent to establish rules and regulations for tht>
R Although th(• rt•cord m thi~ ca~r ~~ ;~bbr!:'vwtell aud not
fret·
from ambiguity, tht• burdrn re~t~:> on appellant to ~:>how t br extent
I o· which the Collrgr i~ church-relat!:'d, cf. Board of Ed·ucatwn 1'.
ALlen, supra, :~92 U. S., at 24~, and he has faded to ~how morr
than a formali~t1c church reJationshtp. A~ Tilton r:stablished, formal denominational control over a liberal art8 college does not
render all aid to the institution a vwlation of thr Establi~:>hmrnt
Clau;;e. So far a::; the record here is concerned, thrre is no showing
that. the College places any sprcial emphasis on Bapti~t denommatwnal or any other ~ectarian type of education. As noted ftbove,
both the faculty and the student body arr open to perHOU>< of any
(or no) religiou~ affiliation,
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use of a project undertaken for such participating
institution for higher education.
" S. C. Code
Ann. ~ 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
These powers are sweeping ones, and were there a
realistic likelihood that they would be exercised in their
full detail, thr entanglement problems with the pro·
posed transaction would not be insignificant.
As the South Carolina Supreme Court pointed out,
the Act was patterned closely after the South Carolina
Industrial Revenue Bond Act, S. C., at - ; 1X7
S. E. 2d, at 651, and perhaps for this reason appears to
confer unnecessarily broad power and responsibility on
the Authority. The opinion of that court, how('ver, re ~
fleets a narrow interpretation of the practical operation
of these powers.
"Counsel for plaintiff argues that thP broad lan
guage of the Act causes the State, of necessity, to
become excessively involved in the operatiOn, management and administration of the College. We do
not so construe the Act.
l Tl he basic functwn
of the Authority is to see ... that fees are charged
sufficieut to meet the bond paymrnts ·
S C
at - , 187 S. E . 2d, at 651
As we read the College's proposal, the Lease Agreement
between the Authority and the College w1ll place on thl'
College the responsibility for making the drtailed decisions regarding the government of the campus and the
fees to be charged for particular services. ~pecifically
the proposal states that the Lease Agreement
"will unconditionally obligate the College (aJ to
pay sufficient rentals to meet the principal and m
terest requirements as they become du<' on such
bonds, [and] (b) to impose an adequate schedule of
charges and fees in order to provide adequate r<'v~>-

71 - l 523-0PINlON

14.

HUNT

11

MeNAlH

nues with which to operate and maintain the said
facilities and to make thf' rental payments .. . .''
App. , p . 18.
In short, under the proposed Lease Agreement, neither
the Authority nor a trustee bank would be Justified 1n
taking action unless the College fails to make the prescribed rental payments or otherwise defaults in 1tR
obligations. Only if the C::ollege refused to meet rental
payments or was unable to do so would the Authority
or the trustee be obligated to take further aetwn . In
that event, the Authority or trustee might either for1 ·
clDse on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting of
rules, charges, and fees. 1t may be argued that only
the former would be consistent with the Establishment.
Clause, but Wf' do not now have that situation before UR.

nr
This case comes to us as an actwn for mJunctive and
declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of th('
Act as applied to a proposed-rather than au actualissuance of revenue bonds. The specifie provisions of
the Act under which the bonds will be issued, the Rules
and Regulations of the Authority, and the College's proposal-all as interpreted by the South Carolina Supreme
Court-confine the scope of the assistance to the secular
aspf'cts of this liberal arts college and do not forcshadov.
excessive entanglement between the Htate and reli~wn
Accordingly , we affirm the holding of the court below
that the Act is constitutional as intf'rprf'ted and appliPrl
Ln thJR caRe·.

To :1 The Chi of Ju::> L.ico
Mr. Justice De Flas
Mr. •JuGtice Brennan
Mr. Ju::;ttce ~) ~.\'I~..L't
Mr. Jtwt.:.ce o~l-:.~te
Mr. Just.,i. . '1 .. nhn. ll
Mr. Ju::; L.i,_:o I _:.:.-J.ckmun
Mr. Justic" I'slmquist
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Appellant. a South Carolina taxpayer, brought this
action to challenge the South Carolina Education al
Facilities Act (the "Act"), S. C. Code Ann. ~~ 22-41
et seq. (Cum . Supp. 1971), as violative of the Establish ~
ment Clause of the First Amendment iusofar as it au ~
thorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the
issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of the Baptist
College at Charleston (the "College") .' ThE' trial court's
denial of relief was affirmed by thE' t;uprE'me Court of
South Carolina. 255 S. C'. 71 , 177 S. E. 2d :362 ( 1070)
This Court vacated the judgment and remanded th e casP
for reconsideration in light of the intervening dE>cisions in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 l '. S. 602 ( 1971); Earley \ .
DiCenso, 40:~ U. S. 602 (11)71); Robin.son v. DiCe-nso ,
403 U. S. 602 ( 1971); and Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U. S. 672 (1971). 403 U. S. 945 (1971). On remand,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina adhered to Jts
1 At variou ~ pomt ~ during th1 · ht1gation, appellant ha;; made·
reference to the Free Exerc1se Clause of the Fin;t Amendment,
but has made no arguments ,;pccifically addres.sed to vwlation:; of
that clause except insofar a:; thi~; Court'8 approach to ca8es jnvolv-tng the Relig10n Clau8e<> represents an i11teraction of the two.
clauses.
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earlier position.
We affirm.

-

S. C. - , 187 S. E. 2d 645 (1972).

I
We begin by setting out the general structure of the
Act. The Act established an Educational Facilities Authority (the "Authority"), the purpose of which is "to
assist institutions for higher education in the construction, financing and refinancing of projects .... ", S. C.
Code Ann. § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971), primarily
through the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms
of the Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities,
site preparation and related items, but may not include
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian mstruction or as a place of religious worship nor any
facility which is used or to be used primarily in
connection with any part of the program of a school
or department of divinity for any religious denomination.'' S. C. Code Ann. ~ 22-41.2 {b) (Cum.
Supp. 1971).
Correspondingly. the Authority is accorded certam powers over the project, including the powers to determine·
the fees to be charged for the use of the project and to·
establish regulations for its use. See pp. - - - , infra.
While revPnue bonds to be used in connection with
a project an' issued by the Authority, the Act is quite·
explicit that the bonds shall not be obligations of the
State, directly or indirectly :
"Revenue bonds issued under the provisions of
this chapter shall not be deemed to constitute a
debt or liability of the State or of any political subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit
of the State or of any such political subdivision, but
shall be payable solely from the funds herein provided therefor from revenues. All such revenue
bonds shall contain on the face thereof a statement.
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to the effect that neither the State of South Carolina nor the Authority shall be obligated to pay
the same or the interest thereon except from revenues of the project or the portion thereof for which
they are issued and that neither the faith and credit
nor the taxing power of the State of South Carolina
or of any political subdivision thereof is pledged to
the payment of the principal of or the interest 011
such bonds. The issuance of revenue bonds under
the provisions of this act shall not directly or indirectly or contingently obligate the State or any
political subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any
form of taxation whatever therefor or to make any
appropriation for their payment." S. C. Code Ann
§ 22-41.10 (Cum. Supp. 1971)
Moreover, since all of the expenses of the Authonty
must be paid from the revenues of the various projects
in which it participates, S. C. Code Ann . ~ 22-41.5 (Cum.
Supp. 1971), none of the general revenues of South
Carolina is used to support a project.
On January 6, 1970, the College submitted to the
Authority for preliminary approval an application for
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the proposal, tlw
Authority would issue the bonds and make the proceeds available to the College for use in connection with
a portion of its campus to be designated a project (the
"Project") within the meaning of the Act. In return,
the College would convey the Project, without cost, to
the Authority, which would then lease the property so
conveyed back to the College. After repayment in full
of the bonds, the Project would be reconveyed to the
College. The Authority granted preliminary approval
on January 16, 1970. 255 S.C., at 76; 177 S. E. 2d, at 365.
In its present form, the application requests the issuance of revenue bonds totaling $1,250,000, of which
$1,050,000 would be applied to refund short term financm~ of capital improvements and $200,000 would b~
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applied to the completion of dining hall facilit1es. 2 The
advantage of financing educational institutions through
a state created authority derives from relevant provisions of federal and South Carolina tate income tax
laws which provide in effect that the interest on such
bonds is not subject to income taxation." The income tax
exempt status of the interest enables the Authority, as
an instrumentality of the State, to market the bonds at
a significantly lower rate of interest than the educational institution would be forced to pay if it borrov,:ed
the money by conventional private financing.
Because the College's application to the Authority wa:.
a preliminary one. the details of the financing arrangement have not yet been fully \VOrked out. But RulPt>
and Regulations adopted by the Authority govern cPttain of its aspects. See Jurisdictional Statf'ment, Ap2
As originally :submittPd by thr Collrgr and approvrd hy t hr
Authority, thr propo~al callrd for thr i~:;uaurr of "not rxcerding
$3,500,000 of rrvenur bonds. . .'' 255 S. C., at 75; 177 S. E
2d, at 364. A:s mdicatrd by a ~t 1pulation of coun:,;p] m t h1;; Court ,
the College ~ub:;cqurntly ;;ecmPd n bank loan 111 thr :nnoun t of
$2,500,000 and now propo~e:; t hP J ;;~> twnc(' of only Sl ,2.50,000 111
revcnur bomb undrr th<' Act, thr procpp(li:; to br u;;rd.
"( i) to rrpay 111 full thP Collrgp';; Currrnt Fund for thr balaJH'l'
(approximatrly 8250,000) advnncrd to thr Collrgr ':; Plant Fund a:;
aforr~aid; (1i) to rrfund out:;tancling :,;hort-tri'lil lonn~ in thr amount
of $800,000 wlwHe prorred~ WPrP to pay off indebtednp;.,; incl!lTPd
for capital im]ll'ovements, and (i1i) to finnncr thr romplPtion of tlw
dming hnll fac!IJtiP::> at n co~t of approximately ));200,000." (Empbn
:;i:; in onginal.) App .. p. 49.
" Oro:;~ mcomP for federal mcom(• tax purpo~r:; dorti not mrludP
interest on " thP obligation;; of a Statr, a Trrntory, or a pot:~~e~~1on
of thr Unitrd Stntes, or nn~· political subdiv1~ion of any of tlw
foregomg .
" 2!) U. S. C. § 10:3 (a) ( 1). For :;tate mcome tax
purpo:;e:;, gro~~ IIH'ome doe;; nor include int rre;;! "upon obliga t wn~
of tho United States or it:; po:;;;r:;;;ion:; or of this State or :111)
political ::;nbdivi:;ion thereof .
" S. C. Code Ann. § ()5-25:3 (4 )1
(Cum. Supp. 1971)
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pendix C, pp. 47-51. Every lease agreement between the
Authority and an institution must contaiu a clause
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased
land, nor any facility located thereon, shall be used
for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious
worship, or in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity of any
religious denomination." - - S. C. , at --; 187
S. E. 2d, at 647.
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agreement must allow the Authority to conduct inspections,
and any reconveyance to the College must . ~ontain a
restriction against use for sectarian purposes.' The Rules
further provide that simultaneously with the execution
4

Rule 4 rf'latmg to the Lease Agreement provide~ m part that ·

"If the Lease Agref'ment contains a provi:,;ion pf'rmttting thr In~t I tution to rrpurchasf' the project upon payment of thf' bonds, tl1C'n
in such instance t hr Lease Agrf'f'ment :-;hall provl(l<• that thr DPcd
of reconvryance from the Authority to the ln:;titutwn shall br madr
subject to the condition that so long nH tlw lm;titution, or an~
voluntar~· grantrf' of the Institution, ;;hall own thr !rased prrmi;;r,;,
or any part therf'of, that no facility thrrron , financed in wholr 01
in part with the proceed;; of the bond;;, ::;hall bf' u:;rd for "t'<'tanan
instructwn or al:i a plncf' of religwus worship, or used 111 connrettoll
with any pnrt of the program of a school or drpartment of divmit~·
of any rrligiou;; drnomination " S C'., at - . lRi S. E. :2d . al
G47-64H.
The Rul<' gm·,., on to allow tlw in~titutwn to rrniov<· tins optwn
the case of mvoluntary sales:

Ill

"The conditiOn may provide, at the option of tlw Institution, that
if the lf'ased premises :;hall become the subject of an involuntary
judicial :;air, a;; a result of any foreclosure of any mortgage, or :,;ale
pursuant to any order of any court, that the titlr to be vested 111
any purcha:;er at such judicial sale, other than the Institution, ;;hall
be in fee simple and shall be frre of thr conditiOn apphcable to tlw
Institution or any voluntary grantee thereof" S. C., at - ;
187 S. E 2d, at 648. See n. 6. infra.
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of the lease agreement, the Authority and the trustee
bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseable
mortgage lien on the Project property including a mortgage on the "right, title and interest of thE' Authority iu
and to the lease agreement.'' Jurisdictional Statemcu t.
Appendix C. p. 50.
Our consideration of appellant's Establishment Clause
claim extends only to the proposal as approved preliminarily with such additions as are contemplated by
the Act, thE' rules, and the decisions of the courts below.

II
This Court has recently had occasion to synthesize the'
principles which govern our consideration of challengPs
to statutes as violative of the Establishment Clause
"Three . . tests may be gleaned from our cases.
First, the statute must have a secular legislatiVE'
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, . . . ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive entanglement with religion .' " Lemon v
Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., at 612-613.
With full recognition that these are no more than helpful signposts, we consider the present statute and the
proposed transaction in terms of thP three "tests". purpose, effect, and entanglement.

A
The purpose of the statute is manifestly a secular one.
The benefits of the Act are available to all institutions
of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not
having a religious affiliation. While a legislature's declaration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its.
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true intent, appellaut makes no suggestion that the introductory paragraph of the Act represents anything
other than a good faith statement of purpose:

"It is hereby declared that for the benefit of the
people of the State. the increase of their commerce,
welfare and prosperity and the improvement of
their health and living conditions it is essential that
this and future generations of youth be given the
fullest opportunity to learn and to develop their
intellectual and mental capacities; that it is essential that institutions for higher education within
the State be provided with appropriate additional
means to assist such youth in achieving the required
levels of learning and development of their intel lectual and mental capacities; and that it is the
purpose of this section to provide a measure of assistance and an alternative method to enable institutions for higher education in the State to provide the facilities and structures which are sorely
needed to accomplish the purposes of this act, all
to the public benefit and good, to the extent and
manner provided herein." S. C. Code Ann. ~ 22.41
(Cum. Supp. 1971) .
The College and other private institutiOns of higher
education provide these benefits to the State." As of the
academic year 1969-1970, there were 1,54~ students
In Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 2:3() (19fi8) , tht~ Court
commented on the importance of thr role of pnvatr education in
this country :
5

"Underlying these cases, and underlying abo tlw lrgislativ<' judgments that have preceded the court d<'cisions, has been a recognition
that privat<' education has played and is playing a significant and
valuable rol<' 111 ntising national levels of knowl<'dge, comp<'tenr<', and
e>.:perience." 392 U. S., at 247.
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enrolled in the College. in addition to approximately 600
night students. Of these students, 95% are residents of
South Carolina who are thereby receiving a college education without financial support from the State of South
Carolina.
B
To identify "primary effect," we narrow our focus from
the statute as a whole to the only transaction presently
before us. Whatever may be its initial appeal, the prop··
osition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any program which in some manner aids an institution with a
religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. E. g. ,
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899) ; Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Tilton v. Richardson,
supra. Stated another way, the Court has not accepted
the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because
aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its
other resources on religious ends.
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect.
of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in
which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion /
of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or
when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting. In Tilton v. Richardson, supra, the Court refused to strike down a direct
federal gran t to four colleges aud uuiversities in Counecticut . MH. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER, for th e plurality,
concluded that despite some institutional rhetoric, none
of the four colleges was pervasively sectarian, but held
open that possibility for future cases :
"Individual projects can be properly evaluated if
and when challenges arise with respect to particular
recipients and some evidence is then presented to
show that the institution does in fact possess these.
Gharacteristics." 403 U. S., at 682..
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Appellant has introduced no evidence in the present
case placing the College in such a category. It is true
that the members of the College Board of Trustee!' are
elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention, that
the approval of the Convention is required for certain
financial transactions, and that the charter of the College'
may be amended only by the Convention. But it was
likewise true of the institutions involved in Tilton that
they were "governed by Catholic religious organizations.,'
403 U. S., at 686. What little there is in the record concerning the College establishes that there are no religious qualifications for faculty membership or student
admission , and that only 60 % of the College student bo<.ly
is Baptist, a percentage roughly equiva!Pnt to the pc•r
centage of Baptists in that area of South Carolina
255 S. C., at 85; 177 S. E. 2d, at 369. On tlw rceord ll l
this case there is no basis to conclude that the College's
operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian
rather than secular education.
Nor can we conclude that the proposed transact10nr
will place the Authority in the position of proviclin~
t:tt'd
the religious as opposed to the secular activities of thP
College. ThP scope of the Authority 's power to ass1st
institutions of higher eclucation extends only to "pro.1
ects." and the Act specifically states that a project "shall
not include, '' any buildings or facilities used for tP li giotl~
purposes. l11 the absence of evidence> to the contrary .
we must assu11w that all of the proposed financing and
refinancing relates to buildings and facilitJCs within a
properly delimited prOJect. [t is not at all clear fron1
the record that the portion of the campus to be conveyed
by the Coll ege to the Authority and leased back is thP
sanw as that being financed. but in any event it too must
he part of the Project and subject to the same prohibition
against usc' for religious purposes. f n addition. as we·
have indicated. every lE'ase agreenH'nt must contain 8,

+o
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clause forbidding religious use and another allowing inspections to enforce the agreement.'; For these reasons,
we are satisfied that implementation of the proposal will
not have the primary effect of ac.lvancing or inhibiting
religion. 7
11
Apprllant abo take:; i::;,;ue with thr Authorit~··~ rulr allowing a
purcha:ser at 1111 involuntar~· salr to take t itlr frer of rr~trirtion~ a~
to religious 11~r. See n. 4. aute. ApJlPllant '~ n·lianrr on Tilton
v. Richardson. :;upra. in this rt?::;prct i,.; mi:splarrd . Thrrr, the Court·
struck down a provi:sion under whirh the churrh-rC'la trd colll?ges
wo11ld hnvP unrr~trirtrd u;;e of a fedl?l'ally finan<·Nl project aftet
20 yrar~. In the present ca:se, b~· contrn:st, the re::;trictiou ngainst
religion::; u:;e i::; lifted not ns to the in:stit ution :seeking the assistance
of the Authorit~· nor as to voluntary transft?ri?P~ , but onl~· as to a
purchaser at a judirial :sale. Bt?cause :some other religious inHtitution
bidding for the property at a judicial salt? could purcha::;p 1he property onl~· b~ · out bidding all other prospt?ct ive purchasers, there i:sonly a ::;pt?culativp po:;;.;ibility that tht? ab:;eJH'e of a UHe limitntion
would Pvl?r afford aiel to rrligion . EvPn in ::;uch an evrnt, the
acq11iring religion:; in:stitution pre::;umabl~· woHlcl have had to pay
tht? tht?n fair valuP of the propert~·.
7 The "::;tate aid" involved in thi::; ca:sl? is of a very spt?rial ~ort.
We have here no Pxpenditurr of publir f11nds , either b~ · grant or
loan, no reimbm:sement by a State for expenditure;.; made b~ · a
parochial ~chool or collrge, and no extending or t'ommitt ing of a
State'" credit. Rather, the onl~· :state aid con:;i:;t:;, uot of financial
assistnnce direct!~· or indirectl~· which wo11ld implicat<• public fund::;
or crPdit, but the crration of an in::;trumentalit~ · (the Authorit~·)
t hmugh whi<·h P<iu<"ational in;.;tit ut ion~ ma~ · bonow fund,.: ott tlH'·
l!a:;i:-< of tlwir own c·redit and thP "<'<'lll'it~· of th<•ir O\\'n propert~ ·
upon mon• fa\·ornbl<o intNe,.:t t<•rm;-; than otlwrwi~<· would ])(' antilable. The Supreme Court of i'\f'w .Trr~e~· charaeterizrd the n~o<:;i~t
ancr rrnderrd an rducational in~titution 1mcler an net generally
~imilar to thr South Carolina Al't a~ merd~· being a "govemmental
~ervire." Cla!J(UII \', Kervirk. 56 X . .T. 5:2:3, s:3o-s:n, :207 A. 2d
5o:3, 506-507 (1970). The South Carolina Supreme Court, in the
opinion below, de;.;cribed the roll? of the State a~ that of a '· mere·
S. C., nt - : 187 S. E. 2d, at 650. Brcau~e wr
ronduit." concludl' that t lw prima r~· l'ffeet of the a:;~i;-;tanrc nfforc!NI hrrr i;;
nrither to advanr<' nor to inhibit religion undrr Lemon and TiLton ,
we nc<·d not decide whetlwr. a~ appellee argue~. Appellee'~ Brief, p.
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c
The final question posed by this case is whether under
the arrangement there would be an unconstitutional degree of entanglement between the State and the College.
Appellant argues that the Authority would become involved in the operation of the College both by inspecting
the project to insure that it is not being used for religious
purposes and by participating in the management. decisions of the College.
The Court's opinion in Lemon and the plurality opillion in Tilton are grounded on the proposition that the
degree of entanglement arising from inspection of facilities as to use varies in large measure with the Pxtent
to which religion permeates the institution . ln finding
excessive entanglement, the Court in Lemon relied 011
the "substantial religious character of these church related'' elementary schools. 403 U. S .. at 616. MR.
CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER's opinion for the plurality m
Tilton placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the
federal aid there approved would be spent 111 a college
setting :
"'Rince religious indoctrination IS not a substantial purpose or activity of these church-related colleges allCI universities, there is less likelihood than
In primary alld secondary schools that religion will
permeate the area of secular education ·· 403 U. ~
at 6R7,
Although MR. JusTICE WHITE saw no such clear distme·
tion, he concurred in the result, stating
"It IS enough for me that ... the Federal Govern ment [is] financing a separable functwn of over14, the 1mportanct> of the tax exemptwn in tht> South Carolina
scheme brings the present ca~r under Walz v. Tax Cornm'n, supra,
whrrr this Court upheld a local property tnx PXE'mption which lll·
eluded reJigio11S institution::<.
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riding importance in order to sustain the legislatiOn
here challenged.'' 403 U. S., at 664.

A majority of the Court in Tilton., then, concluded that
on the facts of that case inspection as to use did not
threaten excessive entanglement. As we have indicated
above, there is no evidence here to demonstrate that the
College is any more an instrument of religious indoctrina,
tion than were the colleges and universiti0s ip volv~d ill
TiUon. 8
A closer Issue under our precedents is presented .by
the contention that the Authority could become deeply
involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions
of the College. The Authority is empowered by the> Act .
" (g) [ g j enerally. to fix and revise from time to
time and charge and collect rates, rents. fees and
charges for the use of and for the servJCes furmshed
or to be furnished by a project or any portion thereof
and to contract with any person, partnership, association or corporation or other body public or pnvate in respect thereof;
"(h) to establish rules and regulatiOns for the use
of a project or any portion thereof and to designate
a participating institution for higher education as
its agent to establish rules and regulations for the·
'Althongb the n·corcl 111 tb1H ca~r Js :lbbrl:'vwtc·<.l ami not tn·c·
!'rom ambiguity, the burden rests on appellant to show thr rxtrnt
to· which the College is churcb-rrlated, cf. Board of Education v.
Allen, supra., 392 U. S., at 24t-J, and he has failrd to show morr
than a formalistic church relatwnslnp. A;; TiLton rstablished, formal denominatwnal control over a liberal arts college dors not
render all aid to the institution a vwlation of thr Establishment
Clause. So far as the record here is concerned, there IS no showing
that the College places any sp<:>cial empha~is on Baptist denommatwnal or any other sectarian type of education. As noted above,
both the faculty and th<:> student body arc open to persons of any
(or no) rrligiou~ aiftliation,
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use of a project undertaken for such participating
institution for higher education.
" S. C . Code
Ann. ~ 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
These powers are sweeping ones, and were there a
realistic likelihood that they would be exercised in thPJr
full detail, the entanglement problems with the pro·
posed transaction would not be insignifiran t.
As the South Carolina Supreme Court pointed out,
the Act was patterned closely after the Houth Carolina
Industrial Revenue Bond Act, S. C., at - ; 1X7
S. E. 2d, at 651, and perhaps for this reason appears to
co:p.fer unnecessarily broad power and responsibility on
the Authority. The opinion of that court, hov;rever, n'ftects a narrow interpretation of the practical operatwn
of these powers.
"Counsel for plaintiff argues that the broad lan
guage of the Act causes the State, of necessity, to
become excessively involved in the operatiOn, management and administration of the College. We do
not so construe the Act.
l T] he basic functJott
of the Authority is to see . .. that fN'S arC' chargPd
sufficient to meet the bond payment~ '
R C
at - , 187 S. E. 2d. at 651
As we read the College's proposal. the Lease Agreement
between th e Authority and the College will place on th< ·
College the responsibility for making th e detailed d<>cisions regarding the government of the campus and tlw
fees to be charged for particular services . 8pecifically,
the proposal states that the Lease Agreement
"will unconditionally obligate the College (a) to
pay sufficient rentals to meet the prinCJpal and m
terest requirements as they beconw due on such
bonds, [and] (b) to impose an adequate schedule of
charges and fees in ordt>r to provide adequate rt>w-
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nues w1th which to operate and maintaw the said
facillties and to make the rental payn1ents
'·'
App .. p. 18.

In short, under the proposed Least> Agreement, neither
the Authority nor a trustee bank would be .I ustified 111
taking action unless the College fails to make tht> prescribed rental payments or otherwise defaults in 1t,~
obligations. Only if the College refused to meet rentE11
payments or was unable to do so would the Authority
or the trustee be obligated to take further actwn . In
that event, the Authority or trustee might either for•·
close on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting of
rules, charges, and fees It may be argued that only
the former would be consistent with the Establishment.
Clause, but we do not now have that situation before uR.

HI
This case comes to us as an actwn f6r m,Junctive and
declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of thf>·
Act as applied to a proposed-rather thau an actualissuancr. of revenue bonds. The specific provisions of
the Act under which the bonds will be issued, tht> Rules
aud Regulations of thP Authority, and the College's proposal-all as interpreted by the South Carolina Supreme
Court-confine the scope of the assistance to the sAcular
aspects of this liberal arts college and do not foreshado"'
excessive entanglernent between the State and religion
Accordingly, we affirm the holding of the court below
that the Act is constitutional as interpreted and applierL
tn tl-ui" case-.
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Here on appeal from the Supreme Court of South Carollna,
this case involves the validity of a state statute which creates an
Fducational Facilities Authority - with power to issue revenue bonds
on behalf of higher educational institutions for the financing of
buildings and other facilities not used for religious purposes.
The Baptist College at Charleston prti(>Oses to issue bonds
through the Authority, and the Act is here challenged as violative
of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment on thegground
that the College is controlled by the Baptist Church.
The revenue bonds to be issued will be sold to the public ,
secured by a mortgage on the campus buildings and facilities which
may not, under the terms of the Act, be used for sectarian instruction
or religious worship.
It is nevertheless contended that the primary effect of financing

through the Authority will be to advance religion, and also will result

2.

in excessive entanglement.
The statute expressly provides that neither the state nor the
Authority is obligated, directly or indirectly, to pay the principal
of or interest on the bonds. Nor is the taxing power of the State
pledged or implicated in any way. And all expenses of the Authority
must be paid solely from the revenues of the projects. The danger
of entanglement, as defined in our prior cases, is remote as the
Authori$' s right to interfere in the affairs of the College does not
become operative unless there is a default.
We also note that the purposes of the ltatute are clearly
secular, and its benefits are available to all institutions of higher
education in the State.
For reasons stated more fully in the opinion, we conclude
that there is no violation of the IBtablishment Clause , and affirm
the judgment below.
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion in which
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Here on appeal from the Supreme Court of South Carolina,
this case involves the validity of a state statute which creates an
Educational Facilities Authority. The Authority is authorized
to issue revenue bonds on behalf of higher educational institutions
for the financing of buildings and other facilities not used for
religious purposes.
The Baptist College at Charleston proposes to issue
bonds through the Authority. The Act is challenged as violative
of the Establishment Caluse of the First Amendment as the College
is controlled by the Baptist Church.
The revenue bonds to be issued will be sold to the public ,
secured by a mortgage on the campus buildings and facilities.
These may not, under the terms of the Act, be used for sectarian
instruction or religious worship. It is nevertheless contended that
the primary effect of financing through the Authority will be to advance
religion, and also will result in excessive entanglement.
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The Act expressly provides that neither the State nor the
Authority is obligated, directly or indirectly, to pay the principal
of or interest on the bonds. Nor is the taxing power of the State

pledged or implicated in any way. And all expenses of the Authority
must be paid solely from the revenues of the projects. The danger
of entanglement, as defined in our prior cases, is remote as the
Authority's right to intervene in the affairs of the College does not
become operative unless there is a default.
We also note that the purposes of the statute are clearly
secular, and its benefits are available to all institutions of higher
education in the state.

We conclude that there is no violation of the

Establishment Clause, and affirm the judgment below.
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion in which
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall have joined.
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to issue revenue bonds on behalf of higher educational institutions
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The Baptist College at Charleston proposes to issue
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bonds through the Authority. The Act is challenged as violative
of the Establishment Caluse of the First Amendment as the College
.
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is controlled by the Baptist Church.
The revenue bonds to be issued will be sold to the public ,
secured by a mortgage on the campus buildings and facilities.
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instruction or religious worship. It is nevertheless contended that
the primary effect of financing through the Authority will be
religion, and also will result in excessive entanglement.
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The Act expressly provides that neither the State nor the
Authority is obligated, directly or indirectly, to pay the principal
of or interest on the bonds. Nor is the taxing power of the state
pledged or implicated in any way. And all expenses of the Authority
must be paid solely from the revenues of the projects. The danger
of entanglement • as defined in our prior cases, is remote as the
Authority's right to intervene in the affairs of the College does not
become operative unle88 there is a default.
We also note that the purposes of the statute are clearly
secular, and its benefits are available to all institutions of higher
education in the state.

We conclude that there is no violation of the

Establishment Clause, and affirm the judgment below.
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion in which
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall have joined.
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Educational Facilities Authority. The Authority is authorized
to issue revenue bondsj on behalf of higher educational institutions/
for the financing of buildings and other
religious purposes.
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bonds through the Authority. The Aet is challenged as violative
if~~
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of the EstablishmentACal""e of the First Amendmeny's the College
is controlled by the Baptist Church.
The revenue bonds to be issued will be sold to the public,
secured by a mortgage on the campus buildings and facilities.
These may not, under the terms of the Act, be used for sectarian
instruction or religious worship. It is nevertheless contendecy{hat
the primary effect of financing through the Authorit1 will be to advance
religion / and also will result in excessive entanglement.
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of or interest on the bonds. Nor is the taxing power of the State
pledged or implicated in any way. And all expenses of the Authority
must be paid solely from the revenues of the projects. The danger
of entanglement, as defined in our prior cases, is remote as the
Authority's right to intervene in the affairs of the College does not
become operative unless there is a default.
We also note that the purposes of the statute are clearly
secular, and its benefits are available to all institutions of higher
education in the State.

We conclude that there is no violation of the

Establishment Clause, and affirm the judgment below.
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion in which
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall have joined.

NOTE: Where It Is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be re·
lensed, as Is being done In connection with this case, at the time
the opinion Is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no purt of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for
the convenience of the reader. See Unitea States v. Detroit Lumber
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
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In this action for injunctive and declaratory relief appellant challenges the South Carolina Educational Facilities Act as violative
of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment insofar as
it authorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the issuance of revenue bonds benefiting a Baptist-controlled college. The
Act establishes an Educational Facilities Authority to assist
(through the issuance of revenue bonds) higher educational institutions in constructing and financing projects, such as buildings,
facilities, and site preparation, but not including any facility for
sectarian instruction or religious worship. Neither the State nor
the Authority is obligated, directly or indirectly, to pay the
principal of or interest on the bonds; nor is the State's taxing
power pledged or implicated. All expenses of the Authority also
must be paid solely from the revenues of the projects. The Authority gave preliminary approval to an application submitted by
the college, only 60% of whose students are Baptists. As subsequently modified, the application requests the issuance of revenue
bond~ to be used for refinancing capital improvements and completing the dining hall. Under the statutory scheme the project
would be conveyed to the Authority, which would lease it back
to the college, with reconveyance to the college on full payment
of the bonds. The lease agreement would contain a clause obligating the institution to observe the Art's r~trictions on sectarian
use and enabling the Authority to conduct inspections. The provision for reconveyance would restrict the project to nonsectarian
use. The trial court denied appellant relief, and the State
Supreme Court affirmed. After this Court had vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in the light of
J,ernon v. K'l,frtzman, 403 U, S, 602, and other intervening deci~
I
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the State Supreme Court adhered to its earlier decision.

Held: The Act as construed by the South Carolina Supreme Court
does not, under the guidelines of Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at
612-613, violate the Establishment Clause. Pp. 6-14.
(a) The purpose of the Act is secular, the benefits of the
statute being available to all institutions of higher education in the
State, whether or not they have a religious affliiation. Pp. 6-8.
(b) The statute does not have the primary effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion. The college involved has no significant
sectarian orientation and the project must be confined to a secular
purpose, with the lease agreement, enforced by inspection provisions, forbidding religious use. Pp. 8-10.
(c) The statute does not foster an excessive entanglement with
religion. The record here does not show that religion so permeates
the collegr that inspection by the Authority to insure that the
project is not usrd for religious purposes would nrcessarily lead
to such entanglement. The Authority's statutory power to participate in certain management decisions also dors not have that
effect, in view of the narrow construction by the State Supreme
Court, limiting such power to insuring that the. college's fees suffice
to meet bond payments. Absent default, the lease agreement
would leave full responsibility with the college regarding fees and
general operations. Pp. 11-14.
258 S. C. 97, 187 S. E. 2d 645, affirmed.
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGEn,
C. J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which DouGLAS
and MARSHALL, JJ., joined.

NOTICE: This opinion Is subject to formal revision before publication
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other
formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-1523
Richard W. Hunt, Appellant,

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of South
Robert E. MeN air, Governor
Carolina.
of South Carolina, et al.

v.

.[June 25, 1973]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Appellant, a South Carolina taxpayer, brought this
action to challenge the South Carolina Educational
Facilities Act (the "Act"), S. C. Code Ann. §§ 22-41
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1971), as violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment insofar as it authorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the
issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of the Baptist
College at Charleston (the "College") .1 The trial court's
denial of relief was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
South Carolina. 255 S. C. 71 , 177 S. E. 2d 362 (1970).
This Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case
for reconsideration in light of the intervening decisions in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Earlew v.
DiCenso, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Robinson v. DiCernso,
403 U. S. 602 (1971); and Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U. S. 672 (1971). 403 U. S. 945 (1971). On remand,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina adhered to its
1 At various points during this litigation, appellant has made
reference to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
but has made no arguments specifically addressed to violations of
that clause except insofar as this Court's approach to cases involving the Religion Clauses represents an interaction of the two
clauses.
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earlier position.
We affirm .

258 S. C. 97. 187 S. E. 2d 645 (1972).

I
We begin by setting out the general structure of the
Act. The Act established an Educational Facilities Authority (the "Authority"), the purpose of which is "to
assist institutions for higher education in the construction, financing and refinancing of projects .... ", S. C.
Code Ann. § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971), primarily
through the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms
of the Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities,
site preparatiou and related items, but may not include
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious worship nor any
facility which is used or to be used primarily in
connection with any part of the program of a school
or department of divinity for any religious denomination." S. C. Code Ann. § 22-41.2 (b) (Cum.
Supp. 1971) .
Correspondingly, the Authority is accorded certain powers over the project, including the powers to determine
the fees to be charged for the use of the project and to
establish regulations for its use . See pp. - - - , infra.
While revenue bonds to be used in connection with
a project are issued by the Authority, the Act is quite
explicit that the bonds shall not be obligations of the
State, directly or indirectly:
"Revenue bonds issued under the provisions of
this chapter shall not be deemed to constitute a
debt or liability of the State or of any political subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit
of the State or of any such political subdivision, but
shall be payable solely from the funds herein provided therefor from revenues. All such revenue
bonds shall contain on the face thereof a statement.
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to the effect that neither the State of South Carolina nor the Authority shall be obligated to pay
the same or the interest thereon except from revenues of the project or the portion thereof for which
they are issued and that neither the faith and credit
nor the taxing power of the State of South Carolina
or of any political subdivision thereof is pledged to
the payment of the principal of or the interest on
such bonds. The issuance of revenue bonds under
the provisions of this act shall not directly or in·
directly or contingently obligate the State or any
political subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any
form of taxation whatever therefor or to make any
appropriation for their payment." S. C. Code AmL
§ 22-41.10 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
Moreover, since all of the expenses of the Authority
must be paid from the revenues of the various projects
in which it participates, S. C. Code Ann. § 22-41.5 (Cum.
Supp. 1971), none of the general revenues of South
Carolina is used to support a project.
On January 6, 1970, the College submitted to the
Authority for preliminary approval an application for
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the proposal, the
Authority would issue the bonds and make the proceeds available to the College for use in connection with
a portion of its campus to be designated a project (the
"Project") within the meaning of the Act. In return,
the College would convey the Project, without cost, to
the Authority, which would then lease the property so
conveyed back to the College. After repayment in full
of the bonds, the Project would be reconveyed to the
College. The Authority granted preliminary approval
on January 16, 1970, 255 S. C., at 76; 177 S. E. 2d, at 365.
In its present form, the application requests the issuance of revenue bonds totaling $1,250,000, of which
$1,050,000 would be applied to refund short term financing, of capital improvements and $200,000 would ba

'.
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applied to the completion of dining hall facilities. 2 The
advantage of financing educational institutions through
a state created authority derives from relevant provisions of federal and South Carolina state income tax
laws which provide in effect that the interest on such
bonds is not subject to income taxation.~ The income tax
exempt status of the interest enables the Authority, as
an instrumentality of the State, to market the bonds at
a significantly lower rate of interest than the educational institution would be forced to pay if it borrowed
the money by conventional private financing.
Because the College's application to the Authority was
a preliminary one, the details of the financing arrangement have not yet been fully worked out. But Rules
and Regulations adopted by the Authority govern certain of its aspects. See Jurisdictional Statement, Ap2 As originally submitted by the College and approved by the
Authority, the proposal called for the issuance of "not exceeding
$3,500,000 of revenue bonds .. . ." 255 S. C., at 75; 177 S. E.
2d, at 364. As indicated by a stipulation of counsel in this Court,
the College subsequently secured a bank loan in the amount of
$2,500,000 and now proposes the issuance of only $1,250,000 in
revenue bonds under the Act, the proceeds to be used:
"(i) to repay in full the College's Current Fund for the balance
(approximately $250,000) advanced to the College's Plant Fund as
aforrsaid ; (ii) to refund outstanding short-term loans in the amount
of $800,000 whose proceeds werr to pay off indebtedness incurred
for capital improvements, and (iii) to finance the completion of the
dining hall farilitirs at a cost of approximately $200,000." (Emphasis in original.) App ., p . 49 .
3 Gross income for federal incomr tax purposes does not include
interest on " the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession
of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the
foregoing . . ." 26 U. S. C. § 103 (a) (1). For state income tax
purposes, gros::; income does not include interest "upon obligations
of the United States or its possessions or of this State or any
political subdivision thereof . .
" S. C. Code Ann. § 65-253 (4)
(Cum, Supp. 1971)
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pendix C, pp. 47-51. Every lease agreement between the
Authority and an institution must contain a clause
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased
land, nor any facility located thereon, shall be used
for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious
worship, or in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity of any
religious denomination." 258 S. C., at 101; 18.7
S. E. 2d, at 647.
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agreement must allow the Authority to conduct inspections,
and any reconveyance to the College must contain a
restriction against use for sectarian purposes. 4 The Rules
further provide that simultaneously with the execution
Rule 4 relating to the Lease Agreement provides in part that:
"If the Lease Agreement contains a provision permitting the Institution to repurchase the project upon payment of the bonds, then
in such instance the Lease Agreement shall provide that the Deed
of reconveyance from the Authority to the Institution shall be made
subject to the condition that so long as the Institution, or any
voluntary grantee of the Institution, shall own the leased premises,
or any part thereof, that no facility thereon, financed in whole or
in part with the proceeds of the bonds, shall be used for sectarian
instruction or as a place of religious worship, or used in connection
with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity
of any religiou ~ denomination." 258 S. C., at 101-102; 187 S. E. 2d,
at 647-648.
The Rule goes on to allow the institution to remove this option in
the case of involuntary sales:
"The condition may provide, at the option of the Institution, that
if the leased premises shall become the subject of an involuntary
judicial sale, as a result of any foreclosure of any mortgage, or sale
pursuant to any order of any court, that the title to be vested in
any purchaser at such judicial sale, other than the Institution, shall
be in fee simple and shall be free of the condition applicable to the
Institution or any voluntary grantee thereof." 258 S. C., at 102 ;·
187 S. E. 2d, at 648. See n. 6, infra.
4
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of the lease agreement, the Authority and the trustee
bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseable
mortgage lien on the Project property including a mortgage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority in
and to the lease agreement." Jurisdictional Statement,
Appendix C, p. 50.
Our consideration of appellant's Establishment Clause
claim extends only to the proposal as approved preliminarily with such additions as are contemplated by
the Act, the rules, and the decisions of the courts below.

II
As we reaffirm today in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, ante, the principles
which govern our consideration of challenges to statutes
as violative of the Establishment Clause are three.
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v.
Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., at 612-613.
With full recognition that these are no more than helpful signposts, we consider the present statute and the
proposed transaction in terms of the three "tests": purpose, effect, and entanglement.
A
The purpose of the statute is manifestly a secular one.
The benefits of the Act are available to all institutions
of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not
having a religious affiliation. While a legislature's declaration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its.
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true intent, appellant makes no suggestion that the introductory paragraph of the Act represents anything
1 other than a good faith statement of purpose:

"It is hereby declared that for the benefit of the
people of the State, the increase of their commerce,
welfare and prosperity and the improvement of
their health and living conditions it is essential that
this and future generations of youth be given the
fullest opportunity to learn and to develop their
intellectual and mental capacities; ,that it is ·essential that institutions for higher education within
the State be provided with appropriate additional
means to assist such youth in achieving the required
levels of learning and development 'of their intellectual and mental capacities; and that it is the
purpose of this section to provide a measure of assistance and an alternative method to enable institutions for higher education in the State to provide the facilities and structures which are sorely
needed to accomplish the purposes of this act, all
to the public benefit and good, to the extent and
manner provided herein." S. C .. Code Ann. § 22.41
(Cum. Supp. 1971).
The College and other private institutions of higher
education provide these benefits to the State. 5 As ofthe
academic year 1969- 1970, there were 1,548 students
5 In Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), this Court
commented on the importance of the role of private education in
this country:
"Underlying these cases, and underlying also the legislative judgments that have preceded the court decisions, has been a recognition
that private education has played and is playing a significant and
valuable role in raising national levels of knowledge, competence, and
experience," 392 U. S., at 247.
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enrolled in the College, in addition to approximately 600
night students. Of these students, 95% are residents of
South Carolina who are thereby receiving a college education without financial support from the State of South
Carolina.
B
To identify "primary effect," we narrow our focus from
the statute as a whole to the only transaction presently
before us. Whatever may be its initial appeal, the proposition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any program which in some manner aids an institution with a
religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. E. g.,
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Tilton v. Richardson,
supra. Stated another way, the Court has not accepted
the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because
aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its
other resources on religious ends.
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect
of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in
which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion
of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or
when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting. In Tilton v. Richardson, supra, the Court refused to strike down a direct
federal grant to four colleges and universities in Connecticut. MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER, for the plurality,
concluded that despite some institutional rhetoric, none
of the four colleges was pervasively sectarian, but held
open that possibility for future cases:
"Individual projects can be properly evaluated if
and when challenges arise with respect to particular·
recipients and some evidence is then presented to
show that the institution does in fact possess these;
characteristics." 403 U. S., at 682,
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Appellant has introduced no evidence in the present
case placing the College in such a category. It is true
that the members of the College Board of Trustees are
elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention, that
the approval of the Convention is required for certain
financial transactions, and that the charter of the College
may be amended only by the Convention. But it was
likewise true of the institutions involved in Tilton that
they were "governed by Catholic religious organizations."
403 U. S., at 686. What little there is in the record concerning the College establishes that there are no religious qualifications for faculty membership or student
admission, and that only 60% of the College student body
is Baptist, a percentage roughly equivalent to the percentage of Baptists in that area of South Carolina.
255 S. C., at 85; 177 S. E. 2d, at 369. On the record in
this case there is no basis to conclude that the College's
operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian
rather than secular education.
Nor can we conclude that the proposed transaction
will place the Authority in the position of providing aid to
the religious as opposed to the secular activities of the
College. The scope of the Authority's power ·to assist
institutions of higher education extends only to "projects," and the Act specifically states that a project "shall
not include" any buildings or facilities used for religious
purposes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary,
we must assume that all of the proposed financing and
refinancing relates to buildings and facilities within a
properly delimited project. It is not at all clear from
the record that the portion of the campus to be conveyed
by the College to the Authority and leased back is the
same as that being financed, but in any event it too must
be part of the Project and subject to the same prohibition
against use for religious purposes. In addition, as we
have indicated, every lease agreement must contain a
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clause forbidding religious use and another allowing in~
spections to enforce the agreement.a For these reasons,
we are satisfied that implementation of the proposal will
not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion. 7
6

Appellant also takes issue with the Authority's rule allowing a
purchaser at an involuntary sale to take title free of restrictions as
to religious use. See n. 4, ante. Appellant's reliance on Tilton
v. Richardson, supra, in this respect is misplaced. There, the Court
struck down a provision under which the church-related colleges
would have unrestricted use of a federally financed project after
20 years. In the present case, by contrast, the restriction against
religious use is lifted not as to the institution seeking the assistance
of the Authority nor as to voluntary transferees, but only as to a
purchaser at a judicial sale. Because some other religious institution
bidding for the property at a judicial sale could purchase the property only by outbidding all other prospective purchasers, there is
only a speculative possibility that the absence of a use limitation
would ever afford aid to religion. Even in such an event, the
acquiring religious institution presumably would have had to pay
the then fair value of the property.
7 The "state aid" involved in this case is of a very special sort.
We have here no expenditure of public funds, either by grant or
loan, no reimbursement by a State for expenditures made by a
parochial school or college, and no extending or committing of a
State's credit. Rather, the only state aid consists, not of financial
assistance directly or indirectly which would implicate public funds
or credit, but the creation of an instrumentality (the Authority)
through which educational institutions may borrow funds on the
basis of their own credit and the security of their own property
upon more favorable interest terms than otherwise would be available. The Supreme Court of New Jersey characterized the assistance rendered an educational institution under an act generally
similar to the South Carolina Act as merely being a "governmental
service." Clayton v. Kervick, 56 N. J. 523, 530-531, 267 A. 2d
503, 506-507 (1970). The South Carolina Supreme Court, in the
opinion below, described the role of the State as that of a "mere
conduit." 258 S. C., at 107; 187 S. E. 2d, at 650. Because we
conclude that the primary effect of the assistance afforded here is
neither to advance nor to inhibit religion under Lemon and Tilton,
we need ·not decide whether, as appellee argues, Appellee's Brief, p,
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c
The final question posed by this case is whether under
the arrangement there would be an unconstitutional degree of entanglement between the State and the College.
Appellant argues that the Authority would become involved in the operation of the College both by inspecting
the project to insure that it is not being used for religious
purposes and by participating in the management decisions of the College.
The Court's opinion in Lemon and the plurality opinion in Tilton are grounded on the proposition that the
degree of entanglement arising from inspection of facilities as to use varies in large measure with the extent
to which religion permeates the institution. In finding
excessive entanglement, the Court in Lemon relied on
the "substantial religious character of these churchrelated" elementary schools. 403 U. S., at 616. MR.
CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER's opinion for the plurality in
.Tilton placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the
federal aid there approved would be spent in a college
setting:
"Since religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of these church-related colleges and universities, there is less likelihood than
in primary and secondary schools that religion will
permeate the area of secular education." 403 U. S.,
at 687.
Although MR. JusTICE WHITE saw no such clear distinction, he concurred in the result, stating:

"It is enough for me that ... the Federal Government [is] financing a separable function of over14, the importance of the tax exemption in the South Carolina
scheme brings the present case under Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra,
where this Court upheld a local property tax exemption which in-·
eluded religious institutiom'!,.·
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riding importance in order to sustain the legislation
here challenged." 403 U. S., at 664.
A majority of the Court in Tilton, then, concluded that
on the facts of that case inspection as to use did not
threaten excessive entanglement. As we have indicated
above, there is no evidence here to demonstrate that the
College is any more an instrument of religious indoctrination than were the colleges and universities involved in
Tilton. 8
A closer issue under our precedents is presented by
the contention that the Authority could become deeply
involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions
of the College. The Authority is empowered by the Act:
"(g) [g]enerally, to fix and revise from time to
time and charge and collect rates, rents, fees and
charges for the use of and for the services furnished
or to be furnished by a project or any portion thereof
and to contract with any person, partnership, association or corporation or other body public or private in respect thereof;
"(h) to establish rules and regulations for the use
of a project or any portion thereof and to designate
a participating institution for higher education as
its agent to establish rules and regulations for the
8 Although the record in this case is abbreviated and not free
from ambiguity, the burden rests on appellant to show the extent
to which the College is church-related, cf. Board of Education v.
Allen, supra, 392 U. S., at 248, and he has failed to show more·
than a formalistic church relationship. As Tilton established, formal denominational control over a liberal arts college does not
render all aid to the institution a violation of the Establishment
Clause. So far as the record here is concerned, there is no showing·
that the College places any special emphasis on Baptist denominational or any other sectarian type of education. As noted above,
both the faculty and the student body are open to persons of any(or no) religious affiliation,
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use of a project undertaken for such participating
institution for higher education .... " S. C. Code
Ann. § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
'These powers are sweeping ones, and were there a
realistic likelihood that they would be exercised in their
full detail, the entanglement problems with the pro.posed transaction would ·not be insignificant.
As the South Carolina Supreme Court pointed out,
the Act was patterned closely after the South Carolina
Industrial Revenue Bond Act, 258 S. C., at 107; 187
S. E. 2d, at 651, and perhaps for this reason appears to
confer unnecessarily broad power and responsibility on
the Authority. The opinion of that court, however, reflects a narrow interpretation of the practical operation
of these powers.
"Counsel for plaintiff argues that the broad language of the Act causes the State, of necessity, to
.become excessively involved in the operation, management and administration of the College. We do
not so construe the Act. . . . [T]he basic function
of the Authority is to see ... that fee8 are charged
sufficient to meet the bond payments." 258 S. C.,
at 108; 187 S. E. 2d, at 651.
As we read the College's proposal, the Lease Agreement
between the Authority and the College will place on the
College the responsibility for making the detailed decisions regarding the government of the campus and the
fees to be charged for particular services. Specifically,
the proposal states that the Lease Agreement
"will unconditionally obligate the College (a) to
pay sufficient rentals to meet the principal and interest requirements as they become due on such
bonds, [and] (b) to impose an adequate schedule of
charges and fees in order to provide adequate reV:e-
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nues with which to operate and maintain the said
facilities and to make the rental payments .. . ."
App., p. 18.
In short, under the proposed Lease Agreement, neither
the Authority nor a trustee bank would be justified in
taking action unless the College fails to make the prescribed rental payments or otherwise defaults in its
obligations. Only if the College refused to meet rental
payments or was unable to do so would the Authority
or the trustee be obligated to take further action. In
that event, the Authority or trustee might either fore,.
close on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting of
rules, charges, and fees. It may be argued that only
the former would be consistent with the Establishment
Clause, but we do not now have that situation before us.

III
This case comes to us as an action for injunctive and
declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of the
Act as applied to a proposed-rather than an actualissuance of revenue bonds. The specific provisions of
the Act under which the bonds will be issued, the Rules
and Regulations of the Authority, and the College's proposal-all as interpreted by the South Carolina Supreme
Court--confine the scope of the assistance to the secular
aspects of this liberal arts college and do not foreshadow
excessive entanglement between the State and religion.
Accordingly, we affirm the holding of the court below
that the Act is constitutional as interpreted and applied
in this caee.

